Complaint Review: Oznomics Inc.

http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2010/04/09-4052.pdf

HANSEN v. PT BANK NEGARA INDONESIA (PERSERO), TBK601 F.3d 1059 (2010)Theodore L. HANSEN; Interstate Energy; Triple M, L.L.C., Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.PT BANK NEGARA INDONESIA (PERSERO), TBK, Defendant-Appellant, andEko Budiwiyono; Firmansyah; Gatot Sismoyo; Rachmat Wiriatmaja; Yopie Lamonge; Max Niode; Lilles Handayani; Utti Kariayam; Mubarik as Djatimuda; Steve O.Z. Finkel-Minkin, a/k/a Steve Finkel; Robert McKee; Fred Newcomb; Newcomb & Company; Native American Refinery, Defendants.No. 09-4052.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.April 13, 2010.Submitted on the briefs:*Christopher Brady, Hollyer Brady LLP, New York, NY; Arthur B. Berger, Ray Quinney and Nebeker, P.C., Salt Lake City, UT; and Orlee Goldfeld, Butzel Long, New York, NY, on the briefs for Appellant Pt. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) TBK.E. Armistead Easterby, Williams Kherkher, Houston, TX, on the briefs for Appellees Hansen, Interstate Energy, and Triple M, L.L.C.Before TACHA, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.  TACHA, Circuit Judge.Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), a foreign state is immune from suit in American courts unless a statutory exception to immunity applies. In this appeal, the primary dispute is whether defendant-appellant PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) TBK ("BNI") or any of its officers or employees in fact generated financial instruments assigned to plaintiffs-appellees Theodore Hansen, Interstate Energy Corporation, and Triple M, L.L.C., thus triggering the commercial-activity[ 601 F.3d 1061 ]
exception to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The district court denied BNI's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on sovereign immunity, concluding that BNI had not carried its ultimate burden of showing that the commercial-activity exception did not apply. In the same order, the district court also denied BNI's motion to stay discovery and ordered that appellees be entitled to conduct limited discovery on that issue. BNI appeals from the denial of sovereign immunity and also argues that the district court's discovery order on the sovereign immunity issue is unduly broad. As to the first issue, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and AFFIRM. We DISMISS the claim based on the discovery order for lack of jurisdiction.I. BACKGROUNDIn 2003, Mr. Hansen entered into an agreement to sell various gas stations, convenience stores, and other real property to Native American Oil Refinery Company ("NARCO"). Pursuant to the agreement, NARCO agreed to pay a certain sum for the properties and assigned purported BNI bank guarantees worth $90 million to Mr. Hansen as collateral. Also at issue in this case are two standby letters of credit worth $25 million that BNI allegedly issued to Interstate Energy Corporation and a $3 million BNI bank guarantee that BNI allegedly issued to Triple M, L.L.C.At some point, NARCO failed to pay under its agreement with Mr. Hansen and he, Interstate Energy Corporation, and Triple M, L.L.C. (hereinafter, "appellees") presented the BNI guarantees and letters of credit to BNI branches in New York, New York and Jakarta, Indonesia. BNI refused to honor any of the financial instruments on the grounds that they were fraudulent and not issued by BNI or any of its employees. Appellees then filed this lawsuit against BNI.1 BNI asserted its status as a foreign state, claimed immunity from suit under the FSIA, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.In response to BNI's motion, appellees argued that BNI's issuance of and refusal to honor the financial instruments constituted commercial activity for which BNI is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. To support their position, appellees presented affidavits and testimony from various people involved with appellees' attempt to redeem the purported BNI instruments. First, appellees presented an affidavit from Charles Hanna, an attorney and officer of Interstate Energy Corporation. In the affidavit, Mr. Hanna states that in 2005 and 2006 he presented the BNI guarantees and letters of credit to BNI's New York branch and was told that the instruments were fraudulent. Second, appellees presented the testimony of Robert McKee, the president of NARCO. Mr. McKee testified that he personally called BNI at a number he retrieved from their website and that he spoke with a man who identified himself as Dr. Firmansyah, a BNI employee. Mr. McKee further testified that Dr. Firmansyah confirmed NARCO's ability to use the BNI guarantees to pursue various financial opportunities and confirmed that the International Monetary Fund numbers listed on the face of the BNI guarantees were legitimate. Third, Mr. Hansen testified that he also contacted BNI and spoke with Dr. Firmansyah who confirmed the authenticity of the BNI guarantees. Fourth, appellees presented the testimony of Mark McDougal, an attorney[ 601 F.3d 1062 ]
and part owner of Triple M, L.L.C. Mr. McDougal provided testimony similar to that of Mr. McKee and Mr. Hansen, and he further stated that he could personally confirm the validity of the BNI letters of credit because he had successfully cashed in a BNI letter of credit in a prior transaction. Finally, appellees presented the testimony of Quinn Jensen, a Merrill Lynch employee. Mr. Jensen testified that he contacted BNI's New York branch to inquire about a BNI letter of credit Mr. Hansen had provided to him for the purpose of conducting due diligence. Mr. Jensen further testified that he read the guarantee number on the BNI letter of credit to a BNI employee who told him that the number was consistent with BNI guarantee numbers.BNI maintained that all of the guarantees and letters of credit were fraudulent and not generated by BNI officers or employees. Accordingly, BNI argued that the commercial activity exception could not apply to it because none of its officers or employees were actually involved in any of the alleged commercial activity. In support of its position, BNI provided fifteen declarations from BNI employees and officers who were allegedly involved in the issuance of the guarantees and letters of credit. Each declaration denied the authenticity of the instruments and stated unequivocally that the declarant did not participate in the creation of any of the purported BNI guarantees or letters of credit.The district court ultimately denied BNI's motion to dismiss and granted appellees' request for jurisdictional discovery. The court limited its discovery order to the issue of whether any BNI officers or employees conducted commercial activity that satisfies the commercial activity exception under the FSIA. BNI now appeals both the denial of its motion for judgment on the pleadings and the discovery order.II. DISCUSSIONA. Motion for Judgment on the PleadingsThe FSIA provides the exclusive basis for obtaining jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state or its instrumentalities in the United States. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,504 U.S. 607, 611, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). "The denial of a claim to sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine." Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,198 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.1999) ("Southway I"). We review a district court's ultimate determination of its subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA de novo, reviewing factual findings attendant to that ultimate determination for clear error. Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China,506 F.3d 980, 991 (10th Cir.2007); see also Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,328 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir.2003) ("Southway II").Courts apply a burden-shifting analysis to determine whether a foreign state or its instrumentality is immune under the FSIA. Orient Mineral Co., 506 F.3d at 991. Under this analysis, once the defendant establishes that it is a foreign state entitled to immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of production to make an initial showing that an FSIA exception to immunity applies. Id. If the plaintiff carries its initial burden, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed exception does not apply in the particular case. Id. at 991-92.Appellees concede that BNI is a foreign state for the purposes of the FSIA; however, they argue that the FSIA's commercial activity exception applies in this case. Under the commercial activity exception:A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the[ 601 F.3d 1063 ]
United States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2). Appellees contend that the evidence they presented satisfies all three of the independent prongs of the commercial activity exception. Specifically, appellees argue that BNI's authentication and subsequent rejection of the guarantees and letters of credit in New York constitute both commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state and acts performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere. Furthermore, appellees contend that BNI's generation of the financial instruments in Indonesia, its issuance of the instruments directly to parties in the United States, and its refusal to honor the instruments, which caused significant loss to appellees in the United States, constitute commercial acts outside the United States that caused a direct effect in the United States.For its part, BNI does not challenge the legal significance of the alleged factsi.e., whether those facts, if true, would satisfy the commercial activity exception. Instead, BNI simply argues that, as a matter of fact, neither BNI nor any of its agents actually participated in the alleged commercial activity. Therefore, according to BNI, the commercial activity exception does not apply in this particular case, and the district court should have granted its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.As discussed above, the evidence presented to the district court consisted of fifteen declarations from BNI employees and the testimony of appellees and Mr. Jensen. The BNI declarations all dispute the authenticity of the BNI guarantees and letters of credit and all deny any BNI participation in the generation of those instruments. On the other hand, the evidence presented by appellees suggests that BNI employees were involved with the generation of the financial instruments and at the very least authenticated and then subsequently rejected them. Thus, the district court was presented with minimal and primarily self-serving evidence from both BNI and appellees. On this record and at this early stage in the litigation, the district court's finding that BNI did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that none of its officers or employees actually participated in the alleged commercial activity was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, it did not err in denying BNI's motion for judgment on the pleadings.B. Discovery OrderThe immunity provided under the FSIA protects foreign sovereigns from all the burdens of litigation, including the general burden of responding to discovery requests. See Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos,962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that foreign sovereigns possess a "legitimate claim to immunity from discovery"); see also Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola,216 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2000) ("[T]he sovereign has an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits"). When, however, there is a factual question regarding a foreign sovereign's entitlement to immunity, and thus a factual question regarding a district court's jurisdiction, the district court "must give the[ 601 F.3d 1064 ]
plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and present evidence relevant to the existence of jurisdiction." Phoenix Consulting, Inc., 216 F.3d at 40. Thus, there is a "tension between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign's or sovereign agency's legitimate claim to immunity from discovery."Arriba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 534. In light of this tension, other circuits have concluded that "[a]t the very least, discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination." Id.; see also EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,473 F.3d 463, 486 (2d Cir.2007).This is not to say, however, that a FSIA defendant may immediately appeal from a discovery order that it considers impermissibly broad. See Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. No. RE-1J,464 F.3d 1182, 1198 (10th Cir.2006) ("This circuit has repeatedly held that discovery orders are not appealable under the Cohen doctrine.") (quotations omitted); see also McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran,52 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C.Cir.1995) (rejecting suggestion that appellate jurisdiction over a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss on FSIA immunity grounds necessarily extends to a subsequent discovery order). In the qualified immunity context, for example, we have held that discovery orders "which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim" are not immediately appealable because they do not subject the defendant to the burdensome pretrial discovery that qualified immunity protects against. See Maxey ex rel. Maxey v. Fulton,890 F.2d 279, 282-83 (10th Cir.1989) ("[Q]ualified immunity does not shield government officials from all discovery but only from discovery which is either avoidable or overly broad"). Given that FSIA sovereign immunity affords defendants the same pre-trial protection against broad discovery that is unrelated to the question of immunity to defendants, see Arriba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 534, we find the Maxey rule equally applicable in the FSIA context. See id. at 534 (stating that the tension between allowing plaintiffs to discover jurisdictional facts and ensuring that immune foreign sovereigns are not subject to discovery orders that undermine their immunities, "is not unlike that attendant to claims that challenge domestic government officials' qualified immunity from suit"). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider BNI's claim only if the district court's order did not adequately limit permissible discovery to the question of BNI's immunity. See Maxey, 890 F.2d at 283.As discussed above, BNI's claim of immunity turns solely on the factual question of whether BNI officers or employees were actually involved in the commercial activity alleged by appellees. The district court ordered that appellees "shall be entitled to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery on whether [BNI], or its officials, conducted commercial activity that satisfies the commercial activity exception under the [FSIA]." Hansen v. Native Am. Refinery Co., et al., No. 2:06-CV-109 (D.Utah Aug. 24, 2009) (order denying BNI's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting in part and denying in part appellees' motion to stay discovery). Furthermore, at the hearing on BNI's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court assured BNI that "[i]f the discovery gets to a point where you feel that it is unnecessarily burdensome, I will entertain a motion to limit it appropriately." Thus, the record reflects that the district court narrowly tailored its discovery order to the precise jurisdictional fact question presented. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider BNI's appeal of the order. See Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282-84.[ 601 F.3d 1065 ]
III. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying BNI's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on sovereign immunity. We DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction BNI's appeal of the court's jurisdictional discovery order.Footnotes* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.Back to Reference1. Appellees also named other defendants in the suit, but they are not relevant to this appeal.

IN RE: STEVE O. Z. FINKEL, DEBTOR; GOOD LEASING, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
STEVE O. Z. FINKEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE; IN RE: STEVE O. Z. FINKEL, DEBTOR; GOOD LEASING, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
STEVE O. Z. FINKEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California Robert L. Hughes, Bankruptcy Judge, PresidingBefore: George, Volinn, and Lasarow, Bankruptcy Judge.Author: GeorgeGEORGE, Bankruptcy Judge:Before the Panel, by way of two consolidated appeals, is a question of whether the trial court erred in assessing the extent of the non-dischargeable debt owed to the appellant by the appellee-debtor in these proceedings. We AFFIRM the trial court's judgment.I. BACKGROUNDSometime before 1977, the appellee, Steve O.Z. Finkel, became interested in converting a restaurant facility into a discoteque. Prior to that time, Mr. Finkel had dealt with the appellant, both personally and as general manager of a business entity known ad Richardson Security Company, in the lease of a number of motor vehicles. In dealing with Good Leasing, Inc., [hereinafter "Good Leasing"] Mr. Finkel had worked primarily through one John Cross, as agent of the appellant.In anticipation of the need to finance his discoteque operation, Mr. Finkel approached Mr. Cross with the idea of obtaining funds from the Good Leasing. (Mr. Cross was subsequently given some $2,000 by Mr. Finkel, ostensibly for having provided his services as an intermediary in this series of transactions.)Three "sale and lease-back" agreements were eventually entered into between the above-named parties. Only the first of these agreements is of concern to the Panel at this time. Under this first agreement, Good Leasing advanced some $50,000 to the appellee through one Harold E. Mackenthun, who had been employed by Mr. Finkel to do the construction work on the project. Prior to making such an advance, however, two distinct bills of sale were issued. First, on February 15, 1977, Mr. Mackenthun gave Mr. Finkel a $50,000 bill of sale for the kitchen equipment to be purchased with the advance. Then, on February 28, 1977, Mr. Finkel gave Good Leasing a $50,000 bill of sale for the same equipment. Finally, on March 1, 1977, Good Leasing issued Mr. Mackenthun a check for the $50,000 amount, and Mackenthun endorsed the check over to Mr. Finkel. Thereafter, Good Leasing "leased" the kitchen equipment back to Finkel on a 36-month fixed-term lease.On November 1, 1977, the lease was renegotiated, with an agreed value being given the subject equipment of $68,999.36. Mr. Finkel was credited, at that time, with having paid $2,838.06 on the earlier lease.The evidence presented at trial supports the appellant's contention that the subject equipment was never worth anything near the $50,000 initially set as its value by the parties or the $68,999.36 established in the renegotiated lease. Moreover, the equipment was in used condition and its title had never been in the appellee's name. In the latter regard, some evidence exists that the equipment either belonged to the owner of the real property on which it was located or to a prior lessee of the said real property. In any event, the equipment was eventually sold by Mr. Finkel and the proceeds from that sale were utilized by him.Subsequently, Mr. Finkel defaulted under his lease and went into bankruptcy. Good Leasing, by way of its present complaint, seeks to avoid the discharge of this debt.Three arguments of law and fact were presented before the trial court on behalf of Good Leasing's complaint. First, it was maintained that a conspiracy had existed between Finkel, Cross, and Mackenthun to defraud Godd Leasing in the obtaining of the funds in question. Second, the appellant argued that Mr. Finkel obtained these funds as the result of a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the title, value, and condition of the equipment which formed the subject matter of their sale and lease-back agreement. Finally, Good Leasing claimed that, in any case, Mr. Finkel willfully and maliciously converted the said equipment.After entertaining evidence in this matter, the trial court reasonably chose to treat the agreements between these parties as loans to the debtor, secured by the "leased" kitchen equipment. The trial court then found that the appellant's conspiracy theory had not been proven. The trial court, however, further stated as follows:"Defendant represented the kitchen equipment to be his and to be worth $50,000. Whether it was his or not is immaterial because none of the plaintiff's loss can be attributed to lack of title in defendant. Plaintiff had a right to rely on the stated value of the kitchen equipment to the same extent it did on the stated values of the other property sold and leased. Had the property been worth $50,000, new, and had it been retained by defendant, it would have brought in the same proportion of salvage value as the other property."To the extent defendant intentionally disposed of property of plaintiff, he is liable for nondischargeable conversion. To the extent he willfully misrepresented the value of the kitchen equipment, he is guilty of nondischargeable fraud. In either case, the measure of damages is the salvage value of kitchen equipment as described if new."Based upon this damages holding, the trial judge then determined that a) the collateral of the appellant relating to the second and third loans had brought some $17,351.00 when sold, b) this latter property had been valued at $122,858 by the parties at the time of the loan, and c) the moving and related expenses involved in selling the kitchen equipment would probably have cost the appellant about $1,200, in any event. Taking the ratio of the actual salvage value of this later collateral to its value as estimated by the parties, i.e., $17,351.00: $122,858.00, or 14%, and multiplying this percentage times $50,000, the trial judge arrived at the hypothetical "salvage" value of the kitchen equipment subject to the first agreement, if new, or $7,000. From this figure, the trial court subtracted what would have been necessary liquidation expenses of $1,200, to arrive at his final damage figure of $5,800.II. ISSUEThe issue, as set forth in the appellant's opening brief, is whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of the nondischargeable debt which the court found to have been incurred by actual fraud and willful and malicious injury to property.III. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS AND THE LAWTwo fundamental arguments are made by the appellant in support of its position in these appeals. These arguments correspond with the trial court's dual bases for finding liability under the appellant's complaint. In the second of these arguments, the appellant maintains that the true measure of damages for conversion is the loss in the value of the property in question on the date it was converted, not its "salvage" value, if new.Although the Panel agrees with the appellant's statement of law concerning the time for measuring damages based upon the tort of conversion, it follows the trial court in holding this issue to have been raised unnecessarily. California's standard measure for damages arising from a wrongful conversion action is found in section 3336 of the California Civil Code:"The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to beFirst -- The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; andSecond -- A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property."The facts of this case indicate that the kitchen equipment used as collateral in this transaction was never worth its "agreed" value $50,000 -- the value now sought by the appellant. Rather, it was used equipment worth, according to the testimony of various parties, very little or nothing when removed from the appellee's premises. Moreover, the appellant has not alleged or proven any special damages arising solely from the conversion of the property now in question. Therefore, the measure of damages suffered by the appellant, as a result of the appellee's conversion, would seem to be less if made, in terms of its real value, on the date of the conversion, than if made at a later date, deeming the equipment to be new. The trial court's decision, based primarily upon the claim of false representation, actually provided the appellant with more than it would have received under its claim of willful and malicious conversion, alone.The question of fraud in the inducement of the Good Leasing-Finkel loan is somewhat more troublesome to the Panel. The thrust of the appellant's position is that it was induced to advance Mr. Finkel the initial $50,000 upon the supposition that the collateral for this loan was worth $50,000. If this is true, then the proper measure of damages suffered by the appellant because of this fraud would arguably be the total amount of the loan made in reliance upon such misstatements.Nevertheless, reliance is a key element in determining the nature and extent of a false representation. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P523.08[4], at 523-40 through 523-41 (15th ed. 1981). But see Zaretsky, "The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code," 53 Am.Bankr.L.J. 253, 258 (1979)(reliance by creditor not necessary under 11 U.S.C. ? 523(a)(2)(A)); In re Reinhart, 1 B.C.D. 666 (E.D. Va. Bkrptcy. 1975) (not requiring reliance in section 17(a)(2) case under the old Bankruptcy Act). In particular, when a misrepresentation concerns the value of collateral property, questions often arise as to the nature and extent of the secured creditor's reliance upon a debtor's false statement of that property's value. In such cases, the creditor has frequently relied upon a number of factors in making his loan decisions. Such factors most often include not only the represented worth of the collateral, but also the past credit record of the borrower, the use to which the total loan proceeds are to be placed, and the estimated ability of the borrower to repay the underlying obligation.In the instant case, for example, the appellant argues that "but for" the debtor having supplied it with collateral allegedly valued at the total amount of the loan in question, it would not have advanced the $50,000 to Mr. Finkel. That is to say, it claims that its reliance was based entirely upon its supposed ability to recover against this kitchen equipment. Nevertheless, the trial court apparently found that the appellant's reliance upon the collateral in question was only to the extent of the amount which it could have reasonably expected to recover through an execution upon that collateral. Additional reliance by the appellant in making the entire $50,000 loan was placed upon the past dealings with the parties, Mr. Finkel's general credit record, and the potential return expected from the debtor's discoteque operation. There is no argument of misrepresentation with respect to these other factors. Therefore, the trial court held that all that the appellant could claim to have been denied by the debtor's misrepresentations was the amount it relied upon obtaining in the event an execution upon its collateral proved necessary.The panel finds that there is sufficient evidence in the trial record to support such a finding. Good Leasing was not new to the business world. There was testimony of a common knowledge in the kitchen equipment business that goods of this sort were custom-fitted to each facility and that their resale value was accordingly limited. No evidence exists that a misrepresentation was made as to this fact or that any misunderstanding existed on the part of the appellant in this regard. The trial record further supports the trial court's underlying assumption that the appellant relied upon much more than this collateral in making its loan. Therefore, the panel finds the trial court not to have been clearly in error in finding that the appellant's reliance upon Mr. Finkel's misrepresentation was limited to the greatly-reduced value it would have received pursuant to an execution upon its collateral, if new. In the latter regard, the formula utilized by the trial court seems to have represented a reasonable attempt to arrive at just such an amount. We find no error in the use of this measure of damages.AFFIRMED.19820518 1998 VersusLaw Inc

OZ Finkel Is a Liar and a Con man.  He is black listed all over the internet!!!  I Have researched him.  He is directly affiliated to somebody else to a woman named June Lawrence who claims to have millions of dollars.  They are all crooks.

Stay away from them.  They give everyone the run around.  They will never deliver anything but just talk and years off your life!!!! 

Oznomics phone is disconnected.  THEY ARE LOSERS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Response and Rebuttal to Rip Off Report, # 489695, Category: Liars, on Oznomics, Inc.
 
To start with, the person filing the report is using a Pen Name (fictitious name)
of Frank M. of Tampa , Florida , USA
 
He did not bother to put any contact information for Frank M. so he cannot be held accountable for any of the lies and fabrications listed in the report.
 
We do however have a good ideal as to who his true identity is.   The Report was probably written by the person / Company who was misusing Financial Documents issued by Oznomics and their Bank.   This person / Company was representing Oznomics Bank Comfort Letter as their own and even had Oznomics Banking Information on their Company Contracts.
 
When this fraudulent activity was discovered, this person / Company was issued a Cease and Desist by Oznomics over 8-weeks ago.   As a matter of information, this case has been turned over to the legal authorities and Oznomics attorney.
 
I will be glad to answer any questions concerning the lies and fabrications listed in the Frank M report.   You can address them to my E-mail address listed herein.
 
Oz Finkle has not been black listed by any officially recognized lawful organizations Black List.   Nor is he a convicted felon with a warrant for his arrest in Texas .   He is however involved in a civil lawsuit in the State of Utah , which is a matter of public record.   Oz is Chairman of Oznomics, Inc. which owns or controls several Multi-National Corporations.   I have always found Oz to be very transparent in his dealings and always available to speak on the telephone, when you call him.
 
Ken Shand, the Executive President of Oznomics, Inc. lives in Ft. Lauderdale , Florida and has a substantial amount of Real Estate holdings there.
 
Oznomics, Inc. has dealt with the PNC Bank (the 5 th largest in the USA ) for many years and has a platform used for Product Purchases substantial enough for large fuel transactions.
 
I am one of several Registered Agents under Contract with Oznomics, Inc. and I have dealt directly with Ken Shand for over a year.   He has vast Executive experience in the Corporate World and has been employed at a high level in two Fortune 100 Corporations in the past.   I have found my dealings with him to be excellent and have found him to be impeccable and honest in all his dealings with me and others.   He has been more than fair with the commission structure paid to those involved in Product sales.   He does not circumvent or cut anyone out of their commissions.
 
You should know, that I volunteered to make these comments on my own and ask Oznomics permission to do so.
 
I would be glad to answer any questions you have, if you send them to my E-mail address: (((ROR redacted)))
 
Don Brice, Registered Agent for Oznomics, Inc.
  CLICK here to see why Rip-off Report, as a matter of policy, deleted either a phone number, link or e-mail address from this Report.

with your obvious distaste for the company i would appreciate knowing if you, or on your behalf, were any formal compalints filed with any regulatory or state agencies as to how they do business, such as SEC, FBI Fraud Dept, and so on.  i would appreciate knowing, thank you