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Pierce v. Society of sisters, 268US510 (1925): “Fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creacher of the state. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431US494 (1977): “Our decisions establish that the constitution protects the sanctity of the family, precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we implicate and pass down many of our most cherished values; moral and cultural.”

Smith v. Organization of foster families, 431US816 (1977): “The liberty interest in family privacy has its source and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in this nation's history and tradition.”

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434US246 (1978): “We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. We have little doubt that the due process clause would be offended if a state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family over the objections of the parents and their children without some showing of unfitness, and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.”

Parham v. J.R, 442US584 (1979): “The laws concept of the family rests upon a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgement required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it is recognized that the natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their child. The status notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases simply because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to american tradition. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455US745 (1982): “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the state. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. Until the state proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”

Reno v. Flores, 507US 292 (1993): “‘The best interest of the child’, (is) a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody, but it is not traditionally the sole criterion, much less the sole constitutional criterion for other less narrowly channeled judgements involving

children where their interests conflict in varying ways with the interests of others. The best interest of the child is not the legal standard that governs parent's or guardian's exercise of their custody, so long as certain minimal requirements of child care are met. The interest of the child may be subordinated to interests of other children, or indeed to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves."

Washington v. Glucksburg, 521US702 (1997): "In a long line of cases, we have held that in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the bill of rights, the liberties specially protected by the due process clause includes the rights to direct to education and upbringing of one's children."

Troxel v. Granville, 530US57 (2000): "The liberty interest at issue in this case, the interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court. In light of this extensive precedent, it can not now be doubted that the due process clause of the 14th amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The problem here is not that the Washington superior court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville's determination of her daughters best interests; more importantly, it appears that the superior court applied exactly the opposite presumption. The due process clause does not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes that a 'better decision' could be made."