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  • Report:  #1466511

Complaint Review: Georgia Supreme Court

Georgia Supreme Court Justices Illegally, Wrongfully and Fraudulently Disbarred Atlanta Attorney Sam Levine Atlanta Georgia

  • Reported By:
    Sam Levine, Atlanta Attorney — ATLANTA GA - Georgia United States
  • Submitted:
    Sat, November 03, 2018
  • Updated:
    Mon, November 05, 2018

The Georgia Supreme Court improperly and unethically disbarred me on March 5, 2018 based on false representations, false claims, material omissions, lack of evidence and denial of my right to a jury trial and due process under the 7th Amendment and Georgia codes O.C.G.A. 9-11-38, which states that "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution of the state or as given by a statute of the state shall be preserved to the parties inviolate" and O.C.G.A. 15-19-32, which states that "The rules and regulations governing the unified state bar shall provide that before a final order of any nature or any judgment of disbarment is entered the attorney involved may elect to have any material issues of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the county of his residence".

The Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court who unanimolusly voted to disbar me are Harold Melton, Carol W. Huntstein, David Nahmias, Robert Benham, Michael P. Boggs, Nels SD Peterson, Keith R. Blackwell, P. Harris Hines and Britt C. Grant

In the 13 Page Disbarment Order with One Exhibit Page, the Georgia Supreme Court Justices made statements that are materially, factually and objectively false and which they have full knowledge of their falsity and therefore constitute and amount to fraud on the court.  Below are the false statements and/or omissions and my response/rebuttal to each one:

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 1 - I neglected matters involving two (2) clients.

REBUTTAL- I did not neglect any client matters and any client neglect would have been and was characterized as "excusable neglect" because while going through my divorce and at a time that I was financially dependent on my former spouse, the judge in my divorce case refused to give me attorney fees to hire an attorney to represent me (while my former spouse was fully represented) and also refused to award me financial support so that I could pay my personal and business bills, which in turn overwhelmed and burdened me financially and emotionally and interfered with my law practice and business operations.  In addition, the State Bar of Georgia not only lacked probable cause to initiate the bar disciplinary proceedings, but they fell way short of proving by clear and convincing evidence that I neglected any clients. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 2 - I engaged in misconduct during my divorce.

REBUTTAL– The state bar produced no evidence whatsover that I engaged in any misconduct in my divorce and all actions I took were constitutionally and legally protected, were justified, warranted, permitted by law, in furtherance of my attorney oath to support and defend the constitution and in furtherance of my first amendment right to seek redress for grievances related to prejudicial rulings by the court during my divorce case.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 3 – I filed an indefinite leave of absence.

REBUTTAL– My leave of absence was not for an “indefinite stay” of the bar case, nor was it filed for any improper or nefarious purpose, filed in bad faith, violative of the bar rules or amount to litigation misconduct. Rather, the reason that I filed a leave of absence, which was not indefinite, was in order to provide him relief from overwhelming stress, undue burdens and hardship brought on from non-stop and continuous divorce, impending foreclosure,          bankruptcy filings, bar case litigation and to relieve me from my obligation to appear in court in order to catch up on past work and to attend to other responsibilities as the divorce, bar cases and financial crises monopolized a significant period of Respondent’s time and were affecting Respondent’s health.  There is no prohibition against a lawyer using time away from the practice of law to catch up on work. Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule 16.2. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 4 - I did not file a motion to stay discovery.

REBUTTAL– This statement is completely false.  I made numerous informal and formal attempts, all documented in writing, to stay discovery and the case, but they were ignored.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 5 – The Bar was justified and entitled to file a motion for sanctions against me for failing to respond to the Bar’s discovery.

REBUTTAL– No, the Bar was not.  First, on November 15, 2017, I emailed the Special Master (at the time), Marc Forsling, requesting a stay of the bar disciplinary proceedings to deal with and attend to numerous financial emergencies, including foreclosure and bankruptcy, which was never acted upon.  Second, the newly appointed Special Master, Patrick Head’s notice dated February 17, 2017 of the original hearing date of the sanctions hearing was March 3, 2017, some 96 hours before my home was due to be foreclosed and which actually was on March 7, 2017 leaving me to deal with numerous matters in response to the foreclosure.  Third, two days later on February 19, 2017, Respondent emailed and mailed the Special Master notifying him that the notice of the sanctions hearing was defective as Respondent was not given 20 days’ notice as required under U.S.C.R. 8.3. and that I had previously filed a leave of absence to include March 3, 2017-March 30, 2017 during both dates that the Special Master had scheduled the sanctions hearing to take place (March 3, 2017 & March 30, 2017. Fourth, rather than the Special Master stay the disciplinary proceedings under Bar Disciplinary Rule 4-211(5), knowing full well that I was in the midst and grips of numerous financial emergencies, including the foreclosure of my home and other pressing and time-sensitive matters, he instead decided to re-schedule the hearing for March 30, 2017. Fifth, on March 30, 2017, Respondent emailed the Special Master that it was improper for a sanctions hearing on the discovery matter to be held since Bar Counsel had not yet sent Respondent a 6.4 letter, that I felt he (Special Master Patrick Head and Bar Counsel) were disqualified as a matter of law and re-stated my preoccupation with numerous emergencies requiring my immediiate attention and that Respondent would not be able to attend the hearing, which I was not required to do anyway because of my leave of absence filed on December 31, 2017. Sixth, the Bar was not justified or entitled to file a motion for sanctions and the Special Master abused and exceeded his authority in granting it because the Bar did not first exhaust informal and priority formal efforts to obtain the discovery responses from me by 1) emailing, calling or writing me to obtain the responses, 2) sending me a U.S.C.R. 6.4 good faith letter or 3) file a motion to compel.  The fraudulent disbarment order omits and and fails to state that I was in the midst of numerous financial crises. (see Georgia Civil Practice Act, U.S.C.R. 6.4 & O.C.G.A. 9-11-37), Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009). Seventh, the Bar filed the motion for sanctions to begin with in retaliation for Respondent filing bar complaints against both Bar Counsel and John Newberry, the appointed Investigative Panel Member assigned to investigate the bar cases, thereby violating the Ant-slapp law and the Georgia Bar’s policy against retaliation and conflict of interest. O.C.G.A. 9-11-11.1, Ga. Bar Standing Pol. 600, Ga. Bar Standing Policy 900 and Bar Rule 1.7.

Moreover, in cases of discovery disputes, it is routine for the judicial official, in this case, the Special Master, to issue an order requiring the response to discovery by a certain date and then and only if there is still no response AND there is a finding of wilfullness AFTER a hearing, then it would not be an abuse of discretion for the judicial official to issue a sanctions order without first exercising his power and authority to first issue an order compelling me to respond to the discovery under Bar Disciplinary Rule 4-210 (11). Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009). Eighth, the order omits and fails to state that I was in the midst of numerous financial crises, including disconnection of utilities, foreclosure proceedings, active and pending lawsuits related to foreclosure, his divorce case and had made repeated efforts to get Bar Counsel to consent to a stay of discovery, even though State Bar’s routinely grant stays of bar disciplinary proceedings for attorneys going through divorce as in Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Gordon Ayer, Esq., Maine Sup. Ct. (2008).

The Special Master failed to act on any of my repeated requests for a stay of the discovery proceedings for cause and which Bar Counsel also opposed.        Moreover, following my filing of one or more motions to stay discovery, the Special Master completely ignored them and did not rule on them or any other motion that I filed during the proceedings as required under O.C.G.A. 15-6-21.    Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb    County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 6 – The Special Master was justified in holding a earing on sanctions under the circumstances.

REBUTTAL– See Rebuttal to Assertion No. 5.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 7 – My failure to respond to the Bar’s discovery was willful.

REBUTTAL– My failure to respond to the Bar’s was not only not willful, but the Special Master neglected to conduct a hearing on the issue of       willfulness in accordance with (see Georgia Civil Practice Act, U.S.C.R. 6.4 & O.C.G.A. 9-11-37), Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 8 – The Special Master’s Findings of Fact in his Report and Recommendation were based on actual, verifiable, admissible and confirmed    information.

REBUTTAL– The facts and information in the Special Master’s findings of facts do not reflect nor are they based on hearsay and not on confirmed facts,      corroborated information or the truth.    

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 9 – My non-appearance at the sanctions hearing resulted in his “default” of all claims of misconduct by the Bar.

REBUTTAL– Courts have repeatedly held that a judgment granting sanctions, cannot operate in the form of or in the nature of a default. Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009). 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 10 – Respondent was retained to file answers to the five (5) student loan lawsuits in the Mattson matter;

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. If this were true, I would have charged substantially more money than $1,750 to represent Mattson in defense of (5) lawsuits.  (Had I not been denied financial resources by the court and not been distracted by his divorce case, being forced to represent myself in my divorce case and not had to deal with the numerous financial emergencies, I would have given my client sufficient time in advance of the due date to secure another attorney to handle the litigation as it was never my intent nor the agreement between my client and I that I was retained to handle the litigation as reflected in my attorney retainer agreement.  Moreover, I was hired to handle just the attempts to negotiate the settlement of the lawsuit before the answer(s) were due.  This was the first filing deadline issue that I had ever had while practicing law and would not have occurred but for the chaos and stress unnecessarily created during my divorce.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 11 – My client, Mattson, was harmed by the default judgment entered against him and the garnishment and by the garnishment of his wages.

REBUTTAL – My client was not harmed by the default judgment  as it was later vacated for excusable neglect and good cause.  In addition, the wage garnishment order entered against Mattson was not only deemed by a federal court to be deemed unconstitutional, but it too was later set aside with the court siting excusable neglect, which in turn judicially estops the Bar or Georgia Supreme Court from alleging or finding "neglect" on my part.

Furthermore, during my divorce case and before the deadline to file an answer to the student loan lawsuits, I made it a point to ask for temporary financial support from the court, including specifically for legal malpractice insurance, but the court denied my request. Sonia Levine v. Sam Levine, Dekalb County Superior Court, CAFN: 14CV1064.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 12 - I misled my client about his actions and lied to him about getting an extension of time to file an answer.

REBUTTAL – I did not mislead his client about anything having to do with getting an extension of time to answer the lawsuit. Not only does the email  exchange between opposing counsel and myself documents my efforts to negotiate an extension of time to file an answer, but I also took a polygraph test  confirming that he neither lied to his client or the bar about anything related to attempting to negotiate an extension of time to file an answer.    

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 13 - During my representation of my client Brahima Traore, I dismissed the case without prejudice.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue. Traore’s previous attorney, Michael Neff, dismissed the case without prejudice, not me.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 14 - I did very little work on and neglected the BrahimaTraore case.

REBUTTAL– This is untrue. I actually did a substantial amount of work even in light of my repeated requests to the divorce court for temporary support for both my personal and business reasons. In addition, I made significant and substantial efforts to retain lead counsel to assist in getting the case ready for trial.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 15 - I filed a motion for continuance the day of the pretrial hearing.

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. I actually filed a motion for continuance at least one week prior to the pre-trial hearing.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 16 - I admitted that I was unprepared to try the case.

REBUTTAL- This is statement is misleading and deceptive as I had previously approached another attorney to be lead counsel in the case and at the hearing, I discovered for the first time, three days before trial, that this other attorney declined to be lead counsel.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 17 - I stated in a written letter to Judge Diane Bessen of Fulton County State Court that I had a conflict with another case.

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. I repeated Judge Bessen’s law clerk’s statement during the pre-trial hearing that because of the other attorney's decision not to be lead counsel and the predicament that it left me in operated as a conflict. In no case did I act unethically, engage in abusive litigation or lie about anything whatsoever related to substantive or procedural matters involving the Traore case.  Also, in the bar complaint against me filed by Judge Bessen, and written by her law clerk, Wynn Sowersby, Ms. Sowersby in the letter based the frivolous bar complaint against me on the fact that I brought my service dog with me to the court for the pre-trial hearing.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 18 - I refused to abide by his client’s wishes regarding lead counsel.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue. During the pre-trial hearing, Judge Bessen instructed me to secure lead counsel, which I did within hours and which is confirmed by my client, Brahima Traore. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 19 - It was only until Respondent secured lead counsel, that any progress in terms of settlement offers were obtained.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue. I submitted a settlement demand to the insurance company who responded with a settlement offer of one-hundred      thousand ($100,000) dollars, which was rejected by my client, which led to the filing of a lawsuit.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 20 -  During my divorce, my former spouse was awarded various items of property, including the family dog.

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. First, despite my "Domestic Relations Financial Affidavit" showing that I made substantially less money than my former spouse and other facts and evidence showing that I was financially dependent on my former spouse, Judge Clarence Seeliger of Dekalb County Superior Court denied my repeated requests for temporary support and told me in open court that because of the fact that I was a man (male), I did not need financial support even though I was experienced documented crippling and paralytic financial problems and inability to pay my personal and business bills because I  did not have any money. Sonia Levine v. Sam Levine, Dekalb County Superior Court, CAFN: 14CV1064.

Second, Respondent’s former spouse was awarded one-hundred (100%) percent of the personal property, the family dog (even though by the time that the court had issued a final divorce decree, the family dog had become a documented service dog prescribed by Respondent’s doctor) and one one-hundred (100%) percent of the debt, including credit card, unpaid bills when I was abandoned, IRS tax debt and Georgia Tax debt. Third, the divorce court failed to equitably divide the personal property as required by O.C.G.A. 19-5-13. Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765(3), 273 S.E.2d 169 (1980), Hendrix v. Hendrix, 224 Ga. 662, 163 S.E.2d 917 (1968), Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 462, 339 S.E.2d 591 (1986) and Schwartz v. Schwartz, 561 S.E.2d 96 275 Ga. 107 (2002).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 21 - I was unjustified in challenging the divorce decree.

REBUTTAL– Wrong.  The divorce decree was, is and remains void under O.C.G.A. 9-12-16 and subject to collateral set aside under O.C.G.A. 9-11-60(a). for procedural errors, fraud on the court, denial of due process, equal protection, right to jury trial  pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-38, other constitutional violations, undisclosed political campaign contributions from opposing counsel (David Givelber) and his former law firm (Lawler, Green, Givelber & Prinz), awarded attorney fees without a hearing or any documentation to Respondent, and numerous other acts prejudicial to the administration of justice, including the court's failure to provide temporary financial support to me, failure to equitably divide the personal property and induced economic injuries to me.  Therefore, at all times, I was justified in deeming the divorce decree as void under O.C.G.A. 9-12-16.

Second, I, as someone with documented disabilities, could not be reasonably expected to surrender my medically necessary service dog and for the court to disregard Respondent’s disabilities and multiple ADA requests, was a gross abuse of discretion. Third, given that I  was denied temporary financial support, in financial distress, experiencing disconnection of multiple utilities, I was justified and entitled under those circumstances to maintain possession of the property for the purpose of liquidating it and applying the proceeds to living expenses as the court denied my original and repeated requests for such support.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 22 - My dog was not a medically necessary service dog.

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. My dog became a medically necessary emotional support animal following a written prescription from my treating medical doctor. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 23 – I do not have standing or legal status to make requests for reasonable accommodations under ADA.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue. Going as far back as 1997, I have received accommodations for his disabilities, including from the Georgia Supreme Court’s Office of Bar Admission on multiple occasions.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 24 - I filed meritless lawsuits against two federal judges, a meritless discrimination complaint against one of the judges in my divorce case, sent a threatening letter to the two judges, violated a bar rule when I copied the letter on various federal regulatory officials who receive and process complaints against government officials, alleging that they committed various crimes, etc., filed meritless lawsuits and police complaints against my brother, criminal warrants against my former spouse, meritless temporary protective orders and a separate civil action against my former spouse.

REBUTTAL– As a direct and proximate result of my 1) being subjected to massive legal, psychological, economic and financial abuse, violations of my constitutional rights during my divorce case, including multiple constitutional torts being committed upon me, 2) violation of Judge Courtney Johnson’s court order by my estranged sibling, Kenneth Levine, also an attorney, to maintain possession of my service dog until I could come pick him up, which violated O.C.G.A. 10-6-21 and Bar Rule 1.15, which he failed to do while my Power of Attorney. 3) There was also collusion and conspiracy to convert Respondent’s service dog by and between Respondent’s sibling (Kenneth Levine) , his wife (Stacey Gandell Levine), former spouse (Sonia Levine) and her attorney David Givelber to not only deprive me of my service dog, but to then extort, against the court’s order and wishes, over $60,000 in attorney fees that under duress, I agreed to pay his my former spouse. I was justified and within my right to file the complaints and lawsuits under his first amendment right to seek redress of grievances as well as under my oath as an attorney to support and defend the constitution, and O.C.G.A. 51-5-7.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 25 - My being held in contempt by Judge Courtney Johnson and incarcerated for three (3) weeks was warranted and justified.

REBUTTAL– First, according to the court docket, the attempted notice of the contempt hearing was sent back to the clerk’s office undelivered even though I have lived at the same address for 12 years at the time.  Second. I filed an affidavit of inability to purge following the order of contempt. Third, I was denied my right to counsel in the contempt action.Fourth, I was denied an attorney once incarcerated. Fifth, I offered to purge the contempt during the first hearing five days after first being incarcerated, but was kept and remained incarcerated anyway violating Georgia law. Fifth, I was incarcerated not for twenty (20) days, but for 26 days violating O.C.G.A. 15-6-28(5).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 26 - As a condition of my release, my mother, Carol Levine, also a lawyer, requested a provision for a psychiatric be incorporated into the consent order.

REBUTTAL- This is untrue. A psychological evaluation was never discussed or contemplated as being a part of or incorporated in the consent motion, which is documented in writing, including an email. It was only through fraud, deception and trickery that a psychological evaluation was included in the consent order and it occurred while I was incarcerated and was asked by my mother acting in the capacity as attorney, who informally asked me if I would agree to get a psychological evaluation after I was released, but at no time did I agree for an evaluation to be a part of the order or for undergoing a psychological evaluation to be a condition of release, which can also be confirmed through Judge Courtney Johnson's former law clerk, David Abercrombie.  When I told my estranged mother that I would undergo an evaluation, I was completely unaware of her attempts to keep me incarcerated or to include an evaluation as part of the consent order as I would have never under any circumstances agreed to that. In my estranged mother doing the above in her capacity as an attorney, she acted against my interests and violated multiple rules of professional conduct.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 27 - That under Bar Rule 4-102(D), I violated bar rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4, 8.1 and 8.4(a)(4).

REBUTTAL– I did not violate any of these rules, nor did probable cause ever exist to support the claim that I violated any of these rules and the bar failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that I violated any of these rules. Furthermore, prior to, during and throughout the bar disciplinary proceedings, despite the burden of proof being on the State Bar and not myself, I rebutted every allegation through documentary evidence, letters from doctors, records from my client’s cases, affidavits and other materials that I did not violate any of the bar rules that I am alleged to have violated.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 28 -  The ABA Disciplinary Standards, including mitigating or aggravating factors, apply to Respondent’s cases and support or warrant disbarment.

REBUTTAL - Without sufficient probable cause and proving by burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated any of the above bar rules, the ABA Standards for imposing lawyer sanctions, mitigating or aggravating factors, are not pertinent, material or relevant.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 29 - My personal or emotional problems impair his ability and make unfit to practice law.

REBUTTAL - I produced a letter to the Bar and the Georgia Supreme Court from my treating medical doctor dated June 29, 2017 certifying that I am fit to practice law, have no cognitive impairments and am not a danger to myself, my clients or to the administration of justice. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 30 -  I offered no medical evidence to document my disabilities.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue. I produced letters from two (2) different doctors, one medical and one psychologist who have treated or seen me and that verify that I have disabilities. I also produced other documentation to the State Bar and the Georgia Supreme Court that show, demonstrate and confirm that I have disabilities. The Office of Bar Admissions, which is part of the Georgia Supreme Court, also granted Respondent ADA accommodation on at least two different occasions in the late 90’s (97-99).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 31 - I committed misconduct, demonstrated a selfish motive, engaged in an extensive pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, engaged in bad faith obstruction of the bar proceedings, lied to the Bar, refused to cooperate with the bar rule governing disciplinary proceedings, engaged in deceptive practices and refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of my conduct.

REBUTTAL - All are untrue. First, I am not the type of person alleged by the Bar to be. I pride myself on my character and integrity  and would never do any of the things that he is alleged to have done. Second, the Bar lacked probable cause from the beginning the case to support their claim that I engaged in any misconduct or violated any bar rules.  Third, the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that I did any of the above inFraudulent Statement/Omission & Accusation No. 31. Fourth, the polygraph test results, which the Georgia Supreme Court has, show that I did not lie to my client or the Bar. In Re Sam Louis Levine, Ga. Sup. Ct. Case Docket No. SY180348.  With respect to the bar disciplinary procedures, I provided ample documentation to the bar and court showing that I  was in financial turmoil land panic and even if he wanted to form the requisite mens rea required for the allegations asserted by the Bar, it would have been impossible for him to do so because of the constant and continuous stress, burdens and distractions thrust upon him during his divorce case, foreclosure, bankruptcy, etc.

In addition, I do not have an issue or problem with accepting responsibility for my actions, but in the case of the Mattson matter case where I made a human mistake while juggling way too many matters at the  same time after having requested and been denied attorney fees in my divorce case for representation, I not only refunded all of the money my client paid me, but I also included interest and sent letters of apology with each payment to my former client. That said, it is not within my value system to accept responsibility for something or admit to something that I did not do.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 32 - My disciplinary history includes a letter of admonition in 2009.

REBUTTAL – I acknowledges his prior disciplinary history. The matter in 2009 did not involve any act of dishonesty, no bad intent and no harm occurred to anyone. That said, Bar Counsel included this history in the original bar complaint and this information was made available to both disciplinary panels in violation of ABA Model Attorney Disciplinary Rule 11(5).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 33 – I suffer from want of a sound mind such that he would be subject to removal from the practice of law based on State Bar Rule 4-104(a).

REBUTTAL– This is untrue. As stated above, I produced a letter to the Bar and the Georgia Supreme Court from my treating medical doctor dated June 29, 2017 certifying that I am fit to practice law, have no cognitive impairments and am not a danger to myself, my clients or to the administration of justice.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 34 -  The Review Panel did not exceed their authority and acted within its’ power to issue a report and recommendation of disbarment adopting the Special Master’s Report & Recommendation.

REBUTTAL - The Review Panel did in fact exceed their authority in their issuance of their report by1) ignoring my multiple challenges to objectivity and qualifications of the Review Panel Members, 2) failing to rule on my  multiple challenges to objectivity and qualifications of the Review Panel Members, 3) Including Review Panel Members with conflicts of interest in  the decision made by the Panel,  4) doing so without a quorum and 5) By not issuing their recommendation subject to my right to a jury trial as specifically and expressly provided for under O.C.G.A. 15-19-32.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 35 -  I violated the Page Limit provision of Ga. Supr. Court Rule 49 nor were his filings that were illegible.

REBUTTAL - I may have inadvertently violated Georgia Supreme Court Rule 49 as either as to his Motion to Recuse/Disqualify the Georgia Supreme Court Justices, his renewed Motion to Recuse/Disqualify the Georgia Supreme Court Justices, his Motions to Dismiss or his multiple objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Review Panel to the extent that Georgia Supreme Court Rule 49 is superseded by the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and because of the fact that there are three separate cases and while the Special Master may consolidate the cases into one, it does not deprive nor can it legally deny meof my ablity to exercise and utilize the full amount of the 50 page limit for each case, especially and particularly in light of the fact the cases were originally filed separate cases were filed separately.

Even if there was an inadvertent page limit violation as to my motion to recuse/disqualify the Georgia Supreme Court justices, any violation on my part as to such page limits, does not discharge the justices of their obligation to recuse/disqualify themselves, particularly in light of the political campaign contributions that at least half of the justices received from the coordinating special master, Bryan Cavan and Review Panel Chairman, Anthony Askew.

Also, any inadvertent violation of Rule 49, does not amount to or constitute a waiver of the argument of or a judge’s obligation under Judicial Canon 3(e)(1) to recuse or to  consider themselves or recused/disqualified from presiding over the case in question when it is evident that they should recuse or consider themselves disqualified. Hargis v. State, 735 SE 2d 91, Ga. Ct. App. (2012). Pursuant to Judicial Canon 2.11 governing disqualification and recusal as well as Judicial Canons 1.1, 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3 governing compliance with the law, promotion of confidence in the judiciary, impartiality and fairness and bias and prejudice, automatic disqualification is not discretionary.The justices failed in their responsibility and obligation to recuse themselves.

The justices reference or claim of illegibility of one of my filings is a red herring.  They knew that they were disqualified and should have recused themselves under U.S.C.R. 25.7. Bottom line. Article VI of the United States Constitution and Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 36 - The Special Master and the Georgia Supreme Court were entitled, with the exception of a few motions I filed with the Court, to neglect and fail to rule on the myriad of other motions I filed.

REBUTTAL - The Special Master was not justified in failing to rule on any of my motions or my notice of appeal nor was the special master or Ga. Supreme Court justified or entitled to ignore or fail to rule on my motion to stay discovery, motion to recuse special master or motion to set aside sanctions order motion to recuse special master as well as other assorted motions.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 37 -  I sought to re-litigate his divorce and filed meritless claims against bar officials alleging misconduct, bar rule violations, conflict of interest, retaliation, violation of oath as a public official and engaging in a cover up of the conflict of interest matter involving complaints filed against two bar officials being handled within the Bar’s Counsel’s own office instead of being referred to outside counsel thereby violating Bar Rule 1.7, Ga. Bar Standing Orders 600 (conflict of interest), 900 (retaliation) and Bar Disciplinary Rule 4-221.

REBUTTAL - This is untrue and there is no evidence whatsoever to support and suggest that Respondent sought to re-litigate his divorce. However, I filed and presented overwhelming evidence that multiple bar officials violated bar rules and bar standing policies on conflict of interest, retaliation, cover up of bar rule violations, complicity and the like and to suggest otherwise constitutes fraud on the court. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 38 - The Special Master was justified in issuing a sanctions order striking my answers to the complaints resulting in a default by claiming that “issuing an order compelling me to respond to discovery by a deadline would be futile, fruitless and a waste of time.” The Court also asserted that there was no requirement for the Special Master to enter an order compelling discovery.

Bar Counsel, Bill Cobb filed the motion for sanctions to begin with in retaliation for my filing bar complaints against both he and John Newberry, the appointed investigative Panel Member assigned to investigate the bar cases, thereby violating the Ant-slapp law and the Georgia Bar’s policy against retaliation and conflict of interest. O.C.G.A. 9-11-11.1, Ga. Bar Standing Pol. 600, Ga. Bar Standing Policy 900 and Bar Rule 1.7. and 1.10.

REBUTTAL - The sanctions order striking Respondent’s answers to the complaints was not justified nor did it result in default. By the Georgia Supreme    Court’s own admission in the first paragraph of page 3 of their order of disbarment stated that the Special Master has power to issue orders on discovery, which includes issuing an order requiring Respondent to respond to the discovery by a certain deadline. Instead, the Special Master threw his hands up in the air and said oh well, there is nothing I can do. I better just go ahead and grant the Bar’s motion for sanctions.

Moreover, Respondent eventually responded to the Bar’s discovery, so the argument that the Special Master was helpless to compel me to respond to the Bar’s discovery is completely meritless and  disengenuous. Lastly, while I responded to the Bar’s discovery, albeit somewhat later than it was due because of dealing with numerous financial emergencies, the Bar is in no position to criticize my late response to their discovery as the Bar 1) oompletely ignored my discovery to them, 2) objected to my request for the issuance of witness subpoenas and 3) failed to cooperate in providing dates for me to depose various witnesses.

In response to the Court’s assertion in their reported that there was no requirement for the Special Master to enter an order compelling discovery, the case law shows and states otherwise. (see Georgia Civil Practice Act, U.S.C.R. 6.4 & O.C.G.A. 9-11-37), Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009).  Also a pleading cannot be struck without a hearing on wilfullness, which there was none.

The cases cited by the Court in support of the Court’s claim that the Special Master was justified in issuing the sanctions order, In the Matter of Burgess, 239 Ga. App. 783, 784 (748 SE2d 916) (2013) and In the Matter of Browning-Baker, 292 Ga. 809, 809-810 (741 SE2d 637) (2013), are not on point because, unlike in these cases, there is ample evidence showing that Respondent was not willful in not responding by the deadline. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Burgess or Browning-Baker, were in financial distress, mired in foreclosure or bankruptcy or had experiencing or was reeling from economic injuries from a divorce.

In another case cited by the Court, In the Matter of Hawk, 269 Ga. 165, 166 (496 SE2d 261) (1998), the Court lacks standing to even cite this case to begin with (based on equity not to mention the merits of it and the fact that it too is not on point as stated above) because the Bar did not even respond to my discovery, did not cooperate in providing dates for me to depose various witnesses and opposed all my efforts to get the Special Master to issue witness  subpoenas.  

It is further ironic that the Court refers to Bar Disciplinary Rule 4-212(c) on Page 10 of their order about both parties being able to engage in discovery since the Bar completely thwarted my efforts to do any discovery in the case. 

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 39 - There is ample evidence to support disbarment.

REBUTTAL - First there is not any evidence, much less ample to support my disbarment. Second, disbarment is a form of punishment, is penal in nature and meant and designed to be punitive and to deter. This is not applicable here as I  did nothing during the cases in question to warrant or justify being punished or deterred. The same cannot be said or is true with respect to the bar officials as well as the egregious conflicts of interest on the part of the Georgia Supreme Court Justices which are too voluminous to overlook and are well documented.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 40 - Respondent is not fit to practice law.

REBUTTAL– Untrue. Respondent’s doctor who actually is a licensed healthcare professional, who actually knows me, has met me, has treated me and issued a letter dated June 29, 2017 that I produced to the Bar and the Georgia Supreme Court from my treating medical doctor certifying that I am fir to practice law, have no cognitive impairments, am not a danger to myself, my clients or to the administration of justice.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 41 -  I persistently ignored bar rules.

REBUTTAL– Untrue. The Bar has never produced any evidence or  proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent in any way violated any bar rules.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 42 -  I filed a meritless bar complaint against John Newberry.

REBUTTAL– Untrue. The bar complaint filed was justified, warranted and based on Mr. Newberry misuse of document subpoenas attempting to obtain my HIPAA protected and sealed medical records, failing to give me proper notice of his attempts to obtain my HIPAA and sealed private medical records and violating Bar Advisory Opinion 40 governing misuse of subpoenas.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 43 -  I was not entitled to vigorously defend myself in the bar complaint cases.

REBUTTAL– Given that the bar complaints were initiated and filed against me with my law license and livelihood at stake and on the line, I was absolutely justified in vigourously defending myself.  From the beginning of the bar investigation, Bar Counsel, Bill Cobb (a/k/a) William Head, tried to get me to consent to the voluntary suspension of my law license over concerns of my mental state and when I asked him to produce evidence of mental unfitness, he could not. To blame and ciritisize someone for defending their professional license and source of livelihood and later in the case, Bill Cobb blaming me and complaining of the amount of pages of my court filings, is really one of the most bizarre statements I have ever heard.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 44 - The Georgia Supreme Court is entitled to and justified in concluding that I engaged in misconduct, “an extraordinary pattern of abuse” of the judicial system and that the authorization of the sanction of disbarment is supported by the Matter of Nicholson, In the Matter of Koehler,  In the Matter of Minsk, & In the Matter of Rolleston (see Page 12 of the Bar’s Order)

REBUTTAL– Contrary to the assertions by the Court, I neither engaged in misconduct or “an extraordinary pattern of abuse” of the judicial  system and as such the sanction of disbarment or any other form of punishment is not warranted, justified or authorized. None of the cases cited above are on point because 1) I never made any false, misleading or deceitful statements to the court, his clients, any third parties or anyone else and in fact nor have I filed any false affidavits or engaged in a pattern of bizarre, disrespectful or outrageous conduct during the disciplinary process. Nicholson, Kohler, Minsk.

I filed sworn affidavits, verifications and took a lie detector test proving that he did not lie in the Mattson case and all claims that I filed meritless claims or took meritless positions during the bar cases, my divorce case or any other cases are untrue. Nicholson. At all times, I was not only justified in the actions he took to seek redress for his grievances under the First Amendment, but he was also privileged in his actions under O.C.G.A. 51-5-7 and in fact required to take the actions he took under his oath as an attorney to support and defend the constitution.

On the other hand, the Bar never filed one document, not even a verification attesting to the truthfulness and accuracy of their assertions that I violated bar rules. I tried to get Bar Counsel to execute a verification of non-collusion, but he refused,  which begs the question, “if one is honest and telling the truth, why would someone have a problem or an issue with executing a verification?” Tthroughout the proceedings, I executed several verifications, filed multiple affidavits and even took a lie detector test at my own expense.

I am also accused of showing no remorse for the mistake I made in the Mattson matter, which is untrue. I paid my client back the fee he paid me to  negotiate settlement of the student loan cases, plus interest in three (3) separate payments and included a letter of apology with each payment.

FRAUDULENT STATEMENT/OMISSION & ACCUSATION NO. 45 -  I plagued the judicial system with untenable claims for purposes unbefitting of a member of the State’s Bar;

REBUTTAL– First, I was a named Defendant in both my divorce case and in the bar complaint cases, both of which could have been handled collaboratively. However, my former spouse and the bar for that matter chose conflict over reconciliation. Chaos over Peace. Bad faith over good faith. Cruel treatment over humane treatment. Intent to harm over desire to heal.

Second, I repeatedly asked the bar to have the matter handled alternatively under ABA Model Attorney Disciplinary Rule 11(g), but Bar Counsel refused and I believe that Bar Counsel instead chose to do Judge Seeliger’s bidding to take out and disbar me because I challenged and criticized Judge Seeliger, which is not only authorized under O.C.G.A. 51-5-7, the attorney oath, but has also been held by the court to be protected speech. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), State v. Brewington, Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 15S01–1405–CR–309 (2014) (where both courts held that the constitution limits a state’s power to impose sanctions, disciplinary or otherwise, for criticism of the official conduct of public officials to false statements reckelessly made with knowledge of their falsity. In the instant case, at no time did I ever knowingly make any false statements, recklessly or otherwise.

Third, at no time, contrary to the assertions of the Court, did I ever act in a manner “unbefitting of any member of this State’s Bar. Unbefitting is defined as not appropriate or suitable.

The type of person that is appropriate or suitable to practice law is one who has integrity, character, humility, empathy, flexibility, sensitivity, kindness, can put himself in another’s shoes and can relate to or identify with the plight of another. I have all of these traits and at no time did I get the sense or feeling that Bar Counsel, the Special Master and others involved have these traits and qualities. So, for the Georgia Supreme Court to allege that I am unbefitting of being a member of the State Bar is off base, out of line and totally without merit. Judge Victoria Pratt, Ted Talks (Nov. 2017), DA Adam Foss, Ted Talks (2016).

 

1 Updates & Rebuttals


Sam

30319,
Georgia,
United States

Video of Oral Hearing Before Review Panel of State Bar of Georgia Where Bill Cobb Made False and Misleading Statements & Representations

#2Author of original report

Sun, November 04, 2018

Attached is a video of an oral hearing on September 22, 2018 before the Georgia State Bar Disciplinary Review Panel in support of the illegal, fraudulent, deceptive & wrongful disbarment by the Georgia Supreme Court Justices.  

The speakers are me in the order that they appear are: 1) Sam Levine, 2) Bridget B. Bagley (Counsel to the Review Panel), 3) Anthony Askew, Chairman of the State Bar of Georgia Review and Law Partner at Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC in Atlanta, Georgia,, 4) Thomas R. Burnside a/k/a as Thomas Reuben Burnside III (Review Panel Member and attorney at Burnside Law Firm LLP in Augusta, Georgia), 5) William Jacob Cobb a/k/a as William J. Cobb and Bill Cobb (State Bar of Georgia Prosecutor / Bar Counsel and 6) Sarah B. Akins a/k/a Sarah Brown Akins (Review Panel Member and Law Partner at Ellis Painter Ratterree & Adams LLP in Savannah, Georgia).

The way the hearing went and the video and written transcript is reflective of this is that I spoke first for about ten minutes and was asked questions by a few members of the Review Panel that I mentioned above. Then William J. Cobb a/k/a Bill Cobb, spoke likewise with questions asked of him during the hearing.

At 10:46 into the 33:06 hearing right after Bill Cobb began speaking, he admitted that the Bar's case hinged on the sanctions order.  Remember, Mr. Cobb filed with a CONFLICT OF INTEREST in retaliation against me for filing a bar complaint against him for illegally and unethically attempting to obtain my HIPAA, Private and SEALED medical records.

Anyway, Mr. Cobb alleges that the sanctions order was proper, but it was not.  For folks that are not lawyers or trained in the law, discovery is the process after the filing of a lawsuit where each side exchanges information.  If one side does not respond to the other's discovery request, there are, as with anything else in life, processes and procedures in place to address it, including sending out what is referred to as a good faith letter to the other attorney requesting a response within ten (10) days under Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.4.  If that does not work, you then file a motion to compel and then the judge normally issues an order compelling a response by a deadline.  If you do not respond by the deadline, the other side files a motion for sanctions and requests a hearing to determine whether the lack of response was willful.  If it was willful, THEN and only then, after ALL of that is a judge permitted to grant sanctions by striking a pleading.  This issue is not up for debate.  The statutory and case law is clear.  Georgia Civil Practice Act, U.S.C.R. 6.4 & O.C.G.A. 9-11-37), Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009). 

Mr. Cobb alleges in the video at 11:04 that my not answering discovery make the Bar's allegations against me as deemed admitted.  This is incorrect in general under the Georgia Civil Practice Act, number one and number two, in no case could the court or would any judge ever grant a sanctions order striking an answer without any effort whatsever by the complaining attorney to resolve a discovery dispute. Mr. Cobb skipped and bypassed several critical steps.  You cannot file a motion for sanctions in a discovery dispute seeking to strike the other side's answer without first sending the good faith letter, filing a motion to compel or without the judge issuing an order to compel discovery by a set date and even if you got this far, there STILL has to be a hearing on intent and willfulness as ruled on by the court in the above cases.

During Mr. Cobb's presentation at 11:16 into the video, Mr. Askew interrupted him and asked Mr. Cobb, "If we/I determine that the sanctions order was improper, then doesn't you case basically collapse?...to which Mr. Cobb responded by saying that if you determine that the sanctions order should be vacated, (then someone's phone rang) & Mr. Cobb said "have to review that".

Bill Cobb them said that if the Review Panel decides that it should vacate the sanctions order, that ends your task, which I interpret to mean that it would green-light the review panel to vacate the sanctions order and issue a report and recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court to dismiss the bar cases against me.

Anthony Askew then asked William Mr. Cobb if he had any facts that would support Mr. Cobb's request that I be disbarred (Paraphrasing) to which Mr. Cobb stated the sanctions order is the only thing in support of his request for disbarment that he was relying on at this time.  

Bill Cobb then stated that the authority he was relying on in support of his request for disbarment based on his position that the Bar's allegations against me were deemed admitted by the sanctions order, was Bar Disciplinary Procedural Rule 4-212(a).  However, Rule 4-212(a) has nothing to do with discovery and instead this rule states that when the bar files a complaint against you and you do not answer, then the allegations are deemed admitted.  This is not about my not having answered the bar complaint - I did.  This is about a discovery matter. So, Bar Rule 4-212(a) does not apply and does nothing to support the Bar's case for my disbarment.

At 13:38, Bill Cobb even mentioned that the sanctions order is a discovery order, that the court has wide discretion in discovery matter and that there was no abuse of discretion in the sanctions order.  If that is the case, why didn't the special master simply issue an order compelling me to respond by a certain date?  Better yet, why didn't Mr. Cobb simply email me or write me a letter saying, "Hey, I have not gotten your discovery responses yet.  Can you please send them to me within ten days?"

Mr. Askew, at 14:18 into the video, stated essentially that "the Georgia Civil Procedural Rules (also known as the Georgia Civil Practice Act) apply to bar disciplinary proceedings", which is true. Mr. Askew then asked Mr. Cobb about what is position was on whether the Georgia Uniform Superior Court rules, more specifically U.S.C.R. 6.4 apply to civil cases in Georgia and in fact doesn't rule 6.4 apply to civil cases in Georgia and wouldn't it impact the sanctions order? to which Bill Cobb brushed over and side stepped the question and instead stated that "No Georgia Supreme Court disciplinary case has ever relied on a Uniform Superior Court rule as part of its decision  , which is complete non-sense.  

Fact and bottom line is that the Georgia Uniform Superior Court rules are an important and essential part of the Georgia Civil Practice Act and the Georgia Civil Practice Act applies to bar disciplinary cases.  The Ga. Civil Practice Act cannot apply without the Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules also applying.

Furthermore, the Georgia Civil Practice Act and Uniform Superior Court Rules are inextricably intertwined and interrelated. In fact, there are many books on Georgia Court Rules and Procedure, both State and Federal, Georgia Rules of Court Annotated, and the State Rules volumes of the West's Code of Georgia Annotated which specifically state and allude to the fact that the Uniform Superior Court rules have been adopted by the courts in Georgia, including the Superior Court who has jursidiction, including under Bar Disciplinary Procedural rules 4-210 and 4-212(c).

Moreover, Uniform Superior Court Rule 1.6. governing Amendments states in the 2nd Paragraph that "The State Bar of Georgia and the Uniform Rules committee chairpersons for the other classes of courts shall receive notice of the proposed changes and additions and be given the opportunity to comment". That being the case, the Bar cannot deny that the uniform superior court rules apply to bar disciplinary proceedings. In addition, U.S.C.R. 4.4 governing admission pro hac vice was even referenced in a proposed amendment to this rule in it first reading on January 23, 2014 where part of the existing or proposed rule change specifically states in D(1) Application Procedure, 1. Verified Application. An eligible Domestic Lawyer or Foreign Lawyer seeking to appear in a proceeding pending in this state as counsel pro hac vice shall file a verified application with the court where the litigation is filed. The application shall be served on all parties who have appeared in the case and the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The application shall include proof of service. The court has the discretion to grant or deny the application summarily if there is no opposition.

Bill Cobb states at the 15:10 mark that it's an open question about whether the uniform superior court rules apply to the Georgia Civil Practice Act, which is total nonsence and he knows it.

Sarah B. Akins then chimed in at 16:00 and asked Bill Cobb if the motion for sanctions was the first notice I had ever received that there was any problem with discovery to which William J. Cobb admitted that it was a few seconds later and then stated that case law exists that supports the grant of the sanctions order even though the cases Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009) have not been overturned and are controlling and good law.

Bill Cobb even admitted 16:53 that since there was not prior communication that there was a basis for the Review Panel to vacate the sanctions order and issue a recommendation accordingly to the Georgia Supreme Court. Bill Cobb then echoed the Special Master Patrick Head's statement in his order granting the Bar's motion for sanctions that "it would have been a futile exercise in issuing an order compelling me to respond to discovery", which is one of the most ridiculous statements I have ever heard.  It makes no sense and there is no way in on earth, with my law license and ability on to make a living on the line, that I would have ignored, blown off or violated an order to respond to discovery, which I filed responses to on my own anyway several months after they were due.  So, if I filed the discovery responses on my own without an order, it makes absolutely no sense that I would have not responded to discovery if the special master had issued an order.

Bill Cobb then said again at 17:17 that it would have been a completely futile exercise and would have made no difference, which again makes no sense and is just a totally absurd statement.  Cobb then stated that my filings since the special master issued the report and recommendation for disbarment somehow "confirms with great clarity" the order to recommend disbarment, which in fact they do not.  My attempts at getting a bogus and void order set aside and the bar case dismissed does nothing to support a recommendation for discipline.  Rather, my filing demonstrate my justifiable attempts to defend myself in the case and avoid disbarment.

Cobb complains about my voluminous filings and citing criminal statutes.  Well, my filings included exhibits and you can be darn sure that I and anyone else in my position facing disbarment are going to litigate and fight vigorously as I had every right to do.  Remember, Bill Cobb, with no evidence whatsoever, tried to get me to voluntarily surrender my law license over an uncorroborated accusation that I was not mentally fit to practice law and when I asked him to back up his claim with evidence, he never did because there was no evidence of that whatsoever.

As for Cobb complaining about my claiming that he and others related to the bar disciplinary proceedings committed crimes, including by Bill Cobb, Patrick Head, Paula Frederick, John Shiptenko, Adrienne Nash and others, they did commit crimes - crimes involving actual fraud, fraud by omission, constructive fraud, violation of oath of office and crimes against public administration.

Cobb then claims that my defending myself against the bar complaints justifies the special master's decision to not issue an order compelling discovery and to recommend disbarment, again is absurd and ludicrous.

Cobb alleges that there is case law that support the special master's decision to not issue an order compelling discovery and to issue the sanctions order.  However this is untrue in all the case cited by the Bar and Special Master, a sanctions order was granted ONLY after an order was issued compelling discovery.

Finding out and learning about a problem with discovery for the first time by and through a sanctions motion is unheard of and if I tried that tactic while litigating a case either pro se or on behalf of someone, I can guarantee that I would have attorney fees awarded against me and face other possible repercussions from the court.

Cobb's subsequent reference to my attempts to get the cases stayed in November 2016 BEFORE the Bar filed their motion for sanctions, which was later granted is at complete odds with and contradicts material portions of the Georgia Supreme Court's disbarment order stating that my failure to respond to discovery was willful and intentional, which it was not.  That was the whole reason why I tried to get the case stayed twice as Cobb mentions, as I was dealing with numerous and time-sensitive emergencies.

Cobb then alludes to my filing a leave of absence which covered a large number of days, which I did and had every right to so that I could get things in order, reduce the chaos and get things under control.  It was not, as Cobb alleges, to obstruct justice.  Cobb did that all on his own by failing to turn over the Bar's case file, which I had a right to, by interfering and objecting with my right to subpoena witnesses and to take depositions.

Cobb then says that I did not respond to the sanctions motion.    Not directly and not immediately because of the financial emergencies I was dealing with, BUT, I did file a notice of appeal of the sanctions order, which the special master ignored and failed to rule on and I filed motions to set aside the sanctions order and to dismiss the car cases, but they too were ignored and not ruled on.

Regarding the bar's accusation that I did not respond to discovery.  Not immediately, but I later did file my responses to the Bar's discovery.  The Bar did not even respond to my discovery requests, so who are they to be complaining about my late discovery responses?

Cobb states at the 19:34 mark that the special master "bent over backward" for me, which is non-sense.  If the special master was fair and impartial, he would have issued an order to respond to the discovery by a certain date, which he did not and gave no valid reason for not doing so.

Cobb states that the special master set a hearing on the motion for sanctions, however, I was relieved from the first hearing because I was an unavailable witness dealing with the impending foreclosure of my home in which the hearing was scheduled for the same time as my foreclosure was set to take place, which both the Bar and the Special Master were aware of.  Also, my previously filed leave of absence, my unavailable witness status and the fact that my home had just been foreclosed relieved me from having to attend.  The Bar does not mention any of those things. 

Bill Cobb's statement that said that the special master did not have the authority to hold a hearing is untrue and supported by any evidence whatsoever.

Cobb then references my case filings related to my divorce and foreclosure, which I had every right to file.  Seeking redress is NOT a disbarrable offense and does not support the Bar's request for discipline.  Seeking redress does not violate any bar rules.

Cobb claims erroneously that because I filed a leave of absence, that I was precluded from doing work, which is an abusrd statement.  A leave of absence relieves an attorney from having to appear in court.  What ther attorney does during his leave of absence is his business.  My doing work during the period of my leave of absence is not unethical, does not violate any bar rules and does not support discipline.

During this hearing, Cobb keeps harping on the fact that I did not respond to discovery in a timely manner, which is true, but what he is doing is completely and totally misrepresenting the facts to the review panel by alleging that I never responded to discovery, which is NOT true.  I did respond to discovery, just later, voluntarily and without a court order.  On the other hand, Cobb NEVER responded to my discovery.

Cobb then reads the special master's report and recommendation agreeing with the allegation that I was engaged in a bad faith scheme to obstruct the bar disciplinary proceedings, which is total non-sense. There is no evidence of my doing that. Cobb then reads on alleging that I prevented the bar from prosecuting the bar cases, which is false.  If anything, the Bar prevented me from defending myself in the bar case and as for the allegation that I was recalcitrant, that too is non-sense.  That was the whole reason why I tried to get the case and discovery stayed -- because I was dealing with a lot and had a lot on my plate.  If the bar had agreed to the stay, I would have been in more of a position to be more responsive and involved in the bar disciplinary process, but the Bar acted in bad faith by refusing to agree to stay the case.

Cobb then states that the sanctions order was able to be decided without a hearing.  Wrong.  The case I cited above are clear evidence that a hearing on the issue of willfulness is REQUIRED and mandatory. Patrick Desmond v. Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Dekalb County State Court, CAFN 10A28641-2 (2010), Harrell v. DHR300 Ga. App. 497 (2009). 

Cobb at 21:48 erroneously states that it was not error for the special master to grant the sanctions motion.  The cases above state otherwise and in fact, it was grave, prejudicial and serious error for the special master to grant the sanctions motion without a hearing and in fact the sanction of striking a pleading is a grave and serious decision not to be made lightly and to be reserved in only the most extreme circumstances, this case not being one and to strike my answers absolutely was in fact an abuse of discretion.

Cobb alleges that the Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the use of striking answers under the circumstances.  Wrong and wrong again.  Never has the Georgia Supreme Court or any other court EVER granted a motion for sanctions striking a party's answer without the court first issuing an order to compel discovery only after a 6.4 letter sent and motion to compel filed, and a hearing on the issue of intent and wilfullness.  Not one.

Cobb states that the sanctions order was well within the discretion of the special master, which is simply not true.  Patrick Head abused his discretion by coming up with some b/s excuse for not issuing an order compelling my response to discovery stating that it would have been futile and useless to do so.  Explain.  Why is that? Why would it have been useless or futile.  Do you think that under the circumstances where I was facing disbarment or other form of discipline that it would make sense to a reasonable and rational person that i would have made no difference to issue an order?  That's most ridiculous and nonsensical thing I have ever heard of.  The reason that the Special Master did this was to meet his/the Bar's agenda to disbar me, which is why the Bar initiated this frivolous bar case against me to begin with.  Cobb even stated and admitted it himself that they were banking on the sanctions order for my disbarment and that they did not have any facts to support my disbarment.  Use common sense. The bar knew the only way they could conceivably disbar me was though a procedural issue, but even then, the Bar violated procedure, which the special master, the investigative panel, review panel and Georgia Supreme Court were complicit it.

Cobb at 22:44 then turns his attention to the special master's report and recommendation. Cobb, through the report, alleges I violated 11 different bar rules.  Not true.  Bar never produced any evidence, documentary, direct or circumstantial, that I violated any bar rules. Cobb references that the special master relies on, among other authorities, the ABA disciplinary standards, which the Bar violated several provisions.

Cobb states that my alleged violations caused serious harm.  Not true.  Cobb mentions the Mattson case where because I was preoccupied in dealing with financial emergencies, utility disconnections and other interferences which combined to create one big economic and logistical disaster for me, I mistakenly failed to arrange for another attorney to answer my client's student loan lawsuit(s), which resulted in default.  However, the default was SET ASIDE and vacated.  Number 2, the garnishment that occurred and was in placed temporarily and briefly, was later vacated and money returned to my client in full and third, I refund all $1,750 of the fee that Mattson paid me PLUS interest AND I apologized to him.  So, Cobb's claim that I caused Mattson harm, hold no water whatsoever and in fact, while no harm luckily occurred to Mattson, I should point out that before his case defaulted and ws later set aside, I tried to get financial support from the divorce court judge for expenses, including for legal malpractice insurance, but the court said no.

In the Brahima Traore case, Cobb claims that there were years of delay in the case getting to trial.  In fact, there were not years of delay.  My progress in advancing the case was slowed down, which is why I associated another lawyer to assist and NEVER stopped looking for or trying to secure LEAD counsel for the case, which I eventually did secure. Secondly, my progress in the case would have never been stunted in the first place had the divorce judge simply awarded me attorney fees to hire a lawyer as well as financial support to pay my personal and business bills.

I did absolutely nothing wrong or unethical in the Traore case, never violated my client's wishes nor did I at any time have a conflict of interest as Cobb alleges.  If you want to talk about a conflict of interest, Cobb is one who should be discussed and who had no business whatsoever being involved in the bar case after I filed a bar complaint against him.  Cobb's retaliation by filing an untimely and improper motion for sanctions is proof positive that he was conflicted and his judgment impaired.

Cobb then makes reference to the grievance filed by my narcissistic brother Kenneth Levine and narcissistic and borderline personality disordered mother Carol A. Levine, both of whom are lawyers, both of whom violated bar rules regarding client confidentiality, safe keeping of property, fraud on the court, etc. and both of whom filed a consolidated bar complaint against me.  Prior their filing of the bar complaint against me, Kenneth Levine was my temporary power of attorney and who without my consent or knowledge, temporarily took custody of my service dog only to later testify against me in court during my efforts to recover my service dog, which he and my former spouse Sonia Lancy Levine Bi, converted and my mother, Carol "Cookie" Levine, deceptively induced me to agree to a psychological eval., which I thought was informal and not part of any formal court agreement and then she turned around and had my informal agreement made a part of a formal consent contempt decree and she further, unbeknownst to me, tried to keep me incarcerated until I had the eval., which I later did, revealing no evidence whatsoever of any mental instability.  I am permanently estranged form both. Whatever happened in my divorce has nothing to with the bar cases and does not support any lawyer discipline. 

Contrary to Cobb's statement during the hearing, I did not engage in misconduct. Seeking redress for grievances and defending and asserting one's right does not equate to, constitute or equal misconduct.

The letter that Cobb referred to at 24:34 was to the judge in my divorce case and I had every right to send such a letter because of the judicial malpractice that Judge Clarence Seeliger and later Judge Courtney Johnson committed.  I make no apologies and have no regrets.  I felt then and felt now that these judges were unethical, violated several judical ethics rules and abused their power and discretion. Cobb says that my attempts to seek redress for my grievances were unbelievable.  What's unbelievable is what a complete unethical and total lying, cheating scumbag Bill Cobb is and how these judges abused their power during my divorce.

Cobb goes on to read part of the letter I wrote to Judges Seeliger and Johnson where I listed and enumerated criminal offense I felt and still feel were committed by these judges.  However, that is not unethical & is not a basis for discipline.  It's called exercising my right to seeking redress of grievances. Cobb then reads a part of the letter where I include a reference to the use of bounty hunters.  First, I was emotional and upset with how my divorce was handled. Second, I mentioned the use of bounty hunters I suppose as an expression for my strong feeling and position that the judges violated various crimes, which in fact, the did related to procedural errors they committed, involvement or complicity in fraud on the court, constitutional violations, including due process and equal protection, violation of oath of office and loyalty oath as well as several crimes against public administration.

Cobb criticizes my insistence in the letter that the judges adhere to the local and state court procedural rules.  That is not unethical, is not a violation of a bar rule, is not a basis for discipline and does not support the Bar's case for disbarment.  It just doesn't. Cobb alleges that I wrote the letter in the capacity as an attorney, which is not true.  I wrote it as a named defendant and party to my divorce case.

Once Cobb left the podium, I then went up and gave my rebuttal and started off by stating that I was provoked during my divorce case and dealt with in a grossly unfair way.  When that happens, it is normally to react in an upset way.  That is human.  There was no basis for Judges Seeliger to rule and preside over the case in an unfair way.  The fact that men are routinely roughed up in divorce court is not an excuse.  That fact that it is common place is not an excuse.  I was entitled to fair and reasonable treatment.  Judge Seeliger committed major judicial malpractice.  Plain and simple that created major interference with my life and ability to make a living.  His rulings were not justified and were a major abuse of discretion.  That's a fact.  When you mistreat and do wrong by people, they are going to react accordingly.  When you treat people with respect and dignity, which Judges Seeliger and Johnson did not do so with respect to me, then you typically will have no problem.

As an attorney, I have represented people in cases where the judge issued ruling adverse to my client, but I never felt that the judge was abusing their power or discretion.  I never got that sense.  If you are someone mistreated or wronged, you know it.  You just do.

My complaining about my treatment during my divorce and seeking redress of my grievances does not support a case for attorney discipline.  Bill Cobb and the Bar my not like what I said, but it is constitutionally protected and cannot be used to discipline a lawyer.  Cobb needs to learn about the Anti-Slapp law.

One thing I know for sure, words and actions speak volumes.  A review of the video of the oral showing provides conclusive evidence of the bad faith, fraud on the court, procedural violations and misconduct on the part of Bill Cobb and in no way do any of Bill Cobb's statements made during the oral hearing support his claim for disbarment or any other form of discipline.

 

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