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First Union Lending, LLC Dennis Arroyo- Scammers Timur SHAMSUTDINOV Dennis Cage, Dennis Arroyo 4900 MILLENIA BLVD SUITE F ORLANDO, FL 32839 Telemarketing - extortionate threats Orlando Florida
I was illegally called by First Union Lending, LLC from Florida. 47 USC section 501 states that it is a federal crime to violate 47 USC 227(b)(1)(A) because it is "unlawful" to call a cellular phone on the DNC to sell whatever you are selling. Dennis Arroyo (aka dennis cage) did exactly that.
Telemarketing to cell phones on the DNC registry and threats by owner Dennis Arroyo I was actually threatened by Dennis who is one of the owners at First Union Lending LLC in Florida. I my opinion, this place is horrible. This company is on the verge of going out of business according to the owners. I was illegally telemarketed several times by First Union Lending LLC from Florida. It is a violation of 47 USC section 227 to cal my cell phone. After I complained, Dennis actually purchased a web domain with my name. www.beat......com with my first and last name. He threatened to have me arrested for complaining. All of this is verifiable separately. I have written emails from Dennis to prove this as well. I am willing to speak to the media about these abusive racketeers. I just own a phone.
I never had my right to peace and quite taken away. No matter who I am, I still have the right to be left alone. I have the right to not be threatened. I just own a phone. I put my number on the Do Not Call Registry. My number is not a business phone and it is not on the internet or on any business web page.
Your Desired Resolution:
Stop threatening me. Stop engaging in felony extortion by stating that you are going to harm me if I make a complaint about your illegal telemarketing. Send me your do not call policy. Stop hiring third world country lead sources to buy lists of numbers from. Make America great again by obeying the law.
Dennis stated to me in writing that he can contacted law enforment, his buddy LT in Florida as well as all the other telemarketers out there, and if I make this complaint, he is going to have me arrested in multiple states. That threat alone by Dennis is extortion under California penal codes 518-523.
In 2014, the 9th Circuit in Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 871, 878, regarding TCPA vicarious liability held:
“[t]his interpretation is consistent with that of the statute's implementing agency, which has repeatedly acknowledged the existence of vicarious liability under the TCPA. The Federal Communications Commission is expressly imbued with authority to "prescribe regulations to implement the requirements" of the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). As early as 1995, the FCC stated that "[c]alls placed by an agent of the telemarketer are treated as if the telemarketer itself placed the call." In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12397 (1995).
More recently, the FCC has clarified that vicarious liability is imposed "under federal common law principles of agency for violations of either section 227(b) or section 227(c) that are committed by third-party telemarketers." In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574, 6574 (2013). Because Congress has not spoken directly to this issue and because the FCC's interpretation was included in a fully adjudicated declaratory ruling, the interpretation must be afforded Chevron deference. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. a*s'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-85, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005)) (other citations omitted), aff'd, 550 U.S. 45, 127 S. Ct. 1513, 167 L. Ed. 2d 422 (2007)” See alsoRestatement (Third) of Agency (2006) §§ 2.01, 2.03, 4.01 (explaining that agency may be established by express authorization, implicit authorization, or ratification)."Lawyer Ethics
As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently explained in a TCPA case regarding calls to a non-debtor similar to this one:
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act...is well known for
its provisions limiting junk-fax transmissions. A less-litigated
part of the Act curtails the use of automated dialers and
prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often
are billed by the minute as soon as the call is answered--and
routing a call to voicemail counts as answering the call. An
automated call to a landline phone can be an annoyance; an
automated call to a cell phone adds expense to annoyance.
Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012).Craig v. County of Los Angeles (1990)
The FCC also recognized that “wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used.” In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115 ¶ 165 (2003).
Standing is proper under Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America because Plaintiff’s claims state:
A valid injury in fact;
which is traceable to the conduct of Defendants;
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.____(2016) at 6, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 560. In order to meet the standard laid out in Spokeo and Lujan, Plaintiffs must clearly allege facts demonstrating all three prongs above.
The “Injury in Fact” Prong.
Plaintiff’s injury, in fact, must be both “concrete” and “particularized” in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, as laid out in Spokeo (Id.). For an injury to be “concrete,” it must be a de facto injury, meaning that it actually exists. In the present case, Plaintiff was called on his cellular phone at least five (5) times by Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff expressly informed Defendants to cease and desist from all future telemarketing on the very first call. Such calls are a nuisance, an invasion of privacy, and an expense to Plaintiff in multiple ways. Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012). Defendant’s invasion of Plaintiff’s right to privacy is further exacerbated by the fact that Plaintiff’s phone number, at all times relevant to this litigation, was on the National Do-Not-Call Registry ( hereinafter, “DNC Registry”). As well, Plaintiff had no prior business relationship with Defendants prior to receiving the seriously harassing and annoying calls as well as the extortionate threats by Prosperify. All of Plaintiff’s injuries are concrete and de facto. For an injury to be “particularized” means that the injury must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___ (2016) at 14. In the instant case, it was Plaintiff’s phone that was called and it was Plaintiff himself who answered the calls. It was Plaintiff’s personal privacy and peace that was invaded by Defendant’s persistent phone calls using an ATDS and a pre-recoded message, despite Plaintiff having no prior business relationship with Defendants and Plaintiff’s attempt to avoid the damage by registering his number on the DNC Registry. Finally, Plaintiff alone is responsible to pay the bill on his cellular phone, his home phone and to pay the bill for his electric utility company kilowatt-hour power usage. All of these injuries are particularized and specific to Plaintiff and will be the same injuries suffered by Plaintiff.
The “Traceable to the Conduct of Defendants” Prong
The second prong required to establish standing at the pleadings phase is that Plaintiff must allege facts to show that his injury is traceable to the conduct of Defendants. In the instant case, this prong is met by the fact that the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone and home phone (land line) were placed either by Defendants directly, or by Defendants’ agent at the direction of Defendants.
The “Injury is Likely to be Redressed by a Favorable Judicial Opinion” Prong
The third prong to establish standing at the pleadings phase requires Plaintiff to allege facts to show that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial opinion. In the present case, Plaintiff’s Prayers for Relief include a request for damages for each call made by Defendants, as authorized by statute in 47 U.S.C. § 227. The statutory damages were set by Congress and specifically redress the financial damages suffered by Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Prayers for Relief request injunctive relief to restrain Defendants from the alleged abusive practices in the future. The award of monetary damages and the order for injunctive relief redress the injuries of the past and prevent further injury in the future. Because all standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution have been met, as laid out in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendants on the stated claims.
“…[C]ourts in the Ninth Circuit have held that "allegations of nuisance and invasions of privacy in TCPA actions are concrete" injuries that establish standing. See Mbazomo v. ETourandtravel, Inc., 16-CV-2229-SB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170186, 2016 WL 7165693, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016); Cabiness v. Educ. Fin. Sols., LLC, 16-CV-1109-JST, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142005, 2016 WL 5791411, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); Juarez v. Citibank, N.A., No. 16-CV-1984-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118483, 2016 WL 4547914, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); Hewlett v. Consolidated World Travel, Inc., 16-713 WBS AC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112553, 2016 WL 4466536, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016); Cour v. Life360, Inc., 16-CV-00805-TEH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98945, 2016 WL 4039279, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016); Booth v. Appstack, Inc., No. 13-1553JLR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68886, 2016 WL 3030256, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016). In Mbazamo, the court held that a violation of the TCPA represents a concrete injury because "[t]he history of sustaining claims against both unwelcome intrusion into a plaintiff's seclusion and unceasing debt-collector harassment are squarely 'harm[s] that [have] traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit.'" Mbazomo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170186, 2016 WL 7165693, at *2 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549-50). The court declined to follow Romero, explaining that Romero "improperly erodes the pleading standard set under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) . . . . A plaintiff [need only] plausibly tie the alleged acts of the defendant to the alleged harms suffered." Id.
Similarly, in Cabiness, the court held that a violation of the TCPA represents a concrete injury because "[e]every unconsented call through the use of an ATDS to a consumer's cellular phone results in actual harm: the recipient wastes her time and incurs charges for the call if she answers the phone, and her cell phone's battery is depleted even if she does not answer the phone . . . . unsolicited calls also cause intangible harm by annoying the consumer." Cabiness, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142005, 2016 WL 5791411, at *5 (internal citations omitted). And in Juarez, the court held that the plaintiff's allegation "that he received repeated unwanted calls that caused him aggravation, nuisance, and an invasion of privacy, is sufficient to allege a 'concrete' and 'particularized' injury that establishes standing under Spokeo." Juarez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118483, 2016 WL 4547914, at *3.
Messerlian v. Rentokil N. Am., Inc. (C.D.Cal. Dec. 15, 2016, No. CV 16-6941-GW (GJSx)) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 175224, at *7-8.
“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The Supreme Court noted that concreteness is quite distinct from particularization. Id. An injury is “particularized” if it affects “the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. In addition, for an injury to be “concrete”, it must be “de facto,” meaning that it is “real” and not “abstract.” Id. However, an injury need not be “tangible” in order to be “concrete,” and intangible injuries may constitute injury in fact. Id. at 1549. In order to determine whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, Spokeo provided two factors to be considered: “history and the judgment of Congress.” Id. at 1549. Specifically, “(1) whether the statutory violation bears a ‘close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,’ and (2) congressional judgment in establishing the statutory right, including whether the statutory right is substantive or procedural.” Matera v. Google, No. 15cv 4062-LHK, 2016 WL 5339806, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016). Spokeo also held that “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. In such a case, a plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one [the legislature] has identified.” Id.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A Complaint may survive a Motion to Dismiss if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a Motion to Dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the Plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). The court must evaluate lack of statutory standing under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and must be “liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (reaffirming standard reviewing pro se complaints post-Twombly). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the court's treatment of pro se filings after Twombly and Iqbal remain the same and pro se pleadings must continue to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640-42 (7th Cir. 2010); Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2010); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even following Twombly and Iqbal, “we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
18 USC 1346
As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).” Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 106 [97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 261].
“The plausibility standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the defendant’s liability.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)—which has authority to implement the TCPA’s provisions, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)— has stated that a plaintiff, to establish a TCPA violation, “need only show that [the Defendant] called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice.” Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 564 (F.C.C. 2008)).DoNotCall.gov
Civil Code 1708.7
PC 633.5
Importantly, “prior express consent is an affirmative defense, not an element of the claim,” meaning a plaintiff “need not plead that he did not give his prior express consent.” Manfred v. Bennett Law, PLLC, No. 12–CV–61548, 2012 WL 6102071, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012). Rather, “[t]he only thing [a] [p]laintiff must plead to establish a violation of the TCPA is that the [d]efendants left voicemail messages at a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded voice.” Id. (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff alleged “that [the] [d]efendants used an Automatic Telephone Dialing System or an artificial or pre-recorded voice to place the telephone calls to [the] [p]laintiff’s cellular phone.”).
The FCC regulations also “generally establish that the party on whose behalf a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for any violations.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 92-90, Memorandum and Order, 10 F.C.C. Rcd. 12391, 12397 ¶ 13 (1995). 13. The FCC confirmed this principle in 2013, when it explained that “a seller …. may be held vicariously liable under federal common law principles of agency for violations of either section 227(b) or section 227(c) that are committed by third-party telemarketers.” See In the Matter of the Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6574 (2013).Domain White Pages
CA SOS
47 C.F.R. 64.1200(c)(2) prohibits calling any number on the national Do-Not-Call Registry. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) states that no person or entity may initiate any commercial purpose telephone call to any cellular telephone that is already on the national Do-Not-Call Registry. 18 USC 1964
PC 637.2
18 USC 1343
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4 Updates & Rebuttals
Anton
Rancho Santa Fe,California,
United States
Dennis Arroyo gets sued again for Racketeering based on extortion
#5Author of original report
Wed, June 13, 2018
Dennis Arroyo has a lengthy criminal record in Orlando, Florida.
[1] Pristine Nature, LLC is the agent for service of process for First Union Lending, LLC.
[1] Any person who willfully and knowingly does or causes or suffers to be done any act, matter, or thing, in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or who willfully and knowingly omits or fails to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, or willfully and knowingly causes or suffers such omission or failure, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for such offense, for which no penalty (other than a forfeiture) is provided in this chapter, by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both.
Dennis
Orlando,Florida,
United States
Cease and Desist Spreading Lies About this Company.
#5REBUTTAL Owner of company
Wed, June 13, 2018
Mr. Ewing
All unfounded, groundless lies and made up. If there is any proof, please provide it.
In the meantime.........
Anton Ewing was indicted by a Grand Jury in February 2009 and arrested by the FBI on April 9, 2009 as part of a $100 million mortgage fraud case:
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/…/Feds-Gang-Member-Ran-100M-Mort…
In addition to his FBI arrest, he was arrested again later in April 2009 on charges of stalking and writing threatening letters with the intention to extort. His bail was set at $750,000. On November 6, 2009, he was arrested a third time, again on charges of stalking and writing threatening letters with the intention to extort. This time his bail was set at $2,000,000.
These arrests can be verified by requesting information from:netwebmaster@sdsheriff.org
Booking number: 9728892 (April arrest)
Booking number: 9786348 (November arrest)
Last Name: EWING First Name: ANTON for both
Anton Ewing was incarcerated for several years. He was released from jail in 2011.
Anton
Rancho Santa Fe,United States
18cv1212
#5Author of original report
Tue, June 12, 2018
Arroyo purchased a list of unscrubbed leads from a company in the Philippines. The Philippine company initially called Plaintiff with an ATDS robo-dialer and recorded the call without warning. That is lawsuit number 18cv1063 now pending in federal district court where Ewing is suing Defendant First Union for those calls. Then Arroyo had his employee Tanya make another telemarketing call to Plaintiff. Then Arroyo had another employee, Hans Becke, call Plaintiff again for telemarketing. Thereafter Arroyo and Plaintiff had a very pleasant conversation on the phone about his telemarketing activities. The entire call was recorded by Plaintiff and at the very beginning of the call it states that all calls are recorded. Then Arroyo purchases www.beatantonewing.com and send a nasty, extortionate email. About a month later, Arroyo proceeds to send voluminous emails and text messages threatening to accuse Plaintiff of a crime if Plaintiff does not give up his private property rights and dismiss lawsuit 18cv1063.
“Director of Underwriting,” called from 352-405-5020. Dennis Arroyo who is a member, manager, owner, and officer of First Union Lending admitted that First Union Lending called and that they record calls. First Union Lending confirmed that they hired a company outside the United States to make telemarketing calls to persons within the United States and record answers to various financial questions that First Union Lending required them to ask. First Union Lending has thus directed and controlled the outside telemarketing lead broker in such a manner as to deem them the agent of First Union Lending. This is in addition to the illegal calls that First Union Lending initiated after the off-shore entity used an ATDS to illegally call Plaintiff.
First Union
Orlando,Florida,
United States
Dear Mr. Ewing
#5REBUTTAL Owner of company
Tue, June 12, 2018
I'm happy to see that you are rattled enough now to spend all day and night coming up with stuff to post on every online venue possible.
Anton Ewing is a Vexatious Litigator, two time felon, ex-convict who has spent time in prison for harrasment, during telemarketing. Imagine that! You can search Anton Ewing right here on Rip Off report and see the long laundry list of of complaints against him. He has been charged on numerous occasions with domestic violence, so yeah. A real stand up type of guy.
His MO is simple, he creates fake businesses and puts his phone number online. Phone numbers registered to businsess are not off limits. He gives the lead generator who contacted him permission to have a lender contact him. When the lender contacts him, he begins his extortion campaign.
A little easy reading... diegoreader.com/news/2015/aug/21/ticker-ex-cpa-anton-ewing-visits-court/
Anton contacts companies and extorts them by threatening lawsuits against them with all of his fancy legal knowledge ( as you can tell by all the cases he has mentioned in this complaint against us).
Unfortunately for Anton, this time he chose to extort the wrong company. Especially since we haven't broken a single law and while we do understand that Anton assumes he is accuser, judge and exectutioner, he cannot legally say we broke any laws (but he is, right here in post, which is lible and will play in nicely to our class action suit against Mr. Ewing) in fact we are currently working our case against him.
We have in fact reported Mr. Ewing to the local authorities in Florida and California for various crimes, including extortion. We also did in fact buy a domain named beatantonewing.com because after we beat his attempted extortion, sue him for damages, see him put back in prison for extortion, we will then let everyone out there know exactly how to deal with him. In fact, we will get domain authority and any time anyone ever runs into this con artist (in my opinion) and searches his name online, they will find our website with all the info needed to put this dog down.
Mr. Ewing is a gross waste of your tax payer dollars because he uses the court to extort people, but can claim poorness and so the thousands of dollars it costs to have a court case are bourne by the State of California. Californians always complain about the high taxes.. well, here is how to begin to stop that. Stop Felons like Anton Ewing.
We have also filed reports with the California Att General, Florida Att General, FBI, and others. Anton has become accustomed to beating people into submission with his tough talk and gets most businesses to settle out of court with him. He has gotten used to this, he has become brazen and crossed the line because no one has stopped him. First Union WILL stop him. If anyone has any issues with Mr. Ewing, don't hesitate to give us a call and see how we can help you.
Thanks
These statements are all opinions of First Union (this snake will try to use anything to get us to pay his rent, but we won't be doing that. In fact, we will help send him on an all inclusive vacation back to the penitentiary he belongs in) Disclaimer