Complaint Review: PAUL WOLF BEN BALE THEODOULOS MONTIS

IF YOU HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY A PAUL WOLF, RUN.

He purports to be from Phoenix Investment Group (PGI GroupInvest) in Seoul, South Korea (PGI-KR), and does most business via Skype.  Phone calls received by Mr. Wolf were actually from London, England. 

Mr. Wolf insists his company had the financial backing to offer a loan.  In one telephone conversation, Mr. Wolf had me call Wells Fargo Bank’s 24-hour customer service number, 1-800-869-3557.  On the automated system, Mr. Wolf instructed me to input an account number which was read over the phone, as well as a Federal Employer Identification Number (FEIN).  The account balance was in excess of $41 million.  Unfortunately, I did not have time to document the account number or FEIN.

Mr. Wolf informed me that a loan in the amount of $12 million was approved to acquire a commercial property.  He stated the loan would be processed by his “Fund Manager” in London:

Theodoulos Montis.

Wealth Management & Fiduciary Financial Control Unit.

World View Financial Group.

Financial Clearing House.

London, United Kingdom.

T:+44 20 **** ****

F:+44 20 **** ****

Website: worldviewfinancial.co.uk/

A requirement of the Loan was to purchase a Capital Investment Guarantee Policy (CIGP), which typically amounts to 5-12% of the loan amount.  Mr. Wolf stated he had a “contact” at London-Re, a company for which PGI-KR has done business.  The contact was:

Benjamin Bale.

2nd Floor, Newby House,

309 Chase Road,

London N146JS,

United Kingdom.

Company Reg. Number: 07171***

Phone: +44 20-3318-1874 Ext. 104

Fax: +44 20-3611-1110

Website: www.London-Re.org (also go to London-re.comfor scam info)

Mr. Bale e-mailed an invoice with instructions to wire $72,000 to a Sun Trust Bank account in Miramar, Florida, to the following:

SunTrust Bank.

8250 Miramar Pkwy,

Miramar FL 33025.

Swift:  SNTRUS3A.

ABA NO:  06100****.

Account No:  1000165******.

Beneficiary:  Raymond Global Sales Inc.

I was not comfortable wiring funds to an “unknown” Beneficiary, especially since the transaction was to procure a “Goldman Sachs” insurance policy.  I was expecting an invoice from an Insurance Agency, with a policy identification number in addition to wiring instructions to an insurance agency.  A Florida Corporations Search (www.sunbiz.org) revealed the business was registered with the State of Florida 7-weeks month prior to the invoice date

To acquire policy, an issuing entity will be able to provide proof of the security from the Bloomberg system.  They provide you with a “screenshot security verification”.  The information contained on Bloomberg will identify just about everything you need for verification, as such:

a.  Issuer Information;

b.  Security Information to include the issue price and maturity date;

c.  Identifiers, which includes the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), 9-digit CUSIP, etc.

The above information is NOT confidential information—it is basic information that a company should be willing to share.  International laws that govern the securities industry derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it.  This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions.

When I visited the website, www.London-Re.com, a notice appeared which states in bold red lettering:

            “It has come to our notice that a scam website under the url www.london-re.org has been using our good name and business model to attract clients.  If you have used this url to attain or have been issued a policy or been contacted by Peter Wolf, James Ault, or Benjamin Bale, please report it to local police service.  Our own clients are unaffected, however, due to the nature and severity of the scam, we have taken down our website until further notice.”

A few weeks later, I received a phone call from WorkflowOne, from Calgary, Canada.  The gentleman stated “was calling on behalf of his boss only obtain your US mailing address so a check may be mailed on behalf of PGI.”  The telephone caller ID number was (587) 889-2890.

An envelope was received in the mail, postmarked from “canadapost.ca 104106 23:09” and “postescanada.ca 3806 M4L 1A5”, but the return address on the envelope was “PO Box 2245, Dayton, OH”  Inside the envelope, wrapped in a piece of bond paper, was a check from WorkflowOne in the amount of $289,176.93.

I was advised by Mr. Wolf to deposit the check immediately.  A day later, Mr. Wolf I informed me via e-mail that in order to procure the CIGP at the discounted rate, I had to wire $20,000 by close of business the following day.  Mr. Wolf provided the following wiring instructions:

Bank of America.

18400 NW 67TH AVE.

HIALEAH,FL 33015

SWIFT:  BOFAUS3N

ABA NO:  026******

ACCOUNT NO:  ************

BENEFICIARY:  YESENIA GLOBAL SALES & TRADES INC.

A search of Yesenia Global Sales & Trades Inc., revealed that the company was registered with the Florida Secretary of State on December 13, 2013, exactly 7 weeks before the instructions from Mr. Wolf to wire funds to this beneficiary, a similar pattern as with the previous beneficiary.

I had no intention to wire any funds to Mr. Wolf until the check cleared.  On Wednesday, January 29, 2014, I received a phone call from BB&T Liability and Risk Management (LRM) office (800-448-5493 and press #3).  Mr. Washington stated that the check was “fraudulent” and “fictitious”.  He asked for all information I had, and it was provided.

I also called WorkforceOne, apparently where the check came from.  The phone number, 937-228-5800, was in very small print on the check.  No one knew a “Robert M. Gracia (sp)”, the signature on the check, and I was referred to their fraud office.  A copy of the check was sent to them, and it was verified as a fraudulent check.

What Mr. Wolf was hoping is that the bank would release $10,000 to $20,000 immediately, and that amount would be wired to the beneficiaries noted above.  Then when the check doesn’t clear, you’re stuck with a $20,000 deficit in your account.

Again, RUN before you get scammed.