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In march of 2012 I secured the services of Local Guerrilla Marketing LLC, to facilitate the production of a video commercial for my company and to promote that video on internet search engines including but not limited to Google. The company agreed to get my video to page one rankings of Google and to keep it there for the period of a year.
After producing the video Ms. Wendy Stevens announced that she was pulling away from the business due to health issues and that someone else would be taking the lead in the company. This was not true. The "new" company insisted that to receive and services paid for that I would have to enter into a new contract and upon review of that contract it did not insure the maintenance of page one rankings that I paid for. Wendy was "spinning" this as a transition of management while it was actually a ceasing of operations and another shell company being produced to absorb the "goodwill" (client base) of the previous company while scuttling the commitments and liabilities of the previous company.
I was given a financial incentive to pay for a years worth of services up front only to receive notice days later of the companies "transition to new management." If this was a management transition why new contracts??? The "new management" would simply honor existing contracts and move forward with new client agreements as they so desired.
The more that you dig the more you find on Wendy Stevens. She has been convicted of 2 Class E felonies and she was sentenced to 18 months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was let out of that in favor of supervised probation. Just google it and you will see. She stole credit cards from her intimate friend while at a prayer meeting of all things. If she was willing to steel from a friend how much easier it has no doubt been to steel from others.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
April 9, 2002 Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WENDY STEVENS
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County
No. II-401-124 Timothy L. Easter, Judge
No. M2001-02464-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 5, 2002
The appellant, Wendy Stevens, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to one count of forgery involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eighteen months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense, but immediately suspended the sentence in favor of supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing to grant her judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.
NORMAMCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOE G. RILEY and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.
Judson Wheeler Phillips, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Wendy Stevens.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Christine M. Lapps, Assistant Attorney General; Ronald L. Davis, District
Attorney General; and Lee Dryer, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. Factual Background
On December 6, 2000, Joan Benton invited the appellant to a prayer meeting at her home. The meeting lasted from
8:00 a.m. until 9:30 a.m. Approximately one and one-half hours after the conclusion of the prayer meeting, Benton noticed that her credit card was missing from the kitchen. Benton assumed she had lost the card until, two weeks later, she received a credit card bill which reflected unauthorized charges totaling almost five thousand dollars. All of the unauthorized charges were made after Benton discovered the card was missing. An investigation determined that the appellant had taken the
credit card and incurred the charges. There were fifteen different 1 We note that there is no guilty plea transcript in the record before this court.
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unauthorized charges on the bill; however, only one of the charges occurred in Williamson County.
All other charges occurred in Davidson County. The Williamson County offense resulted from the appellants charges of $768.46 worth of merchandise at Cool Springs Target in Franklin.
As a result of the charges, the appellant pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to forgery involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, and to fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000.1 The plea agreement left all sentencing determinations up to the discretion of the trial court.
At the sentencing hearing, Benton testified to the facts underlying the offenses.
Benton related that the appellant was the only individual to go into her kitchen during the prayer meeting, after which meeting she discovered the credit card missing. Additionally, a security camera at Target recorded the appellant using the card. Benton told the court that she felt extremely betrayed and violated as a result of the offenses. She also observed that the appellant did not seem destitute at the time of the offenses. Notably, the appellant lived in a lovely home with a swimming pool, drove a nice vehicle, and sent her children to private school. Benton informed the court that the appellants
previous attorney, John Nefflin, had contacted Benton and her husband in an effort to resolve the case out of court. One week prior to trial, the Bentons received a letter which the appellant denoted as her attempt to apologize. Benton further related that the appellant had not been prosecuted for the Davidson County offenses and she thought it unlikely that the Davidson County District Attorney Generals office would initiate charges against the appellant.
Kim Camp testified on behalf of the appellant. Camp related that she had known the appellant for eight or nine years and considered her to be a faithful, loving friend. Camp indicated that the appellant had a troubled marriage which ended in a bitter divorce. Nevertheless, she stated that the appellant remained concerned about providing a stable environment for her two children.
Camp also knew that, prior to these offenses, the appellants mother had passed away and the appellant had witnessed a
horrendous car accident in which the appellants daughter, Haley; the appellants best friend, Alice Freeman; and Freemans son, Will, were involved. The crash ultimately claimed the life of Freeman. Camp asserted that these events were traumatic for the appellant, rendering her emotionally devastated. Camp theorized that the trauma of these events compelled the appellant to return to past patterns of unwise behavior. Regardless, Camp asserted that the appellant recognized her
wrongdoing and was seeking help from friends, doctors, and counselors. She maintained that the appellant had recently obtained a dream job and had moved into a good neighborhood. Camp conceded that, at the time of the offenses, the appellant was not destitute and was living beyond her means. Camp further admitted that the appellant had also previously stolen her credit card and made unauthorized charges on two occasions.
Next, the appellant called DavidPratt, the probation officer who prepared her presentence report. Pratt related that the appellant owed $768.46 restitution to Citibank for the
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Williamson County case. In
response, the appellant immediately tendered to Pratt a certified check
for the full restitution amount.
The appellant also presented the testimony of Joe Chilberg, a long-time friend of the
appellant. Chilberg testified
that the appellants life had been tumultuous for two to three years prior
to the incident, and the
appellant was more than remorseful. He had recommended to the appellant
that she seek counseling and soon
thereafter the appellant followed Chilbergs advice.
The appellant testified on her
own behalf. She related that she was a thirty-eight-yearold
mother of two children. She
explained that she had recently accepted a position as the
development director for the Nature Conservancy of Tennessee. The appellant indicated that she had
been through a difficult divorce and lost her mother and her best friend, all within the last few years.
She stated that she considered
Benton to be a friend and, on December 6, 2000, went to Bentons
house to pray. She claimed that,
during the meeting, she began to feel anxious and pressured
and took Bentons credit card.
She used the card to purchase necessities and Christmas presents for
her family and other friends. The appellant admitted that her behavior was ridiculous and over
the top. She further acknowledged that she was sorry and was seeking help. Contrary to Bentons
testimony, the appellant
contended that the reason her previous attorney, Nefflin, contacted the
Bentons was to explain that the
appellant was responsible for all of the unauthorized charges on the
credit card. Moreover, the appellant maintained that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and had previously taken
anti-depressant medication. She also asserted that she wanted to get
involved in a mental health inpatient program to help her understand why she committed these acts.
Finally, she expressed her desire
to make full restitution.
On cross-examination, the
appellant told the court that, prior to her death, Freeman
had obtained a credit card
account in Freemans name with an additional card issued to the appellant
so the appellant could use the
card in an emergency. However, the appellant confessed that, after
Freeman was killed in the car
accident, the appellant used the card to make irrational purchases,
including the purchase of a chair
for Freemans husband. The appellant quickly asserted that
Freemans husband was reimbursed
for the charges. The appellant further admitted that, while living
in Maryland several years before
these offenses, she took a credit card from Mr. and Mrs.
Chamberlain and used the card
without their prior approval. Additionally, she acknowledged that
she had used the credit cards of two other friends, Camp and Mr. and Mrs. Bach, without obtaining
their permission.
Based upon the foregoing
evidence, the trial court denied the appellant judicial
diversion, noting that the appellant
had an extensive history of this type of crime. The trial court
then imposed a sentence of
eighteen months supervised probation. The appellant now appeals the
trial courts denial of judicial
diversion.
II. Analysis
The appellant claims that the
trial court erred by denying her judicial diversion. With
respect to judicial diversion, TennesseeCode Annotated section 40-35-313(a)(1)(A) (1997) provides:
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If any person who has not
previously been convicted of a felony or a
Class A misdemeanor is found guilty
or pleads guilty to . . . a Class
C, D or E felony, the court may,
without entering a judgment of guilty
and with the consent of such
person, defer further proceedings and
place the person on probation
upon such reasonable conditions as it
may require, and for a period of
time . . . not more than the period of
the maximum sentence of the
felony with which the person is
charged.
We observe that judicial
diversion is similar in purpose to pretrial diversion and is to be imposed
within the discretion of the
trial court subject only to the same constraints applicable to prosecutors
in applying pretrial diversion
under [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 40-15-105. State v.
Anderson, 857 S.W.2d 571, 572
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
On appeal, [t]he lower courts
denial of judicial diversion is subject to reversal on
appeal only if that court abused
its discretion. State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). As a
consequence, we may not revisit the issue if the record contains any
substantial evidence supporting
the trial courts decision. Id. Moreover, [t]he same guidelines are
applicable in diversion cases as
are applicable in probation cases, but they are more stringently
applied to those seeking
diversion. State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000).
The trial court must consider all
of the following factors in determining whether to
grant the appellant judicial
diversion:
(a) the accuseds amenability to
correction, (b) the circumstances of
the offense, (c) the accuseds
criminal record, (d) the accuseds social history, (e) the status of the
accuseds physical and mental health, and
(f) the deterrence value to the accused as well as others. The trial
court should also consider
whether judicial diversion will serve the
ends of justice the interests
of the public as well as the accused.
State v. Lewis, 978 S.W.2d 558,
566 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Additionally, the trial court may
consider the appellants attitude,
. . . behavior since arrest, . . . home environment, current drug
usage, emotional stability, past employment, general reputation, family responsibilities, and the
attitude of law enforcement. Id.
The record must reflect that the trial court has taken all of the
preceding factors into
consideration. Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 229. Furthermore, [t]he court
must explain on the record why the [appellant] does not qualify under its analysis, and if the court
has based its determination on only some of the factors, it must explain why these factors outweigh
the others. Id.
The trial court thoroughly
considered the factors concerning judicial diversion,
remarking that, at first blush,
the appellant appeared to be an appropriate candidate for diversion.
The court noted the following
factors weighing in favor of the granting of judicial diversion: the
appellants amenability to
correction, her social history, her lack of prior criminal convictions, her
good attitude toward dealing with her problems, her family responsibilities, the attitude of law
2 These are not the only factors
applicable in deterrence cases. See Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 10-12. However,
these are the only factors
applicable in the instant case.
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enforcement, her acknowledgment
of responsibility, and her remorse. See Lewis, 978 S.W.2d at
566. Furthermore, the court noted
that the appellants [g]eneral reputation seems to be good, other
than she steals from her friends.
The court also observed that the appellants mental and physical
health weighs both ways, and
concluded that the appellants emotional stability was questionable.
In turning to the factors
weighing against the grant of judicial diversion, the trial court placed
significant weight on the fact
that the appellant abused a position of private trust and also recognized
the need for deterrence,
specifically noting that the appellant had previously committed acts similar
to the instant offenses.
Ultimately, the trial court found that to allow the appellant to continue this
type of behavior without sanction
would not serve the ends of justice for the appellant or society.
The appellant complains that the
majority of the factors to be considered in
determining whether to grant
judicial diversion weigh in her favor; therefore, the trial court abused
its discretion by denying
diversion. Specifically, the appellant argues that
[a]t the hearing, proof was
introduced th[at] the Appellants name
was on [Freemans] card . . . and
she was a joint card holder. As far
as the other incidents [of
unauthorized credit card usage] are
concerned, the record is mostly
silent. What is obvious from the
record is that no criminal
charges were ever filed. Perhaps the other
parties forgave her for what she
allegedly did or perhaps gave her
permission after the fact. The
record is silent in this regard and the
Court can not draw facts out of
thin [air].
We acknowledge that much of the
appellants history is positive and, at first blush,
indicates her favorable candidacy
for judicial diversion. However, we agree with the trial court that
the need for deterrence is a
significant factor in this case. Our supreme court recently outlined
several factors to be considered
in determining when deterrence is correctly employed to deny
probation. State v. Hooper, 29
S.W.3d 1, 10-12 (Tenn. 2000). We note that [d]eterrence in judicial
diversion cases is to be
considered in the same manner as it is in probation cases. State v. Parker,
932 S.W.2d 945, 959 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996). However, the applicable guidelines are more
stringently applied to diversion
applicants. State v. Holland, 661 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1983). The following factors may
indicate a need for deterrence:
(1) the defendants crime was the
result of intentional, knowing, or
reckless conduct or was otherwise
motivated by a desire to profit or
gain from the criminal behavior
[and]
(2) the defendant has previously
engaged in criminal conduct of the
same type as the offense in
question, irrespective of whether such
conduct resulted in previous
arrests or convictions.2
Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 11-12. From
the appellants own testimony, it is clear that she committed the
instant offenses intentionally,
admitting that she was concerned about providing Christmas presents.
3 See Tenn. Code Ann. 39-14-118(a)
(1997) ([a] person commits the crime of illegal possession of a credit
or debit card who, knowing the
person does not have the consent of the owner or issuer, takes, exercises
control over or otherwise uses such card or
information from such card.)
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Additionally, at the sentencing
hearing, Camp conceded that the appellant took her credit card and
used it on two occasions without
Camps permission. Moreover, the appellant confessed that she
used the credit cards of Mr. and
Mrs. Chamberlain, Mr. and Mrs. Bach, and Camp without their
permission.3 Furthermore, the
appellant testified that Freeman obtained a credit card in Freemans
name with an additional card for
the appellant to use only in case of emergency. After Freemans
death, the appellant admitted
that she made irrational and wrong purchases, specifically buying
a chair for Freemans husband. Like the trial court, we find disturbing the appellants frequent return
to this same criminal behavior.
Our supreme court has noted:
Repeated occurrences of the same
type of criminal conduct by a
defendant generally warrant a
more emphatic reminder that criminal
actions carry consequences.
Although the [probation] statute speaks
in terms of general deterrence,
it has been recognized that general
deterrence is possible only after
specific deterrence has first been
achieved.
Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 12.
Additionally, the trial court
found particularly offensive the appellants abuse of
a position of private trust when,
under the guise of a friend seeking spiritual healing, the appellant
entered Bentons home as a guest
and stole from her friend. An abuse of private trust is a valid
concern in determining an
appellants suitability for judicial diversion. See State v. Marsha L. McClellan, No.
E2000-02373-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292, at *20 (Knoxville,
Apr. 19, 2001); State v. Danielle
L. Walker, No. E2000-00578-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 235, at *11 (Knoxville,
Mar. 29, 2001). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying
judicial diversion.
III. Conclusion
Finding no error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
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NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE