Complaint Review: Attorney Eugene Carson - Riverside California

Who Is Attorney Eugene Carson?

 Can He Be Trusted?

 This is one of Attorney Carson’s Actual Cases which shows how he operates his Law Business

 Read and See what the Judges have said about him, his conduct and his behavior

 Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two

Filed January 4, 2012

In re the Marriage of EUGENE and LOVEJOY CARSON 

EUGENE CARSON III, Appellant, v. LOVEJOY CARSON, Respondent.  NO. E052074

 

You can scroll down to see the entire case. The following are a few excerpts of the case for a quick overview:

1- The court commented that "numerous motions" had been filed and the "amount of litigation" in the case was "extraordinary."

2- The court also said: "This case is starting on a path that is what I consider scorched earth. …. It's a lot of litigation over a lot of things that can be easily resolvable."

3- … husband (attorney Eugene Carson) should be required to pay her attorney's fees and costs because his conduct was unreasonable and had increased the cost of litigation.

4- The court agreed with wife's contention Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) had not provided enough information. As a result, the court appointed an expert to examine the cash flow (which resulted in increased cost of litigation).

5- During the hearing, the court commented that: "This is by far the most conflicted case I have seen on the family law bench."  (That is how attorney Eugene Carson’s operates his Divorce Business. He creates conflict in order to increase cost of litigation).

6- The court granted wife's request for a protective order… and ordered husband (attorney Eugene Carson) to pay a portion of her attorney's fees and costs. (Because attorney Carson had caused her costs of litigation to increase)

7- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) failed to produce enough information for the court and the parties (which increased cost of litigation).

8- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) took no steps to withdraw the subpoenas even though circumstances strongly indicated that would have been the only appropriate tactical decision to make.

9- The court ordered husband (attorney Eugene Carson) to pay fees and costs associated with the motion (Because attorney Carson had caused her costs of litigation to increase).

10- In sum, we (the judges of the Court of Appeals) would be hard pressed to find a record that more clearly shows Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) frustrated the policy of reducing costs of litigation through cooperation and settlement.

11- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) pursued the medical records even after admitting to the court he already had the records heneeded … and after the court essentially warned him the specific records he was seeking would not impact the outcome of the case.

12- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) was continuing his attempts to prevent her (his pregnant wife, mother of his children) from obtaining her one-half share of community property.

13- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson)'s conduct had frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement and reduce the costs of litigation.

14- The court said, "My belief at this point is that husband (attorney Carson) is not incurring attorney fees to the extent he's telling us (he is lying).

15- The court said …the (legal) fees have been exacerbated because of husband (attorney Eugene Carson)'s actions.

16- The court concluded based on the record that husband (attorney Eugene Carson) was "not in the mood to settle, period, under no circumstances" and was intent on going to trial and on "throwing every road block in her way.” (Which increased her cost of litigation).

17- According to the court, the record clearly demonstrated husband (attorney Eugene Carson) was engaged in "frustrating attempts at settlement."

18- Ninety-nine percent of those situations result in the other party acquiescing or stipulating to set aside the default because the law is crystal clear that that's what the Court will do. . . . Again, that wasn't good enough for husband (attorney Eugene Carson).

19- We still have to come to court, jack up attorney fees for everybody to fight on a clearly losing issue. (And increase cost of litigation).

20- Based on our (Court of Appeals) independent review of the record … husband (attorney Eugene Carson) was simply unwilling to settle on anything, was intent on fueling unnecessary litigationonevery issue. (To increase her cost of litigation)

21- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) did not attach the required schedule and only reported losses (dishonesty).

22- Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) had not produced all of the documents necessary … even though he was ordered to do so by the court.

23- Because husband (attorney Eugene Carson) had not provided enough information, the court found it necessary to appoint an expert to examine the cash flow (which increased the cost and length of litigation).

24- From husband (attorney Eugene Carson)'s failure to produce key information and documents on this issue, the courtcould reasonably infer Husband (attorney Eugene Carson) had other monthly income he had not reported.

Note: Parentheses added for clarification

 

Note: This appeal was so ludicrous and imprudent that the Respondent did not even appear and WON the case!

 

 

Eugene Carson III, in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS (too embarrassing for attorney Eugene Carson)

OPINION

MILLER, J.

Eugene Carson III (husband) filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Lovejoy Carson (wife) on or about October 15, 2009. Later, wife filed two different motions requesting an order requiring husband to pay her attorney's fees and costs. On August 10, 2010, the court ordered husband to pay part of wife's attorney's fees and costs. Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay these attorney's fees and costs, and in refusing to issue a written statement of decision on the issue. Husband further contends the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to pay half of the fees for an expert accountant without first determining a reasonable amount for the fees. Wife has not filed a response to husband's appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Two separate cases were filed in the course of the dissolution, and the two cases were later consolidated. First, husband filed an ex parte petition for custody in case No. SWD018733. On August 24, 2009, the court awarded joint custody of the couple's 10-month-old son. Wife then filed an order to show cause (OSC) in this action seeking child support, spousal support, and attorney's fees. The court resolved these initial support issues at a hearing on October 8, 2009. During the hearing, the court learned wife was about six weeks pregnant with the couple's second child and was not working when she filed for support. Prior to the birth of the couple's first child, she was employed as an underwriter in the mortgage industry. In addition to her prior work experience, wife had a masters degree in business. As a result, the court imputed $3,813 of monthly earning capacity to wife and ordered husband to pay a total of $1,030 per month, which included $387 in child support and $643 in spousal support. Spousal support was ordered even though husband argued he did not have the ability to pay since his monthly expenses exceeded his income.

In the second case, No. SWD019185, husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on October 15, 2009; the two cases were consolidated into case No. SWD019185. Through inadvertence of counsel, wife did not file a response to the dissolution petition in the correct action. At husband's request, default was entered against her on February 26, 2010. Wife then filed a motion to set aside the default on March 18, 2010. Husband opposed the motion, filing two separate sets of points and authorities, arguing the motion should be denied because wife failed to prove excusable neglect, her attorney did not clearly admit fault, and any negligence by staff should be imputed to the attorney. At a hearing on May 3, 2010, the court granted wife's motion to set aside the default. Wife filed a response on May 5, 2010.

At the next hearing on June 7, 2010, the court commented that "numerous motions" had been filed and the "amount of litigation" in the case was "extraordinary." The court also said: "[T]his case is starting on a path that is what I consider scorched earth. I'm not saying one side or the other. It's a lot of litigation over a lot of things that can be easily resolvable."¹

Filings by husband to be considered at the hearing on June 7, 2010, included an OSC seeking modification of support, and a motion to expunge the lis pendens on four properties. However, new support issues could not be resolved at that hearing, because husband failed to file an updated income and expense declaration, including a profit and loss statement concerning four rental properties in dispute. Husband was ordered to file the documents before the next hearing. On the motion to expunge the lis pendens on the properties, the court agreed with husband that wife's pleadings lacked specificity. Instead of granting husband's motion, the court granted wife time to amend the pleadings to remedy the defects.

By oral motion at the hearing on June 7, 2010, husband raised custody and visitation issues over the couple's infant daughter, who was born April 1, 2010. Husband complained wife had not yet allowed him to see his daughter and had waited almost a week to tell him she had been born. Although the court ordered the couple to mediation on the custody and visitation issue, the court issued a temporary order allowing husband "reasonable contact" with the infant. A further hearing was set for July 7, 2010.

On June 30, 2010, wife filed a motion for a protective order and for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,958. The supporting declaration indicated husband noticed wife's deposition and served two subpoenas on Kaiser Permanente seeking her medical records related to the birth of their son. Wife's attorney prepared and served objections to the subpoenas. Before filing the motion, wife's attorney indicated he asked husband to withdraw his request for these records, but there was no response. As a result, wife requested a protective order on the grounds that her medical records were irrelevant, private, and protected by the physician-patient privilege.

On July 7, 2010, wife also filed a motion pursuant to Family Code sections 271 and 2030 asking the court for an order requiring husband to pay all of her attorney's fees and costs in the dissolution action to date. Wife argued husband should be required to pay her attorney's fees and costs because his conduct was unreasonable and had increased the cost of litigation. Wife further argued an award of attorney's fees and costs was justified based on husband's ability to pay and the disparity in their respective incomes.

During the hearing on July 7, 2010, the court commented that both parties filed "hundreds . . . of pages" for the hearing. For the most part, the court followed the mediator's recommendation with respect to custody of the couple's infant daughter and ordered both husband and wife to attend a co parenting program. Husband was ordered to pay a total of $1,205 in support, which included $885 in child support and $320 in spousal support. Spousal support was ordered to terminate on October 1, 2010. In addition, husband was ordered to enroll the children in his health insurance plan.

The court was unable to resolve disputed issues over the amount of profit or loss from the four rental properties at the hearing on July 7, 2010.

Husband claimed he was losing money on the rentals at varying amounts every month. In his declaration, husband claimed a loss of $513 per month. Wife argued there was a positive cash flow from the properties of $1,300 to $1,700 per month based on the documents husband produced and the positive cash flow wife was aware of while the couple was still together. Wife also argued husband had not complied with the court's order to provide proof of cash flow, including a spreadsheet and canceled checks. The court agreed with wife's contention husband had not provided enough information. As a result, the court appointed an expert to examine the cash flow of the four rental properties, as well as the source of the down payments for the properties and any monies used to make improvements, with both parties equally responsible for payment of the fees.

Because wife complied with the court's prior order to amend the pleadings on the lis pendens on the properties, the court denied husband's motion to expunge at the hearing on July 7, 2010. During the hearing, the court commented that: "This is by far the most conflicted case I have seen on the family law bench." Other issues were reserved for a further hearing.

On August 10, 2010, the court held a hearing on wife's motion for a protective order and attorney's fees and costs related to the motion, as well as wife's separate motion for attorney's fees and costs under Family Code sections 271 and 2030 related to the dissolution proceeding to date. The court granted wife's request for a protective order, quashed the subpoenas for her medical records, and ordered husband to pay a portion of her attorney's fees and costs. Husband requested a written statement of decision from the court, but the court indicated husband was not entitled to one, because there had been no final decision on a disputed material fact, and because the court stated its reasons on the record. Husband's appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. COURT APPOINTED EXPERT FEES

As noted above, the family court appointed an expert to examine the cash flow of the four disputed rental properties, as well as the source of the down payments for the properties and any monies used to make improvements, with both parties equally responsible for payment of the fees. Citing Evidence Code 730 and In re Marriage of Laurenti (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 395, husband complains the trial court abused its discretion by failing to determine a reasonable amount of compensation for the expert or the specific amount he was required to pay the expert. As a result, husband contends the order requiring him to pay the expert should be reversed.

Evidence Code section 730 states in part as follows: "When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required. The court may fix the compensation for these services, if any, rendered by any person appointed under this section, in addition to any service as a witness, at the amount as seems reasonable to the court." (Italics added.)

In our view, husband's reliance on section 730 is misplaced and premature. First, under Evidence Code section 730, the court "may," but is not required to, fix the amount of an expert's compensation. We therefore reject husband's contention the court's order requiring him to pay the court-appointed expert's fees is reversible because it was mandatory for the court to determine the specific amount husband would be required to pay the expert. Second, the record shows the expert was appointed by the court during the hearing on July 7, 2010, shortly before husband filed this appeal. At that time, the expert had not even been contacted about the work to be done, or to obtain an estimate of the cost of the court-ordered accounting. Thus, any determination about the reasonableness of the costs for the expert's services would have been premature. We therefore conclude there is no basis for reversing the order requiring husband to pay half of the expert's fees. The order was appropriate at that point in the proceeding, and necessary because husband failed to produce enough information for the court and the parties to determine the actual cash flow on the disputed rental properties.

In re Marriage of Laurenti, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at page 395, is factually and procedurally distinguishable from the circumstances at issue here. The court in Laurenti appointed an expert to evaluate a custody issue. Custody issues are more specifically governed by rule 5.220 of the California Rules of Court. (Laurenti, at p. 403.) Under California Rules of Court, rule 5.220(d)(1)(D), the court "must. . . [d]etermine and allocate between the parties any fees or costs of the evaluation." (Italics added.) The wife in Laurenti was billed for the cost of the court ordered custody evaluation even though the expert had been disqualified and did not complete all of the work. (Id. at pp. 402-403.) As a result, the wife filed a motion to vacate the fees. (Id. at p. 402.) The court denied the motion and ordered the wife to pay the amount billed by the expert. Prior to entering the order to pay, the court did not review the bill, consider the value of the services rendered, or the circumstances surrounding the expert's disqualification. As a result, the appellate court reversed the order and remanded the matter for further consideration. (Id. at pp. 402-405.)

Here, the expert services ordered by the court did not involve a custody issue governed by the mandatory language in California Rules of Court, rule 5.220(d)(1)(D). The record on appeal indicates only that the expert was appointed at the hearing on July 7, 2010. There is nothing to indicate the expert was asked for an estimate of the cost of the work. Nor is there anything to indicate any of the work had been completed or billed by the expert when husband filed his appeal. The record also does not indicate husband or wife made any request under Evidence Code section 730 for the court to fix the expert's compensation at a reasonable amount. Thus, Laurenti does not support husband's argument.

B. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Husband argues the court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay some of wife's attorney's fees and costs, because there is insufficient evidence that he had the ability to pay or that wife needed him to pay. According to husband, the record shows he was unable to pay because his expenses exceeded his income. Husband further believes the record does not show the court considered all of the relevant circumstances or that the fees were "reasonably necessary" under the standards set forth in Family Code sections 2030 and 2032.² Husband also complains the court failed to adequately state the basis of its decision on the record.

Subdivision (a) of section 271 states in part as follows: "[T]he court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties' incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award."

"A sanctions order under section 271 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Accordingly, we will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order. [Citations.] `We review any findings of fact that formed the basis for the award of sanctions under a substantial evidence standard of review.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225-1226.) "[W]e may affirm the court's sanctions order on any ground supported by the record. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1225.) Section 271 is not "a need-based statute," and, as a result, it "does not require a correlation between the sanctioned conduct and specific attorney fees," or require the moving party to support the motion with a current income and expense declaration. (Corona, at pp. 1226-1227.)

A motion for attorney's fees and costs under section 2030 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 630.) Under section 2030, the court may award attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the other party in a marital dissolution proceeding in order to ensure that each party has access to legal assistance. (§ 2030, subd. (a)) In a marital dissolution proceeding, such an award may be necessary in order to maintain "parity between spouses in their ability to obtain effective legal representation." (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1312.) The court may award "whatever amount is reasonably necessary . . . for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding. . . ." (§ 2030, subd. (a).)

Attorney's fees and costs under section 2030 may be awarded "where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties." (§ 2032, subd. (a).) "In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320. The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party's own attorney's fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances." (§ 2032, subd. (b).)

The parties' "circumstances" as described in section 4320 include earning capacity, training and education, marketable employment skills, assets, debts, the balance of hardships to each party, and "[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable." (§ 4320, subds. (a)-(n).) In other words, the court must apply a totality of the circumstances approach and must consider more than a disparity in the couple's respective incomes before it decides to award attorney's fees and costs to one party. (Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 258.) "Further, in determining whether to award attorney fees to one party, the family court may consider the other party's trial tactics." (In re Marriage of Tharp, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.)

Despite husband's contention to the contrary, the record includes a lengthy and detailed discussion by the court as to why it believed an award of attorney's fees and costs in favor of wife was appropriate under the circumstances. Based on that discussion and the limited record provided by husband with his appeal, it is our view substantial evidence supports the court's order requiring husband to pay a portion of wife's attorney's fees and costs. As a result, we cannot conclude the court's order was an abuse of discretion.

Wife's first request for attorney's fees and costs was made on June 30, 2010, in connection with her motion for a protective order as to her medical records. Wife represented she incurred attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,958 to bring her motion for a protective order. She requested husband be required to pay this amount as sanctions, because he would not withdraw his subpoenas for her medical records even though they were privileged and irrelevant to the dissolution.

After granting wife's motion for a protective order and quashing the subpoenas for her medical records, the court ordered husband to pay fees and costs associated with the motion in the amount of $1,500. The court's order is readily and wholly supported by the record. Husband took no steps to withdraw the subpoenas even though circumstances strongly indicated that would have been the only appropriate tactical decision to make.

At the end of the hearing on July 7, 2010, the court noted wife had filed a motion for protective order, which was scheduled to be heard on August 10, 2010. The court indicated it had already read the motion and asked the parties whether they would like the court to discuss the matter informally in the hope of resolving the issue without a hearing. Both husband and wife responded affirmatively. Husband indicated he subpoenaed wife's medical records related to the birth of their son in order to use information in the records to impeach wife's "future credibility" based on statements made by wife in a prior declaration. The court suggested it considered the medical records irrelevant and told the parties they should discuss and resolve the matter informally to save time and expense. The court also told husband it was inclined to quash the subpoenas and grant the protective order. The court further indicated it would be "very sympathetic" to wife's request for attorney's fees sought in connection with the motion. Husband indicated on the record he already had the information he needed to impeach wife's credibility. Specifically, husband said, "I spoke to him, and I already have the information regarding her medical records. He provided that to me back in April under the discovery request so . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I really don't need the medical records because she has already provided the information that I need to impeach her credibility."

At the hearing on the motion on August 10, 2010, wife's counsel stated he had not received any communication from husband or his counsel about withdrawing the subpoenas. Husband's counsel argued once again the medical records were important to the issue of wife's credibility, because wife represented in her declaration seeking support that she quit her former job to prepare for the birth of the couple's first child. According to counsel, the medical records would show she was not even pregnant when she voluntarily terminated her employment. The court reiterated its position the documents being sought were private and were only "marginally relevant at best and likely not admissible." The court further indicated the documents husband was seeking would not have changed any of its rulings thus far. On the issue of support, the court indicated it disregarded wife's declaration and imputed income to her.

In sum, we would be hard pressed to find a record that more clearly shows husband frustrated the policy of reducing costs of litigation through cooperation and settlement, by his continued pursuit of the medical records. Husband pursued the medical records even after admitting to the court he already had the records he needed to impeach wife's credibility, and after the court essentially warned him the specific records he was seeking would not impact the outcome of the case. As outlined more fully below, the court's decision to award attorney's fees and costs to wife based on all of the relevant evidence about the parties' comparative financial positions is supported by the record.

Wife's second request for attorney's fees and costs was made in a separate motion filed July 7, 2010, pursuant to sections 271 and 2030. In her motion, wife claimed to have paid attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $12,250 and said there seemed to be "no end in sight," because husband was continuing his attempts to prevent her from obtaining her one-half share of community property. In support of the motion, wife's counsel filed a lengthy and detailed declaration including information he believed was sufficient to show husband's conduct had frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement and reduce the costs of litigation. Counsel stated husband had an advantage not only because husband was employed and wife was not working, but also because husband was an attorney himself, and was not paying all of his own fees and costs. The court ordered husband to pay $5,000 of wife's attorney's fees and costs associated with the dissolution action.

Based on the balance of equities approach required by statute, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the award of attorney's fees and costs to wife. First, attorney's fees and costs claimed by husband and wife were roughly equivalent. Husband claimed he incurred $13,457.56 in attorney's fees and costs, and wife claimed she incurred $12,250. Although represented by retained counsel, husband was doing a lot of his own legal research and drafting his own paperwork. Thus, his access to the legal system was greater than wife's even if we do not consider the amount of fees and costs incurred by either party. Second, the court questioned whether husband was actually going to pay as much as wife in legal fees based on his ability to do his own legal research and draft his own paperwork. The court said, "My belief at this point is that [husband] is not incurring attorney fees to the extent he's telling us . . . . I don't know if [husband] will ever be liable for his end of it, especially in light of the fact that he's, per everybody's acknowledge, doing a substantial portion of this work. The reality of it is that both . . . have a right to have equal access to counsel so that you can both be on the same footing and have a level playing field. I think the fees have been exacerbated because of [husband's] actions. . . ."

More importantly, the court concluded based on the record that husband was "not in the mood to settle, period, under no circumstances" and was intent on going to trial and on "throwing every road block in her way. . . ." The court said, "That's what Family Code section 271 deals with, is whether one party is going to have an open mind and try to settle or whether they are going to do a scorch-earth campaign on their part." According to the court, the record clearly demonstrated husband was engaged in "frustrating attempts at settlement." This included husband's relentless pursuit of wife's private medical records to impeach her credibility, his protracted litigation over the lis pendens on the properties in dispute, and his unyielding quest to prevail in the action based on wife's default. With respect to husband's strong and repeated opposition to wife's motion to set aside the default, the court said, "[Wife's counsel] . . . threw himself on the sword in that motion. [Ninety-nine] percent of those situations result in the other party acquiescing or stipulating to set aside the default because the law is crystal clear that that's what the Court will do. . . . Again, that wasn't good enough for [husband]. We still have to come to court, jack up attorney fees for everybody to fight on a clearly losing issue." The court also mentioned the fact that income was imputed to wife at the original OSC hearing, but husband brought the same issue up again "in at least one or two subsequent hearings."

Based on our independent review of the record, we cannot disagree with the trial court's conclusions that husband was simply unwilling to settle on anything, was intent on fueling unnecessary litigation on every issue, and was not incurring attorney's fees and costs at the same level as wife. Under these circumstances, it is our view an award of attorney's fees and costs in wife's favor was reasonably necessary to give wife equal access to legal representation.

In reaching its decision to award attorney's fees and costs in wife's favor, the trial court also considered the available evidence on the parties' incomes, assets, and liabilities. On the basis of the available evidence, the court essentially determined an award of attorney's fees and costs to wife was "just and reasonable under the relative circumstances" and would not impose "an unreasonable financial burden" on husband based on the relative circumstances of the parties. Husband's income was also expected to increase when spousal support payments terminated in less than two months on October 1, 2010.

Despite husband's argument to the contrary, the court did address husband's objection he could not afford to pay any of wife's attorney's fees and costs, because his expenses exceeded his income. The court specifically declined to change its ruling on that basis, because husband's stated expenses included money to maintain four rental properties even though there was no equity in any of them. In response, husband claimed the income and expense declaration only included his "personal expenses," but the court was not persuaded to change its ruling by the argument. It is apparent from the record that the court did not find husband's objection credible.

As husband contends, it is true that losses from the four rental properties were not included in his personal expenses. However, wife claimed there was a positive cash flow from the properties during the marriage. The income and expense declaration required the claimant to attach a schedule showing gross receipts less cash expenses for each and every piece of rental property. Tellingly, husband did not attach the required schedule and only reported losses from the properties of $513 to $1,434 per month on his income and expense declaration. In addition, as discussed more fully above, husband had not produced all of the documents necessary to demonstrate the cash flow for the properties even though he was ordered to do so by the court. Because husband had not provided enough information, the court found it necessary to appoint an expert to examine the cash flow for the properties. From husband's failure to produce key information and documents on this issue, the court could reasonably infer husband had other monthly income he had not reported.

Based on the foregoing, we cannot disagree with the trial court's order requiring husband to pay a portion of wife's attorney's fees and costs. Substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that requiring husband to pay part of wife's attorney's fees and costs was just and reasonable under the circumstances, and did not impose an unreasonable financial burden on husband.

C. STATEMENT OF DECISION

Husband believes it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to honor his request for a written statement of decision on wife's motions for attorney's fees and costs. He believes the trial court should have exercised its discretion to issue a written statement of decision because he made a timely request, and his request only involved a single issue from one hearing. We disagree.

"Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires the trial court to issue a statement of decision `upon the trial of a question of fact' when it receives a request therefore by a party appearing at trial. In general, however, section 632 applies when there has been a trial followed by a judgment. [Citation.] It does not apply to an order on a motion. [Citation.] This is true even if the motion involves an evidentiary hearing and the order is appealable. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1040.)

Here, the hearing on wife's motions was not a trial and was not followed by a judgment. Therefore, under the general rule, the trial court was not required to issue a statement of decision. Although we acknowledge there are some exceptions to this general rule, these exceptions do not include a hearing in a dissolution proceeding to determine whether a husband should be ordered to pay his wife's attorney's fees and costs. (In re Marriage of Askmo, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040.) Nor has husband cited any authority requiring a trial court to exercise its discretion to issue a written statement of decision where Code of Civil Procedure section 632 does not require it to do so. (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1497.) As a result, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error when it declined to issue a statement of decision on the issue of attorney's fees and costs.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.

RAMIREZ, P. J. and KING, J., concurs.

FOOTNOTES

1. The record on appeal does not include all of the parties' filings in the dissolution.

2. All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.

 

Here is how Attorney Eugene Carson operates his profitable divorce business:

1- He creates a lot of conflict and tension between husbands and wives to increase the amount of litigation. If there is any chance of the husband and wife getting back together, he makes sure he takes it away. He accomplishes that by having his clients lie in their declarations and in court and make false accusations against the other party which creates hostility among the parties. The hostility and tensions that attorney Eugene Carson creates among parents have horrible effects on the children involved in the divorce. Attorney Eugene Carson ruins people’s lives only to make more money.

2- He files a lot of unnecessary motions, declarations and exhibits which have no impact on the outcome of the case other than cause delays and increase his attorney fees.

3- During the court hearings he deliberately causes delays to increase the time he spends in court and make more money.

4- He does not produce the required documents or provide the information required under the law to the other party in order to cause delays and make more money.

5- He prevents his clients from going to mediation because he doesn’t want to end the case.

6- He provides false information to his clients who know nothing about family law and continues to use them and hurt them and their children emotionally and financially by dragging the case for as long as he can only to make more money.

 

If attorney Eugene Carson could do what he did to the mother of his own children who was also pregnant, imagine what he would do to you and your children?