concerning crooked attorney Frank G. Prantil and Mary T. Prantil drug addicts | ||||||||
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MARY T. PRANTIL FOLLOWS IN HER CRIMINAL FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS MARY T. PRANTIL FOLLOWS IN HER CRIMINAL FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS MATTER DISBARRMENT FRANK G. PRANTIL ( MARY T. PRANTIL THAT KEEPS POSTING LIES ABOUT BLOOD LOVE AND LUST SPELLS, JIM MORGAN AND JAN WINDGLOWS OF BLOOD LOVE AND LUST SPELLS... it is no WONDER that Mary T. Prantil is such a CRIMINAL and SCAM CON...hey public take a look and read below and click the links to verify that Mary T. Prantil and her father are the same birds of a feather- criminals, liars, and drug addicts !!! After you THE PUBLIC read the information below, you will learn all about Mary T. Prantil's father getting disbarred TWICE as a lawyer, charged several times for misconduct, all about his cocaine addictions, his lies, schemes, causing a mistrial for a famous controversial murder case, stealing money from a safe from inside a client's house... Mary T. Prantil sure is a piece of slime gutter trash...like father, like daughter...A CRIMINAL, a liar, a piece of white trash gutter slime that cannot shut her OPEN GAPING HOLE in her face where her mouth used to be!!! Mary T. Prantil LIAR LIAR PANTS ON FIRE !!! she learned everything she knows from her criminal father. PRANTIL GET OFF THE INTERNET AND STOP SHOWING YOUR UGLY LIAR FACE BECAUSE EVERYONE KNOWS ALL ABOUT YOU AND YOUR CRIMINAL FATHER. TAKE A HIKE, YOU ROTTEN LIAR SCUM GUTTER TRASH. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. D-787 110 S. Ct. 493, 493 U.S. 972, 107 L. Ed. 2d 497, 58 U.S.L.W. 3351, 1989.SCT.45677 <http://www.versuslaw.com> November 27, 1989 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARRMENT OF FRANK G. PRANTIL For earlier order herein, see Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy It having been reported to the Court that Frank G. Prantil, of Fair Oaks, California, has been disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of California and this Court by order of May 15, 1989, having suspended the said Frank G. Prantil from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued; It is ordered that the said Frank G. Prantil be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. Disposition Disbarrment entered. 19891127 1998 VersusLaw Inc. http://wi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CSCT%5CSCT2%5C1989%5C19891127_0045677.SCT.htm/qx -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Powered by VersusLaw, Inc. Home | Advertise | About | Feedback | Terms | Privacy Policy | FAQ All contents Copyright 2008 - 2009 VersusLaw, Inc. Bellevue, WA, USA. All rights reserved **************************************************************************************************** On trial before the bar court in San Francisco, FRANK PRANTIL [#35155], 67, of Sacramento is charged with multiple counts of failing to perform legal services competently. Prantil was disbarred in 1989, reinstated in 1994 and charged with misconduct in 2002. The trial on the new charges was ongoing at press time and although the bar had not formally asked for his disbarment, it is a possible penalty. The 1989 disbarment was the result of convictions for forgery and being an accessory to possess cocaine. http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%20Resources/California%20Bar%20Journal/June2005&sCatHtmlPath=cbj/2005-06_TH_03_2nd-disbarments.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines ********************************************************************************************************** In a case two miles across town at the State Bar offices on Howard Street -- and at the other end of the world of privilege -- 67-year-old defense attorney Frank Prantil is facing a task he's already performed numerous times -- defending himself against accusations that he's acted unethically as an attorney. In 1979, Prantil was suspended from practicing law after he was accused of improperly representing a client. While on probation, Prantil was alleged to have participated in a check-fraud scheme. He was convicted of forgery and disbarred, according to the California Supreme Court opinion confirming Prantil's disbarment. Prantil later took advantage of California rules that allow disbarred attorneys to ask for reinstatement after five years. Prantil successfully argued that he had rehabilitated himself, and resumed practice in 1994. Prantil is now facing State Bar disciplinary charges, which could potentially get him disbarred again, alleging that he failed to competently defend a client, then improperly charged the client for his services. Prantil's case, along with three cases decided earlier this year in which California attorneys were disbarred for a second time, has added steam to a nine-year-old bureaucratic proposal to give judges the option of disbarring the worst attorneys for life. In California, there now exists no legal concept of permanent disbarment. A State Bar committee on Nov. 15 will consider the possibility of changing that, if only slightly. Rather than making all disbarments permanent, it would extend from five to seven years the amount of time disbarred attorneys would have to wait before requesting to be reinstated, and would give judges the option of forever banishing the worst of California's worst attorneys. The fact that it's taken nine years for such a mild proposal to reach this preliminary step hints at a lack of seriousness the California legal establishment lobby applies to abuses by its own members. http://www.sfweekly.com/2005-11-09/news/baring-equality/ *********************************************************************************************************** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank G. PRANTIL, Defendant-Appellant. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit June 25, 1985 764 F.2d 548 Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant. AMENDED OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of California. Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, * District Judge. FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: 1 The defendant, a criminal defense attorney, appeals his conviction on eight out of eleven counts alleged in an indictment for the offenses of perjury, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623; false statements, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001; and being accessory after the fact, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3. All of the defendant's convictions are predicated on actions he took while representing a criminal defendant, Betty Powell, in a separate criminal prosecution. After a seven-day trial the jury found the defendant not guilty on two counts of harboring a fugitive and perjury. The district court had previously dismissed the misprision of a felony count before the trial began. On appeal, the defendant raises a host of issues which, for the most part, we need not address. Three of the defendant's challenges, however, require reversal of the defendant's convictions for the reasons explained herein. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 The defendant was retained by Ronald Powell to represent his wife, Betty Lou Powell, and her son in a federal criminal prosecution on various drug-related charges.1 Mr. Powell had been a previous client of the defendant in unrelated criminal proceedings. After Mrs. Powell and her son were arrested at the Powell residence on April 23, 1982 in connection with the narcotics charges, Mr. Powell, who was also named in the felony arrest warrant, remained a fugitive until his apprehension on August 10, 1982. On the day of his wife's arrest, Mr. Powell telephoned the defendant, Frank Prantil, and retained his services for the criminal proceedings against his immediate family. Throughout Mr. Powell's fugitive status, the defendant periodically telephoned Mr. Powell and met him on at least two occasions. 3 During their first meeting after the incarceration of Mrs. Powell, Mr. Powell presented the defendant with a partial payment of the retainer agreement and directed the defendant to the whereabouts of other sources of cash in various bank accounts and at the Powell residence. Mrs. Powell, unable to make a $750, 000 bond, remained incarcerated until the completion of her criminal trial. She gave the defendant the power of attorney to collect the funds from the various bank accounts. The defendant also retrieved a substantial sum of money from a floor safe at the Powell residence that had been overlooked at the time of the Powell family arrest. Although questions over the capacity in which Mr. Prantil retained custody of these monies (as attorney fees or in bailment for Mrs. Powell) occupied a substantial portion of the defendant's trial, we need not parse the evidence on this subject here. Pursuant to the retainer agreement negotiated by Mr. Powell, the defendant represented Mrs. Powell for the duration of her criminal trial. The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Charles Gorder. 4 Mr. Prantil succeeded in obtaining an acquittal on all but four of the fifteen criminal counts leveled against his client Mrs. Powell. During the course of his representation of Mrs. Powell, the defendant also sent his sister-in-law, Malvina Schmidt, to meet the fugitive Ronald Powell for reasons not relevant here. Within the same time frame, the defendant, on several occasions, acted as the conduit for negotiations between the fugitive Ronald Powell and Assistant U.S. Attorney Gorder for Mr. Powell's surrender. During the period when Mr. Powell was a fugitive, the defendant was summoned before a grand jury and questioned by Mr. Gorder concerning his contacts and relationship with Mr. Powell. Three of the defendant's five perjury convictions rest on responses he made to Mr. Gorder's grand jury examination. The remaining two perjury charges and the two false statement counts stem from the events surrounding the defendant's efforts to obtain Mrs. Powell's release on bond pending the appeal from her criminal conviction. For purposes of this appeal, however, we need only discuss the evidence presented on one perjury count. 5 One of the defendant's perjury convictions rests on grand jury testimony the defendant gave under questioning by Mr. Gorder regarding a trip to Omaha, Nebraska. In his testimony the defendant stated that he was picked up by a blonde woman at his hotel in Omaha, Nebraska who took him to meet Mr. Powell and then transported the defendant to the airport. The defendant further testified that he did not know the identity of this woman. At trial the government contended that the defendant committed perjury when he denied knowing the name of this woman. 6 Under the government's theory, the defendant falsely denied knowing the identity of this blonde woman in order to protect the woman from the grand jury's investigation. The government unsuccessfully sought to prove that the blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel was Malvina Schmidt, the defendant's sister-in-law. The evidence at trial revealed that although the defendant had been met and transported to a different airport by a blonde woman on a different occasion, no one picked up the defendant at his Omaha hotel. The evidence did demonstrate that the defendant eventually met his sister-in-law at a restaurant in the Omaha area. Accordingly, on appeal the government has shifted its perjury allegation by recasting the defendant's denial of knowledge about the name of the blonde woman who met him at his hotel into a denial of "knowing who was with [Mr.] Powell in the Omaha area." In response, the defendant claims his conviction should be reversed because the identity of the woman whom he incorrectly recalled to have met at his Omaha hotel is immaterial to any matters then before the grand jury and thus not perjurious. II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 7 The defendant has raised several challenges to his convictions on appeal. We reach only three of his challenges. The defendant's first allegation of error involves the refusal of the trial court to grant a pretrial motion to have the prosecutor, Mr. Gorder, recused from the case so that the defendant could call Mr. Gorder as a witness. The defendant also claims that the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of proper argument during closing argument and the defendant was thereby prejudiced. The final contention of error challenges the materiality of the defendant's allegedly perjurious statements regarding the blonde woman at the Omaha airport. 8 The defendant has also raised a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as to counts seven and eight of the indictment which charged the defendant with violations of the false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. In essence, the government presented evidence that the defendant attempted to secure the release of his client Betty Powell through the submission of an appeal bond form that the defendant knew was not authorized by the named bond company. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution we find the evidence presented sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed in the balance of the opinion, we reverse the defendant's convictions on these and the other counts of the indictment. A. The Propriety of a Prosecuting Witness 9 The prosecutor in this case, Assistant United States Attorney Charles Gorder, was also the prosecutor in the previous trial of Betty Powell. Mr. Gorder not only opposed the defendant in that trial but also conducted the examination of the defendant in both the grand jury and bond proceedings that are the subject of defendant's perjury convictions in this case. Mr. Gorder was also involved in the discussions with the bond agency as to the adequacy of Mrs. Powell's bond collateral which gave rise to the defendant's false statement convictions. Finally, on several occasions Mr. Gorder negotiated directly with the defendant for the surrender of Ronald Powell, the fugitive whom the defendant was accused of harboring and giving aid. Thus, although he never took the stand, Mr. Gorder was a witness to, and indeed a participant in, some aspect of all of the events alleged in the indictment. 10 The defendant was charged and convicted of being an accessory after the fact to Mr. Powell's criminal offenses in that the defendant did "receive, relieve, comfort and assist Ronald Lee Powell in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension, trial and punishment, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3. During trial the principal defense asserted by the defendant to this count, and the harboring a fugitive charge, revolved around the defendant's efforts to successfully negotiate Mr. Powell's surrender with Mr. Gorder. Rather than harboring or assisting Mr. Powell, the defendant contended he was actively conducting the ongoing negotiations for Mr. Powell's timely surrender through direct communications with both Mr. Gorder and Mr. Powell. Obviously, this defense hinges substantially on the availability of evidence detailing the defendant's role in these surrender negotiations. 11 Both before and during the trial defense counsel unsuccessfully moved the court to recuse the prosecutor to enable the defense to call him as a witness. After final argument the defendant moved for a mistrial because the prosecutor's remarks "reaffirm[ed] Mr. Gorder's role as a witness in the case without cross-examination, because they appeared to be, in the way that they were framed, assertions of personal knowledge based on his dealings with Mr. Prantil." At every juncture, the prosecutor refused either to recuse himself or to testify. The trial court declined to disturb the prosecutor's decision and denied, without comment, all of the defendant's motions on this matter. 12 The prosecutor defended his decision, and the trial court concurred, on the grounds that his testimony was unnecessary and cumulative to the defendant's case. We recognize that a defendant has an obligation to exhaust other available sources of evidence before a court should sustain a defendant's efforts to call a participating prosecutor as a witness. United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1982). Nonetheless, the defendant's obligation to resort to alternative means of adducing factual testimony is not absolute. Both the quality and quantity of the alternate sources of evidence are proper subjects for comparison with that sought directly from the participating prosecutor. For example, in this case the prosecutor contends that his testimony on the defendant's efforts to arrange for the surrender of the fugitive Ron Powell was unnecessary and cumulative because the defendant could have presented some testimony on this point through an FBI agent who listened to some, but not all, of the relevant discussions. The prosecutor also avers that the defendant himself was available to testify as to any conversations for which there are no other witnesses besides the defendant and the prosecutor. The true worth of the prosecutor's generous suggestion that the defendant himself testify in order to "exhaust" all other sources of testimony, however, becomes self-evident when the prosecutor subsequently portrays the defendant's testimony as self-serving and "sleazy" in his summation before the jury. 13 Regardless of the prosecutor's view of the utility of his own testimony, the district judge is charged with the responsibility of making determinations as to the materiality of witness testimony. In so doing, the court must honor the defendant's constitutional rights under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The unequivocal admonition of the Supreme Court on this point bears repetition here: 14 The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. | ||||||||
do not tread on me
Astoria,#2Author of original report
Sat, July 31, 2010
The California Supreme Court has quietly ended one of San Diego
County's more clamorous legal careers. The court this month upheld the disbarment of Frank George
Prantil, a well-known attorney and aspiring politician before being convicted of
perjury and forgery charges and spending 14 months in prison. "At one time, he was considered one of the county's top defense
attorneys," said attorney Eugene Iredale, who once represented Prantil. "Somehow
his life just fell apart on him." Now living outside Sacramento, the 51-year-old Prantil said he
was "devastated" by the court's rejection of his plea that he was unfairly
convicted. And he repeated his oft-made accusation that he was victimized
because of his maverick ways. "I'm a victim of the war on drugs," Prantil said. "The
prosecutors and the courts can't stand it when someone insists that all
defendants have rights." In nearly two decades as a practicing attorney, the San Diego
native was never far from the headlines. He won several high-publicity felony
cases and big-money damage suits. He defended a San Diego councilman indicted in
the Yellow Cab scandal. Reporters loved his flamboyant rhetoric (he favored Shakespeare
and the classics) and brash attire (he wore an American flag tie to court). His
practice boomed. He moved from East County to a comfortable spread in La
Jolla. But there were also political defeats, angry public disputes,
money problems and his final slide into Vacaville state prison. He concedes now
that alcohol and marijuana played a role in his difficulties. He lost races for Congress (1968), district attorney (1970) and
El Cajon Municipal Court (1978). The County Bar Assn. branded him as
unqualified. The State Bar in 1979 suspended him for six months for misusing a
client's money. He was convicted in 1983 of forgery and perjury in a case
involving a bogus $53,000 check and, in 1986, of being an accessory to a cocaine
conspiracy. Released from prison in 1987, Prantil says he will never return to
San Diego County: "They rode me out on a rail." He says that Deputy Dist. Atty. Bob Sullivan had a vendetta
against him. Sullivan says that's bunk and notes that two juries convicted
Prantil on a number of counts. From his self-imposed exile, Prantil tries not to dwell on how
far he has fallen. "I used to believe in ultimate justice," he said. "I don't
anymore." A Winning T-Shirt T-shirts protesting the judge's decision will go on sale today
in 14 San Diego County outlets of Pacific Eyes and T's, the Sorrento
Valley-based T-shirt and sunglasses chain. The new shirts show a Conner-like catamaran with a large screw
through it, and a kiwi bird laughing at the sight. Price: $10. Pacific Eyes and T's has long backed Conner against
pirate-banker Michael Fay. During the September races it sold shirts saying "No
Way Fay", and "Throw Another Kiwi on the Barbie." A Well-Done Roast In Pete Wilson's latter years as mayor of San Diego, it was said
he had two goals: to learn to sing and to become governor. He took lessons and can manfully handle a tune. The second goal
eluded him, and he settled for the U. S. Senate. Now, he's trying to rectify
that with his third try at the governorship, with his likely Democratic foe
being Atty. Gen. John Van de Kamp. Thursday night the Republican Wilson was among those roasting
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) at a benefit dinner in
Oakland. He joked that he wasn't surprised to find picketers carrying
signs urging him to stay in the Senate. What did surprise him, he said, was that
one of the signs was carried by Van de Kamp. ========================================================================================== 843 F.2d 314 Frank George PRANTIL,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 86-6669. United States Court of
Appeals, Submitted Sept. 23, 1987*. Frank G. Prantil, Fair Oaks, Cal., pro
se. M. Howard Wayne, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
San Diego, Cal., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California. Before CHOY, FARRIS and HALL, Circuit
Judges. PER CURIAM: Frank George Prantil, a California state
prisoner, appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. I. Prantil, formerly an attorney in
California, was introduced to Daryl Bell by his client Melvin Goins. Prantil
agreed to represent Bell on a criminal charge. A few weeks later a woman purporting to be
Bell's mother asked Prantil to help her negotiate an escrow check from which
Prantil would receive his fee. Prantil accompanied the woman to his bank
where he informed the teller that the woman was his client's mother and that he
wanted to deposit the check into his trust account. The woman signed the
check, which was made payable to Joanna F. McKnight, and Prantil endorsed it to
his trust account. Neither Prantil nor the woman indicated that the check
might not be genuine. Subsequently, the owner of an escrow
agency discovered that three checks were missing from her office. One of the
checks had been made out to Joanna F. McKnight and deposited in Prantil's
account. The agent's signature had been forged on the
check. Prantil was charged with
forgery in violation of Section 470 of the California Penal Code. At
trial, Prantil argued he knew nothing of the forgery, and that he had deposited
the check merely for collection purposes to see whether it was genuine.To establish that Prantil knew the escrow check was forged, the
prosecution introduced evidence concerning four trust deeds which Prantil had
prepared. Prantil had received information suggesting that the four deeds were
forged and that Goins and Bell, were responsible for the
forgeries. Prantil was convicted of
forgery and sentenced to two years in prison. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. People v. Prantil, 169 Cal.App.3d 592, 215 Cal.Rptr. 372 (1985). The
California Supreme Court denied review and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Prantil v. California, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1381, 89
L.Ed.2d 606 (1986).1 Prantil filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court. The district court summarily denied the petition. This
court granted Prantil's application for a certificate of probable
cause.2 II. Prantil contends that numerous trial court errors
and a district court delay in deciding his habeas petition denied him due
process. This court reviews de novo a district court's
denial of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Turner v. Compoy,
827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir.1987). This court presumes the state court's findings
of fact to be correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). III. Prantil contends he was denied due process because
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he passed
the forged escrow check "as true and genuine."3 This court determines whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979). The evidence established that
Prantil received information prior to the transaction which suggested that Goins
and Bell were involved in a forgery scheme. He also knew that one of the
possible victims of the scheme was Joanna McKnight, who was described to him as
an elderly woman between the ages of 78 and 80. Yet, despite this knowledge,
when Prantil deposited the escrow check into his trust account he did not inform
the teller that the check might be a forgery or that the woman with him, who
appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years of age, might not be the person
whose name appeared on the check. He merely endorsed the check and asked that it
be deposited into his account. Prantil's knowledge of the
previous forgeries and the contradictory descriptions of McKnight could have led
the jury to reasonably conclude that by failing to alert the bank, Prantil was
attempting to pass the check "as true and genuine." See People v. Williams, 186 Cal.App.2d 420,
424, 8 Cal.Rptr. 871, 873 (1960) (tender of check purporting to be signed by
specific person established "true and genuine" requirement). Thus, the district
court did not err in the determining there was sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to find that the "true and genuine" requirement was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. IV. Prantil contends that the trial court deprived him
of due process by giving two erroneous jury instructions. This court evaluates jury instructions "in the
context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial
process." Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469
U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). To warrant habeas relief, the
instruction cannot be merely "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally
condemned,' " but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38
L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Moreover, the petitioner in a habeas proceeding has the
burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction "so infected the entire
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Darnell v. Swinney,
823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.1987), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 1,
1987). Prantil challenges the trial court's instruction
regarding the elements of forgery. He contends that by omitting the "true and
genuine" requirement, the trial court denied him his due process right to have
the jury consider each element of the charged offense. See Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87-88, 103 S.Ct. 969, 978, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983)
(instruction on presumption of intent reversible error because permitted jury to
convict defendant without examining evidence concerning essential element of
crime). The trial court gave the following instructions on
the elements of forgery: Now, in order to prove the commission of such crime [forgery],
each of the following elements must be proved, each of them. Here we
go. Number one, that a person passed or offered to pass a forged
instrument. That is the first one. Two that such person knew that the instrument was forged; and
three, that such person passed or offered to pass such instrument with the
specific intent to defraud another person or persons. Although the instruction omitted the "true and
genuine" requirement, we consider the instruction in conjunction with the other
instructions. See Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1239. Prior to giving the challenged
instruction the court told the jury: Now, every person with the specific intent to
defraud--now, remember that I told you 'specific intent.' That's it. That's
specific intent--with the specific intent to defraud another, utters, publishes,
passes or attempts to pass or make use--there's a lot of things here--or make
use of, as true and genuine, any false, altered, forged or counterfeited
instrument or document, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or
counterfeited, is guilty of the crime of forgery. (emphasis
added) Because the overall charge to the jury informed
them of the true and genuine requirement, Prantil was not denied his due process
right to have the jury consider every element of the crime. Prantil also contends he was denied due process
because the trial court gave an inapplicable and erroneous jury instruction on
aiding and abetting. Prantil argues that the accomplice instruction removed an
issue of intent from the jury's consideration and thus constituted reversible
error under the reasoning of Johnson and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99
S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). However, the prosecutor specifically denied that
Prantil could be guilty as an aider and abettor instead of as a principal. An
erroneous jury instruction does not merit habeas relief if the deficiencies
pertain to matters that are not in dispute and the error did not so affect the
entire trial as to deprive the defendant of due process.See
Darnell, 823 F.2d at 302-03. The trial court gave proper instructions regarding
the intent necessary to convict Prantil as a principal to the
forgery. Because the prosecution
did not present an accomplice theory, any deficiencies went to a matter that was
not in dispute. The error did not mislead the jury on a disputed issue and thus
did not so infect the trial as to deprive Prantil of due process.
Id. V. Prantil contends that the trial court denied him
due process by refusing to grant judicial use immunity to a potentially
exonerating witness. On his motion for a new trial,
Prantil claimed that Goins could testify that Goins and Bell had set up Prantil,
that Prantil was unaware that the check was stolen, and that Bell had lied to
Prantil when he said there were criminal charges pending against him. Goins had
been unavailable to testify at the trial because he was in prison on an
unrelated charge. At the new
trial hearing Goins invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to testify at the trial unless he received judicial use immunity because he was
in prison on an unrelated charge. The court denied Prantil's motion to grant
immunity to Goins. Under California law, a court may only grant
immunity on the prosecutor's request. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1324. See In re
Weber, 11 Cal.3d 703, 720, 523 P.2d 229, 240, 114 Cal.Rptr. 429, 440 (1974).
However, the prosecution's failure to request immunity violated Prantil's due
process rights if it deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See United
States v. Garner, 663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905,
102 S.Ct. 1750, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982). Here, Prantil's unsupported assertion is the only
indication that Goins would have presented exculpatory testimony had he been
granted immunity. The record contains overwhelming evidence that Prantil was not an
unwitting accomplice in the crime, much of which would not be controverted by
Goins' testimony even if that testimony is as Prantil contends it would be. For
example, Prantil knew that the woman who deposited the check in his account did
not match the description of the woman whose name appeared on the check. On
these facts, we hold that Prantil was not deprived of a fair trial. If Prantil was denied a fair trial in this
case, trial courts would be required to grant immunity simply on the basis of
unsupported allegations by criminal defendants that immunity is required by due
process. Moreover, Prantil has made no
showing that any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor caused Goins to invoke
his privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v. Lord, 711
F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir.1983). VI. Prantil contends he was denied due process because
of a twenty-month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of
the indictment. A pre-indictment delay, unlike a delay in bringing
a charged defendant to trial, is "tested by general proscriptions of due
process."4 Arnold
v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir.1978). A pre-indictment delay does not
justify habeas relief unless the defendant can show actual prejudice. Id. at
1382. To prove actual prejudice a defendant must give more than "mere assertions
that ... witnesses' memories may have faded with the passage of time...." United
States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d 60 (1985). Prantil contends that he suffered actual prejudice
because the bank teller could no longer remember the details of the escrow check
transaction. However, the state court of appeals found that the delay did not
affect the teller's memory. In addition, the court noted that Prantil was
benefited by the teller's unresponsiveness to certain questions; therefore there
was no prejudice. Prantil also claims that a seven-month delay
between the time he filed his habeas petition and the time the district court
dismissed the action violated his right to due process.5 In Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1976),
the Fifth Circuit held that a district court's procedure for handling habeas
petitions which routinely resulted in delays of up to twenty months violated due
process. However, in Satterlee v. Kritzman, 626 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir.1980), we
held that a district court's clerical error which resulted in an eight-month
delay between the dismissal of a prisoner's habeas petition and the time his
files were forwarded to the court of appeals did not deprive the
petitioner of any substantive rights. As in Satterlee, here there is no
policy of discrimination and no showing that the delay was
purposeful. VII. We conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Prantil's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. AFFIRMED. The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without
oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P.
34(a) Because Prantil's direct appeal presented the same
constitutional claims as his subsequent habeas petition, it is unnecessary for
him to have filed for state habeas relief. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528
(9th Cir.1987) Prantil was released from prison on April
20, 1987. However, because a felony conviction may cause a defendant to suffer
adverse collateral consequences even after he has served his sentence, a
defendant's release from custody prior to the completion of his federal habeas
corpus proceedings will not render his petition moot. Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). Prantil was in custody
when he filed the petition in district court, so this court retains jurisdiction
over the proceedings after he is released. Id Under California law, a person is guilty of
forgery if he passes or attempts to pass as true and genuine a forged instrument
with knowledge of the forgery and with the specific intent to defraud. Cal.
Penal Code Sec. 470; People v. Hellman, 189 Cal.App.2d 777, 778-79, 11 Cal.Rptr.
433 (1961). The only element Prantil challenges as lacking sufficient evidence
is the true and genuine requirement Once a suspect is indicted, the more stringent requirements of
the speedy trial right apply. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th
Cir.1978) Prantil first raised the issue in his brief to this court.
Ordinarily, this court will not decide an issue which was not raised at the
District Court. Bolker v. C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985). The court
may decide an issue for the first time on appeal, however, where review is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process. Id. Because a claim that a district court violated a party's due
process rights questions the integrity of the federal judicial system, we review
Prantil's claim despite his failure to raise it
below CC | Transformed by
Public.Resource.Org ========================================================================= Initially, we decline to accept the government's
contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed
perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question
concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was
asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's
depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the
activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in
light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement
to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around
the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant
focused on who picked up the defendant at the airport and who drove him back.
The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our
view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation.
The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman at the airport
could not have launched any further successful grand jury
investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this
count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there
was a woman at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's
sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant,
however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent
woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this
nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal
falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put,
if there was no blonde woman at the Omaha airport, the defendant's inability to
recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony
was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is
reversed. CONCLUSION To conclude, we reverse defendant's perjury
conviction on Count Six of the indictment because the allegedly perjurious
statements lack materiality. We reverse and remand the defendant's remaining
convictions on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to recuse the participating prosecutor as a material witness and on the
ground of prosecutorial misconduct in the government's closing
argument. =========================================== In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his
role in the case as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy
system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United
States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's
explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected
represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped
statement that "I have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains
to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing
his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added) ========================================== Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K.
Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San
Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for
defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern
District of California. Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and
JAMESON,* District Judge. FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the
closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous
by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed
from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The
prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that
results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under
litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal
knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized
attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's
summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy,"6 "corrupt," "dishonest," and "sleazy." The
prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum
standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As
such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a
bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to
account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the
ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true,
thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general
rule." These comments came from an individual who was not
only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to
appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative
character. ========================================= (1984). Hence, we must decide whether the
defendant's testimony was material. Initially, we decline to accept the government's
contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed
perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question
concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was
asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's
depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the
activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in
light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement
to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around
the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant
focused on who picked up the defendant at his hotel and who drove him back to
the Omaha Airport. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't
recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand
jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent
woman could not have launched any further successful grand jury
investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this
count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there
was a woman who met him at his hotel and that this woman was the defendant's
sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant,
however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent
woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this
nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal
falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put,
if there was no blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel and drove him to
the airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial.
Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that
the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed. =========================================== http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ See United States v. Powell, 708
F.2d 455 (9th
Cir.1983), rev'd in part, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984).
Betty Powell was convicted on four counts of a fifteen-count indictment which
had alleged that she conspired with her husband and son to distribute cocaine.
She was acquitted on all substantive conspiracy counts. Three of her four
convictions, those alleging the use of a telephone to facilitate drug offenses,
were subsequently reversed on appeal, United States v. Powell, 708
F.2d 455 (9th
Cir.1983), but then reinstated by the Supreme Court, United States v. Powell,
--- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
931, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61 L.Ed.2d 300
(1979) In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his
role in the case as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy
system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United
States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's
explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected
represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped
statement that "I have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains
to the jury, "He talks about he's just pickin do not tread on me #3Author of original report Sat, July 31, 2010
The California Supreme Court has quietly ended one of San Diego
County's more clamorous legal careers. The court this month upheld the disbarment of Frank George
Prantil, a well-known attorney and aspiring politician before being convicted of
perjury and forgery charges and spending 14 months in prison. "At one time, he was considered one of the county's top defense
attorneys," said attorney Eugene Iredale, who once represented Prantil. "Somehow
his life just fell apart on him." Now living outside Sacramento, the 51-year-old Prantil said he
was "devastated" by the court's rejection of his plea that he was unfairly
convicted. And he repeated his oft-made accusation that he was victimized
because of his maverick ways. "I'm a victim of the war on drugs," Prantil said. "The
prosecutors and the courts can't stand it when someone insists that all
defendants have rights." In nearly two decades as a practicing attorney, the San Diego
native was never far from the headlines. He won several high-publicity felony
cases and big-money damage suits. He defended a San Diego councilman indicted in
the Yellow Cab scandal. Reporters loved his flamboyant rhetoric (he favored Shakespeare
and the classics) and brash attire (he wore an American flag tie to court). His
practice boomed. He moved from East County to a comfortable spread in La
Jolla. But there were also political defeats, angry public disputes,
money problems and his final slide into Vacaville state prison. He concedes now
that alcohol and marijuana played a role in his difficulties. He lost races for Congress (1968), district attorney (1970) and
El Cajon Municipal Court (1978). The County Bar Assn. branded him as
unqualified. The State Bar in 1979 suspended him for six months for misusing a
client's money. He was convicted in 1983 of forgery and perjury in a case
involving a bogus $53,000 check and, in 1986, of being an accessory to a cocaine
conspiracy. Released from prison in 1987, Prantil says he will never return to
San Diego County: "They rode me out on a rail." He says that Deputy Dist. Atty. Bob Sullivan had a vendetta
against him. Sullivan says that's bunk and notes that two juries convicted
Prantil on a number of counts. From his self-imposed exile, Prantil tries not to dwell on how
far he has fallen. "I used to believe in ultimate justice," he said. "I don't
anymore." A Winning T-Shirt T-shirts protesting the judge's decision will go on sale today
in 14 San Diego County outlets of Pacific Eyes and T's, the Sorrento
Valley-based T-shirt and sunglasses chain. The new shirts show a Conner-like catamaran with a large screw
through it, and a kiwi bird laughing at the sight. Price: $10. Pacific Eyes and T's has long backed Conner against
pirate-banker Michael Fay. During the September races it sold shirts saying "No
Way Fay", and "Throw Another Kiwi on the Barbie." A Well-Done Roast In Pete Wilson's latter years as mayor of San Diego, it was said
he had two goals: to learn to sing and to become governor. He took lessons and can manfully handle a tune. The second goal
eluded him, and he settled for the U. S. Senate. Now, he's trying to rectify
that with his third try at the governorship, with his likely Democratic foe
being Atty. Gen. John Van de Kamp. Thursday night the Republican Wilson was among those roasting
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) at a benefit dinner in
Oakland. He joked that he wasn't surprised to find picketers carrying
signs urging him to stay in the Senate. What did surprise him, he said, was that
one of the signs was carried by Van de Kamp. ========================================================================================== 843 F.2d 314 Frank George PRANTIL,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 86-6669. United States Court of
Appeals, Submitted Sept. 23, 1987*. Frank G. Prantil, Fair Oaks, Cal., pro
se. M. Howard Wayne, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
San Diego, Cal., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California. Before CHOY, FARRIS and HALL, Circuit
Judges. PER CURIAM: Frank George Prantil, a California state
prisoner, appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. I. Prantil, formerly an attorney in
California, was introduced to Daryl Bell by his client Melvin Goins. Prantil
agreed to represent Bell on a criminal charge. A few weeks later a woman purporting to be
Bell's mother asked Prantil to help her negotiate an escrow check from which
Prantil would receive his fee. Prantil accompanied the woman to his bank
where he informed the teller that the woman was his client's mother and that he
wanted to deposit the check into his trust account. The woman signed the
check, which was made payable to Joanna F. McKnight, and Prantil endorsed it to
his trust account. Neither Prantil nor the woman indicated that the check
might not be genuine. Subsequently, the owner of an escrow
agency discovered that three checks were missing from her office. One of the
checks had been made out to Joanna F. McKnight and deposited in Prantil's
account. The agent's signature had been forged on the
check. Prantil was charged with
forgery in violation of Section 470 of the California Penal Code. At
trial, Prantil argued he knew nothing of the forgery, and that he had deposited
the check merely for collection purposes to see whether it was genuine.To establish that Prantil knew the escrow check was forged, the
prosecution introduced evidence concerning four trust deeds which Prantil had
prepared. Prantil had received information suggesting that the four deeds were
forged and that Goins and Bell, were responsible for the
forgeries. Prantil was convicted of
forgery and sentenced to two years in prison. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. People v. Prantil, 169 Cal.App.3d 592, 215 Cal.Rptr. 372 (1985). The
California Supreme Court denied review and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Prantil v. California, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1381, 89
L.Ed.2d 606 (1986).1 Prantil filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court. The district court summarily denied the petition. This
court granted Prantil's application for a certificate of probable
cause.2 II. Prantil contends that numerous trial court errors
and a district court delay in deciding his habeas petition denied him due
process. This court reviews de novo a district court's
denial of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Turner v. Compoy,
827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir.1987). This court presumes the state court's findings
of fact to be correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). III. Prantil contends he was denied due process because
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he passed
the forged escrow check "as true and genuine."3 This court determines whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979). The evidence established that
Prantil received information prior to the transaction which suggested that Goins
and Bell were involved in a forgery scheme. He also knew that one of the
possible victims of the scheme was Joanna McKnight, who was described to him as
an elderly woman between the ages of 78 and 80. Yet, despite this knowledge,
when Prantil deposited the escrow check into his trust account he did not inform
the teller that the check might be a forgery or that the woman with him, who
appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years of age, might not be the person
whose name appeared on the check. He merely endorsed the check and asked that it
be deposited into his account. Prantil's knowledge of the
previous forgeries and the contradictory descriptions of McKnight could have led
the jury to reasonably conclude that by failing to alert the bank, Prantil was
attempting to pass the check "as true and genuine." See People v. Williams, 186 Cal.App.2d 420,
424, 8 Cal.Rptr. 871, 873 (1960) (tender of check purporting to be signed by
specific person established "true and genuine" requirement). Thus, the district
court did not err in the determining there was sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to find that the "true and genuine" requirement was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. IV. Prantil contends that the trial court deprived him
of due process by giving two erroneous jury instructions. This court evaluates jury instructions "in the
context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial
process." Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469
U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). To warrant habeas relief, the
instruction cannot be merely "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally
condemned,' " but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38
L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Moreover, the petitioner in a habeas proceeding has the
burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction "so infected the entire
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Darnell v. Swinney,
823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.1987), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 1,
1987). Prantil challenges the trial court's instruction
regarding the elements of forgery. He contends that by omitting the "true and
genuine" requirement, the trial court denied him his due process right to have
the jury consider each element of the charged offense. See Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87-88, 103 S.Ct. 969, 978, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983)
(instruction on presumption of intent reversible error because permitted jury to
convict defendant without examining evidence concerning essential element of
crime). The trial court gave the following instructions on
the elements of forgery: Now, in order to prove the commission of such crime [forgery],
each of the following elements must be proved, each of them. Here we
go. Number one, that a person passed or offered to pass a forged
instrument. That is the first one. Two that such person knew that the instrument was forged; and
three, that such person passed or offered to pass such instrument with the
specific intent to defraud another person or persons. Although the instruction omitted the "true and
genuine" requirement, we consider the instruction in conjunction with the other
instructions. See Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1239. Prior to giving the challenged
instruction the court told the jury: Now, every person with the specific intent to
defraud--now, remember that I told you 'specific intent.' That's it. That's
specific intent--with the specific intent to defraud another, utters, publishes,
passes or attempts to pass or make use--there's a lot of things here--or make
use of, as true and genuine, any false, altered, forged or counterfeited
instrument or document, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or
counterfeited, is guilty of the crime of forgery. (emphasis
added) Because the overall charge to the jury informed
them of the true and genuine requirement, Prantil was not denied his due process
right to have the jury consider every element of the crime. Prantil also contends he was denied due process
because the trial court gave an inapplicable and erroneous jury instruction on
aiding and abetting. Prantil argues that the accomplice instruction removed an
issue of intent from the jury's consideration and thus constituted reversible
error under the reasoning of Johnson and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99
S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). However, the prosecutor specifically denied that
Prantil could be guilty as an aider and abettor instead of as a principal. An
erroneous jury instruction does not merit habeas relief if the deficiencies
pertain to matters that are not in dispute and the error did not so affect the
entire trial as to deprive the defendant of due process.See
Darnell, 823 F.2d at 302-03. The trial court gave proper instructions regarding
the intent necessary to convict Prantil as a principal to the
forgery. Because the prosecution
did not present an accomplice theory, any deficiencies went to a matter that was
not in dispute. The error did not mislead the jury on a disputed issue and thus
did not so infect the trial as to deprive Prantil of due process.
Id. V. Prantil contends that the trial court denied him
due process by refusing to grant judicial use immunity to a potentially
exonerating witness. On his motion for a new trial,
Prantil claimed that Goins could testify that Goins and Bell had set up Prantil,
that Prantil was unaware that the check was stolen, and that Bell had lied to
Prantil when he said there were criminal charges pending against him. Goins had
been unavailable to testify at the trial because he was in prison on an
unrelated charge. At the new
trial hearing Goins invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to testify at the trial unless he received judicial use immunity because he was
in prison on an unrelated charge. The court denied Prantil's motion to grant
immunity to Goins. Under California law, a court may only grant
immunity on the prosecutor's request. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1324. See In re
Weber, 11 Cal.3d 703, 720, 523 P.2d 229, 240, 114 Cal.Rptr. 429, 440 (1974).
However, the prosecution's failure to request immunity violated Prantil's due
process rights if it deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See United
States v. Garner, 663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905,
102 S.Ct. 1750, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982). Here, Prantil's unsupported assertion is the only
indication that Goins would have presented exculpatory testimony had he been
granted immunity. The record contains overwhelming evidence that Prantil was not an
unwitting accomplice in the crime, much of which would not be controverted by
Goins' testimony even if that testimony is as Prantil contends it would be. For
example, Prantil knew that the woman who deposited the check in his account did
not match the description of the woman whose name appeared on the check. On
these facts, we hold that Prantil was not deprived of a fair trial. If Prantil was denied a fair trial in this
case, trial courts would be required to grant immunity simply on the basis of
unsupported allegations by criminal defendants that immunity is required by due
process. Moreover, Prantil has made no
showing that any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor caused Goins to invoke
his privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v. Lord, 711
F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir.1983). VI. Prantil contends he was denied due process because
of a twenty-month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of
the indictment. A pre-indictment delay, unlike a delay in bringing
a charged defendant to trial, is "tested by general proscriptions of due
process."4 Arnold
v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir.1978). A pre-indictment delay does not
justify habeas relief unless the defendant can show actual prejudice. Id. at
1382. To prove actual prejudice a defendant must give more than "mere assertions
that ... witnesses' memories may have faded with the passage of time...." United
States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d 60 (1985). Prantil contends that he suffered actual prejudice
because the bank teller could no longer remember the details of the escrow check
transaction. However, the state court of appeals found that the delay did not
affect the teller's memory. In addition, the court noted that Prantil was
benefited by the teller's unresponsiveness to certain questions; therefore there
was no prejudice. Prantil also claims that a seven-month delay
between the time he filed his habeas petition and the time the district court
dismissed the action violated his right to due process.5 In Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1976),
the Fifth Circuit held that a district court's procedure for handling habeas
petitions which routinely resulted in delays of up to twenty months violated due
process. However, in Satterlee v. Kritzman, 626 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir.1980), we
held that a district court's clerical error which resulted in an eight-month
delay between the dismissal of a prisoner's habeas petition and the time his
files were forwarded to the court of appeals did not deprive the
petitioner of any substantive rights. As in Satterlee, here there is no
policy of discrimination and no showing that the delay was
purposeful. VII. We conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Prantil's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. AFFIRMED. The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without
oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P.
34(a) Because Prantil's direct appeal presented the same
constitutional claims as his subsequent habeas petition, it is unnecessary for
him to have filed for state habeas relief. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528
(9th Cir.1987) Prantil was released from prison on April
20, 1987. However, because a felony conviction may cause a defendant to suffer
adverse collateral consequences even after he has served his sentence, a
defendant's release from custody prior to the completion of his federal habeas
corpus proceedings will not render his petition moot. Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). Prantil was in custody
when he filed the petition in district court, so this court retains jurisdiction
over the proceedings after he is released. Id Under California law, a person is guilty of
forgery if he passes or attempts to pass as true and genuine a forged instrument
with knowledge of the forgery and with the specific intent to defraud. Cal.
Penal Code Sec. 470; People v. Hellman, 189 Cal.App.2d 777, 778-79, 11 Cal.Rptr.
433 (1961). The only element Prantil challenges as lacking sufficient evidence
is the true and genuine requirement Once a suspect is indicted, the more stringent requirements of
the speedy trial right apply. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th
Cir.1978) Prantil first raised the issue in his brief to this court.
Ordinarily, this court will not decide an issue which was not raised at the
District Court. Bolker v. C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985). The court
may decide an issue for the first time on appeal, however, where review is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process. Id. Because a claim that a district court violated a party's due
process rights questions the integrity of the federal judicial system, we review
Prantil's claim despite his failure to raise it
below CC | Transformed by
Public.Resource.Org ========================================================================= Initially, we decline to accept the government's
contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed
perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question
concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was
asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's
depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the
activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in
light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement
to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around
the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant
focused on who picked up the defendant at the airport and who drove him back.
The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our
view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation.
The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman at the airport
could not have launched any further successful grand jury
investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this
count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there
was a woman at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's
sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant,
however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent
woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this
nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal
falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put,
if there was no blonde woman at the Omaha airport, the defendant's inability to
recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony
was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is
reversed. CONCLUSION To conclude, we reverse defendant's perjury
conviction on Count Six of the indictment because the allegedly perjurious
statements lack materiality. We reverse and remand the defendant's remaining
convictions on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to recuse the participating prosecutor as a material witness and on the
ground of prosecutorial misconduct in the government's closing
argument. =========================================== In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his
role in the case as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy
system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United
States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's
explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected
represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped
statement that "I have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains
to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing
his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added) ========================================== Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K.
Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San
Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for
defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern
District of California. Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and
JAMESON,* District Judge. FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the
closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous
by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed
from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The
prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that
results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under
litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal
knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized
attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's
summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy,"6 "corrupt," "dishonest," and "sleazy." The
prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum
standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As
such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a
bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to
account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the
ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true,
thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general
rule." These comments came from an individual who was not
only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to
appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative
character. ========================================= (1984). Hence, we must decide whether the
defendant's testimony was material. Initially, we decline to accept the government's
contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed
perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question
concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was
asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's
depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the
activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in
light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement
to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around
the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant
focused on who picked up the defendant at his hotel and who drove him back to
the Omaha Airport. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't
recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand
jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent
woman could not have launched any further successful grand jury
investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this
count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there
was a woman who met him at his hotel and that this woman was the defendant's
sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant,
however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent
woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this
nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal
falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put,
if there was no blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel and drove him to
the airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial.
Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that
the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed. =========================================== http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ See United States v. Powell, 708
F.2d 455 (9th
Cir.1983), rev'd in part, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984).
Betty Powell was convicted on four counts of a fifteen-count indictment which
had alleged that she conspired with her husband and son to distribute cocaine.
She was acquitted on all substantive conspiracy counts. Three of her four
convictions, those alleging the use of a telephone to facilitate drug offenses,
were subsequently reversed on appeal, United States v. Powell, 708
F.2d 455 (9th
Cir.1983), but then reinstated by the Supreme Court, United States v. Powell,
--- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
931, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61 L.Ed.2d 300
(1979) In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his
role in the case as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy
system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United
States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's
explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected
represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped
statement that "I have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains
to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing
his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added) =========================================================================== PsychicHater #4UPDATE EX-employee responds Tue, July 27, 2010 New Yorker Mary Prantil is NOT a Convicted Criminal and CRIME does not run in her prestigious family. The Prantil Family is a very prestigious Family in San Diego, California with ties St Augustine High and Our Lady of Peace both Catholic High Schools that Guido Prantil helped finance and created Charities in his name. SCAM Jan Windglows has NO CRIMES on this NYC Woman, Mary Prantil and infact, the NYC woman filed POLICE report #3057 in April of 2010 on SCAMMERS Jan Windglows and her BOY-Toy Creep employee, Jim/James Morgan for Aggravated Harassment related to the Global Internet Slander that SCAM Jan Windglows just keeps on posting daily and committing the same CRIMES of harassing and stalking which is Aggravated Harassment. ps..the photo of this NYC woman in the HOT JEANS with her long gorgeous blonde hair- WOW Mary Prantil is beautiful. I looked up her REAL BLogs - WOW Mary Prantil did work at HBO and CNN - this is a serious player in Media - SCAM Jan Windglows is a SCAMMER Con-Artist that commits DECEPTION FRAUD everytime she offers to do a SPELL for MONEY!! SCAM Jan Windglows you keep committing Aggravated Harasssment and the Global Internet is witnessing your CYBER Crimes of Defamation;Aggravated Harassment. I know for FACT SCAM Jan Windglows that you have been arrested and convicted of DECEPTION FRAUD; GRAND LARCENY and Identitu Theft. The only LIAR is SCAM Jan Windglows - I used to work for SCAM Janhett T. Windglows when she lived in Florida. SCAM Jan Windglows lives in Idaho now on the run from SUMTER Florida JAIL. Hey - Jan Windglows the ADA on the case is PUBLIC information and I bet you do call him all the time. Why are posting LIES when all one has to do is READ the info you ONLY POST COURT DATES and NO CONVICTIONS - hey the next Court Date is Oct 14, 2010. Your CLIENTS Scott and Meredith are going to JAIL for filing false police reports. The NYC woman - Mary Prantil has a Clean Criminal Record - SCAM Jan Windglows caught CYBER Stalking. I used to work for SCAM Jan Windglows who taught me the trade of SCAMMING innocent ppl for SPELLS and Psychic Readings. Now I am PAID informant trying to get SCAM Jan Windglows REAL address as part of a DEAL with the SUMTER Florida Police. SPELLS DO NOT WORK !!!! SCAM Jan Windglows is a Verified Criminal for Deception FRAUD!!! do not tread on me #5Author of original report Tue, July 27, 2010 The California Supreme Court has quietly ended one of San Diego County's more
clamorous legal careers. The court this month upheld the disbarment of Frank George Prantil, a
well-known attorney and aspiring politician before being convicted of perjury
and forgery charges and spending 14 months in prison. "At one time, he was considered one of the county's top defense attorneys,"
said attorney Eugene Iredale, who once represented Prantil. "Somehow his life
just fell apart on him." Now living outside Sacramento, the 51-year-old Prantil said he was
"devastated" by the court's rejection of his plea that he was unfairly
convicted. And he repeated his oft-made accusation that he was victimized
because of his maverick ways. "I'm a victim of the war on drugs," Prantil said. "The prosecutors and the
courts can't stand it when someone insists that all defendants have rights." In nearly two decades as a practicing attorney, the San Diego native was
never far from the headlines. He won several high-publicity felony cases and
big-money damage suits. He defended a San Diego councilman indicted in the
Yellow Cab scandal. Reporters loved his flamboyant rhetoric (he favored Shakespeare and the
classics) and brash attire (he wore an American flag tie to court). His practice
boomed. He moved from East County to a comfortable spread in La Jolla. But there were also political defeats, angry public disputes, money problems
and his final slide into Vacaville state prison. He concedes now that alcohol
and marijuana played a role in his difficulties. He lost races for Congress (1968), district attorney (1970) and El Cajon
Municipal Court (1978). The County Bar Assn. branded him as unqualified. The
State Bar in 1979 suspended him for six months for misusing a client's
money. He was convicted in 1983 of forgery and perjury in a case involving a bogus
$53,000 check and, in 1986, of being an accessory to a cocaine conspiracy.
Released from prison in 1987, Prantil says he will never return to San Diego
County: "They rode me out on a rail." He says that Deputy Dist. Atty. Bob Sullivan had a vendetta against him.
Sullivan says that's bunk and notes that two juries convicted Prantil on a
number of counts. From his self-imposed exile, Prantil tries not to dwell on how far he has
fallen. "I used to believe in ultimate justice," he said. "I don't anymore." A Winning T-Shirt T-shirts protesting the judge's decision will go on sale today in 14 San
Diego County outlets of Pacific Eyes and T's, the Sorrento Valley-based T-shirt
and sunglasses chain. The new shirts show a Conner-like catamaran with a large screw through it,
and a kiwi bird laughing at the sight. Price: $10. Pacific Eyes and T's has long backed Conner against pirate-banker Michael
Fay. During the September races it sold shirts saying "No Way Fay", and "Throw
Another Kiwi on the Barbie." A Well-Done Roast In Pete Wilson's latter years as mayor of San Diego, it was said he had two
goals: to learn to sing and to become governor. He took lessons and can manfully handle a tune. The second goal eluded him,
and he settled for the U. S. Senate. Now, he's trying to rectify that with his
third try at the governorship, with his likely Democratic foe being Atty. Gen.
John Van de Kamp. Thursday night the Republican Wilson was among those roasting Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) at a benefit dinner in Oakland. He joked that he wasn't surprised to find picketers carrying signs urging him
to stay in the Senate. What did surprise him, he said, was that one of the signs
was carried by Van de Kamp. ========================================================================================== 843 F.2d 314 Frank George PRANTIL,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 86-6669. United States Court of Appeals, Submitted Sept. 23, 1987*. Frank G. Prantil, Fair Oaks, Cal., pro se. M. Howard Wayne, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Diego,
Cal., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California. Before CHOY, FARRIS and HALL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Frank George Prantil, a California state
prisoner, appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. I. Prantil, formerly an attorney in California, was introduced to Daryl Bell
by his client Melvin Goins. Prantil agreed to represent Bell on a criminal
charge. A few weeks later a woman purporting to be
Bell's mother asked Prantil to help her negotiate an escrow check from which
Prantil would receive his fee. Prantil accompanied the woman to his bank
where he informed the teller that the woman was his client's mother and that he
wanted to deposit the check into his trust account. The woman signed the
check, which was made payable to Joanna F. McKnight, and Prantil endorsed it to
his trust account. Neither Prantil nor the woman indicated that the check
might not be genuine. Subsequently, the owner of an escrow agency discovered that three checks were
missing from her office. One of the checks had been made out to Joanna F.
McKnight and deposited in Prantil's account. The agent's signature had
been forged on the check. Prantil was charged with forgery in
violation of Section 470 of the California Penal Code. At trial, Prantil
argued he knew nothing of the forgery, and that he had deposited the check
merely for collection purposes to see whether it was genuine.To establish that Prantil knew the escrow check was forged, the
prosecution introduced evidence concerning four trust deeds which Prantil had
prepared. Prantil had received information suggesting that the four deeds were
forged and that Goins and Bell, were responsible for the
forgeries. Prantil was convicted of forgery and
sentenced to two years in prison. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. People v. Prantil, 169 Cal.App.3d 592, 215 Cal.Rptr. 372 (1985). The
California Supreme Court denied review and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Prantil v. California, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1381, 89
L.Ed.2d 606 (1986).1 Prantil filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. The
district court summarily denied the petition. This court granted
Prantil's application for a certificate of probable cause.2 II. Prantil contends that numerous trial court errors and a district
court delay in deciding his habeas petition denied him due process. This court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a habeas
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528
(9th Cir.1987). This court presumes the state court's findings of fact to be
correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). III. Prantil contends he was denied due process because the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he passed
the forged escrow check "as true and genuine."3 This court determines whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The evidence established that Prantil
received information prior to the transaction which suggested that Goins and
Bell were involved in a forgery scheme. He also knew that one of the possible
victims of the scheme was Joanna McKnight, who was described to him as an
elderly woman between the ages of 78 and 80. Yet, despite this knowledge, when
Prantil deposited the escrow check into his trust account he did not inform the
teller that the check might be a forgery or that the woman with him, who
appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years of age, might not be the person
whose name appeared on the check. He merely endorsed the check and asked that it
be deposited into his account. Prantil's knowledge of the previous
forgeries and the contradictory descriptions of McKnight could have led the jury
to reasonably conclude that by failing to alert the bank, Prantil was attempting
to pass the check "as true and genuine." See People v. Williams, 186 Cal.App.2d 420,
424, 8 Cal.Rptr. 871, 873 (1960) (tender of check purporting to be signed by
specific person established "true and genuine" requirement). Thus, the district
court did not err in the determining there was sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to find that the "true and genuine" requirement was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. IV. Prantil contends that the trial court deprived him of due
process by giving two erroneous jury instructions. This court evaluates jury instructions "in the context of the
overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process." Bashor
v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 838, 105
S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). To warrant habeas relief, the instruction
cannot be merely "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned,' " but
must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Cupp
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973).
Moreover, the petitioner in a habeas proceeding has the burden of demonstrating
that an erroneous instruction "so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process." Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th
Cir.1987), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 1, 1987). Prantil challenges the trial court's instruction regarding the
elements of forgery. He contends that by omitting the "true and genuine"
requirement, the trial court denied him his due process right to have the jury
consider each element of the charged offense. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460
U.S. 73, 87-88, 103 S.Ct. 969, 978, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983) (instruction on
presumption of intent reversible error because permitted jury to convict
defendant without examining evidence concerning essential element of
crime). The trial court gave the following instructions on the elements
of forgery: Now, in order to prove the commission of such crime [forgery], each of the
following elements must be proved, each of them. Here we go. Number one, that a person passed or offered to pass a forged instrument. That
is the first one. Two that such person knew that the instrument was forged; and three, that
such person passed or offered to pass such instrument with the specific intent
to defraud another person or persons. Although the instruction omitted the "true and genuine"
requirement, we consider the instruction in conjunction with the other
instructions. See Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1239. Prior to giving the challenged
instruction the court told the jury: Now, every person with the specific intent to
defraud--now, remember that I told you 'specific intent.' That's it. That's
specific intent--with the specific intent to defraud another, utters, publishes,
passes or attempts to pass or make use--there's a lot of things here--or make
use of, as true and genuine, any false, altered, forged or counterfeited
instrument or document, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or
counterfeited, is guilty of the crime of forgery. (emphasis
added) Because the overall charge to the jury informed them of the true
and genuine requirement, Prantil was not denied his due process right to have
the jury consider every element of the crime. Prantil also contends he was denied due process because the
trial court gave an inapplicable and erroneous jury instruction on aiding and
abetting. Prantil argues that the accomplice instruction removed an issue of
intent from the jury's consideration and thus constituted reversible error under
the reasoning of Johnson and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450,
61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). However, the prosecutor specifically denied that Prantil could
be guilty as an aider and abettor instead of as a principal. An erroneous jury
instruction does not merit habeas relief if the deficiencies pertain to matters
that are not in dispute and the error did not so affect the entire trial as to
deprive the defendant of due process.See Darnell, 823 F.2d
at 302-03. The trial court gave proper instructions regarding the intent
necessary to convict Prantil as a principal to the forgery. Because the prosecution did not present an
accomplice theory, any deficiencies went to a matter that was not in dispute.
The error did not mislead the jury on a disputed issue and thus did not so
infect the trial as to deprive Prantil of due process. Id. V. Prantil contends that the trial court denied him due process by
refusing to grant judicial use immunity to a potentially exonerating
witness. On his motion for a new trial, Prantil
claimed that Goins could testify that Goins and Bell had set up Prantil, that
Prantil was unaware that the check was stolen, and that Bell had lied to Prantil
when he said there were criminal charges pending against him. Goins had been
unavailable to testify at the trial because he was in prison on an unrelated
charge. At the new trial hearing
Goins invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify at
the trial unless he received judicial use immunity because he was in prison on
an unrelated charge. The court denied Prantil's motion to grant immunity to
Goins. Under California law, a court may only grant immunity on the
prosecutor's request. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1324. See In re Weber, 11 Cal.3d 703,
720, 523 P.2d 229, 240, 114 Cal.Rptr. 429, 440 (1974). However, the
prosecution's failure to request immunity violated Prantil's due process rights
if it deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See United States v. Garner,
663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1750, 72
L.Ed.2d 161 (1982). Here, Prantil's unsupported assertion is the only indication
that Goins would have presented exculpatory testimony had he been granted
immunity. The
record contains overwhelming evidence that Prantil was not an unwitting
accomplice in the crime, much of which would not be controverted by Goins'
testimony even if that testimony is as Prantil contends it would be. For
example, Prantil knew that the woman who deposited the check in his account did
not match the description of the woman whose name appeared on the check. On
these facts, we hold that Prantil was not deprived of a fair trial. If Prantil was denied a fair trial in this
case, trial courts would be required to grant immunity simply on the basis of
unsupported allegations by criminal defendants that immunity is required by due
process. Moreover, Prantil has made no showing that
any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor caused Goins to invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d
887, 890-92 (9th Cir.1983). VI. Prantil contends he was denied due process because of a
twenty-month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of the
indictment. A pre-indictment delay, unlike a delay in bringing a charged
defendant to trial, is "tested by general proscriptions of due process."4 Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th
Cir.1978). A pre-indictment delay does not justify habeas relief unless the
defendant can show actual prejudice. Id. at 1382. To prove actual prejudice a
defendant must give more than "mere assertions that ... witnesses' memories may
have faded with the passage of time...." United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d
1400, 1405 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d
60 (1985). Prantil contends that he suffered actual prejudice because the
bank teller could no longer remember the details of the escrow check
transaction. However, the state court of appeals found that the delay did not
affect the teller's memory. In addition, the court noted that Prantil was
benefited by the teller's unresponsiveness to certain questions; therefore there
was no prejudice. Prantil also claims that a seven-month delay between the time he
filed his habeas petition and the time the district court dismissed the action
violated his right to due process.5 In Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1976), the Fifth
Circuit held that a district court's procedure for handling habeas petitions
which routinely resulted in delays of up to twenty months violated due process.
However, in Satterlee v. Kritzman, 626 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir.1980), we held
that a district court's clerical error which resulted in an eight-month delay
between the dismissal of a prisoner's habeas petition and the time his files
were forwarded to the court of appeals did not deprive the
petitioner of any substantive rights. As in Satterlee, here there is no
policy of discrimination and no showing that the delay was purposeful. VII. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Prantil's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. AFFIRMED. The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument
pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a) Because Prantil's direct appeal presented the same constitutional claims as
his subsequent habeas petition, it is unnecessary for him to have filed for
state habeas relief. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th
Cir.1987) Prantil was released from prison on April 20, 1987.
However, because a felony conviction may cause a defendant to suffer adverse
collateral consequences even after he has served his sentence, a defendant's
release from custody prior to the completion of his federal habeas corpus
proceedings will not render his petition moot. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234, 237-38, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). Prantil was in custody
when he filed the petition in district court, so this court retains jurisdiction
over the proceedings after he is released. Id Under California law, a person is guilty of forgery if he
passes or attempts to pass as true and genuine a forged instrument with
knowledge of the forgery and with the specific intent to defraud. Cal. Penal
Code Sec. 470; People v. Hellman, 189 Cal.App.2d 777, 778-79, 11 Cal.Rptr. 433
(1961). The only element Prantil challenges as lacking sufficient evidence is
the true and genuine requirement Once a suspect is indicted, the more stringent requirements of the speedy
trial right apply. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th
Cir.1978) Prantil first raised the issue in his brief to this court. Ordinarily, this
court will not decide an issue which was not raised at the District Court.
Bolker v. C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985). The court may decide an
issue for the first time on appeal, however, where review is necessary to
prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process. Id. Because a claim that a district court violated a party's due
process rights questions the integrity of the federal judicial system, we review
Prantil's claim despite his failure to raise it below CC | Transformed by
Public.Resource.Org ========================================================================= Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention,
raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by
denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning
the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or
answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of
Mr. Prantil's
actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from
the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had,
pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full
knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury
testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at
the airport and who drove him back. The defendant said that a woman, whose name
he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have
influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony
about a nonexistent woman at the airport could not have launched any further
successful grand jury investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the
indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman
at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose
identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could not
possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman. Similarly,
the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent woman, a
testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could not have
influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no blonde
woman at the Omaha airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is
immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we
hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed. CONCLUSION To conclude, we reverse defendant's perjury conviction on Count
Six of the indictment because the allegedly perjurious statements lack
materiality. We reverse and remand the defendant's remaining convictions on the
ground that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse the
participating prosecutor as a material witness and on the ground of
prosecutorial misconduct in the government's closing argument. =========================================== In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case
as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice
and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an
adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation,
contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his
attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I
have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He
talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T.
115 (emphasis added) ========================================== Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty.,
Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San Diego, Cal., for
plaintiff-appellee. Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of
California. Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON,* District Judge. FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument
reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves,
served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's
ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's
closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an
advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can
argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The
prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A
recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as
"greedy,"6 "corrupt,"
"dishonest," and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant
did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the
"advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that
"Mr. Prantil is the kind of
person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as
jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the
responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a
"crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense
attorneys are not crooks as a general rule." These comments came from an individual who was not only an
experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both
a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character. ========================================= (1984). Hence, we must decide whether the defendant's testimony
was material. Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention,
raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by
denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning
the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or
answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of
Mr. Prantil's
actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from
the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had,
pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full
knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury
testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at
his hotel and who drove him back to the Omaha Airport. The defendant said that a
woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could
not have influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate
testimony about a nonexistent woman could not have launched any further
successful grand jury investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the
indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman
who met him at his hotel and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law,
whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could
not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman.
Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent
woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could
not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no
blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel and drove him to the airport,
the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because
the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that the defendant's
conviction on Count Six is reversed. =========================================== http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ See
United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d
455 (9th Cir.1983), rev'd in part,
--- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Betty Powell was convicted
on four counts of a fifteen-count indictment which had alleged that she
conspired with her husband and son to distribute cocaine. She was acquitted on
all substantive conspiracy counts. Three of her four convictions, those alleging
the use of a telephone to facilitate drug offenses, were subsequently reversed
on appeal, United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d
455 (9th Cir.1983), but then
reinstated by the Supreme Court, United States v. Powell, --- U.S. ----, 105
S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61
L.Ed.2d 300 (1979) In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case
as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice
and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an
adversary, Frank Prantil is an
adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the
defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a
system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court.
Frank Prantil is not that
kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on
October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty
to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of
guilty on each count of the indictment. R.T. 116. In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation,
contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his
attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I
have a right to earn my living too," the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He
talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T.
115 (emphasis added) =========================================================================== Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention,
raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by
denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning
the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or
answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of
Mr. Prantil's
actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from
the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had,
pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full
knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury
testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at
the airport and who drove him back. The defendant said that a woman, whose name
he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have
influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony
about a nonexistent woman at the airport could not have launched any further
successful grand jury investigation. The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the
indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman
at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose
identity the d PsychicHater #6UPDATE EX-employee responds Mon, July 26, 2010 Do not get scammed by Jan Windglows who is a convicted Criminal for DECEPTION FRAUD, GRAND LARCENY and Identity Theft. EX-Employee Speaks OUT: Unfortunately, I worked with Jan Windglows when she lived in Bushnell Florida address 7961 Court, Bushnell Florida 352-793-2205 - last known mailing address. Current PO BOX #118 Bonners Ferry, Idaho most recent on www.bloodloveandlustspells.com 208-714-4348 www.bloodloveandlustspells.com - SCAM SITE to download Trojan Virus and STEAL your MONEY. SCAM Jan on the LAM Windglows is a Convicted Criminal and FUGITIVE from the SUMTER Bushnell County JAIL!!! SPELLS do not WORK!!! Scam Jan Windglows does no work - just takes your MONEY!!! Jan on the LAM !!! SPELLS DO NOT WORK!! SCAMMERS Jan Windglows and Jim Morgan have been reported to the Florida Police. DO NOT USE these Convicted Criminals on the LAM. http://twitter.com/JanWindglowSCAM - READ up to date Ripoff of these SCAMMERS Jan Windglows and Jim Morgan - 15 yrs Western Unionm Paypal Ripoff Scheme. BEWARE - Jan Windglows violated her SUMTER BUSHNELL COUNTY Sentence and Probation - 90 Day Jail Sentence. Hello to all who read this- this is Enchantress
Jan Windglows, owner and successful entrepreneur of my beautiful web site, www.bloodloveandlustspells.com
The person above posting against us on the
Internet is a deluded woman from New York facing a lot of criminal charges,
named Mary Prantil.
We expect her to be thrown in jail this October
hopefully sooner. She is a liar and blabber mouth, as everyone can see, and a
garbage mouth as well.
Every time she emails or calls us, we simply send
her threatening emails and phone calls to the attorney in New York currently
prosecuting her.
Mary Prantil is our "pet psycho" so to speak-
every successful business owner deals with these types of unsavory characters.
People like this freak Mary Prantil are actually twisted GROUPIES trying to ride
off our famous coat tails because it is their only claim to fame since they
cannot get a life of their own and keep messing up their own life by perpetually
getting into trouble with the law, LOL. IT IS A TWISTED AND VERY SICK
PSYCHOTIC ATTRACTION FOR CRIMINALS AND UNSAVORY CHARACTERS WHO ARE UNHAPPY AND
UNSUCCESSFUL AND CONTINUE TO GET IN TROUBLE AND DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO
CREATE SOMETHING BEAUTIFUL- they are hateful, evil, vindictive, and hate honest
people because they are unhappy and have an extremely troublesome existence and
no one can help them.
My husband James and I are here in Bonners Ferry
Idaho, anyone can call us- our phone number is 208-714-4348, just like it says
on our web sites. No one is on the lam here, lol just Mary and her CRIME RIDDEN
CLAN.
Mary would LOVE to have our home residential
address so she can make more trouble for us, but that will never happen. This
is precisely why business owners have post office boxes- to avoid psychotic
people like Mary of course, LOL.
You see, Mary is MAD because when we did her spell
work, the spells WORKED, her boyfriend wanted to marry her, and then Mary messed
up and drove her boyfriend off, and she has been blaming all her messed up
agenda on us ever since.
She also has some kind of psychotic thing going
where she makes up outlandish stories about other people about the same things
that are happening in HER life, lol. The woman needs to be put away, committed,
locked up for the rest of her life. She is 46 years old and still all she can
do is try to make trouble for innocent people.
My husband James spent countless hours on the
phone helping this woman. She did receive her spell results. She messed up her
life. Oh, well ! I have no control over what this crazy woman did to her own
life and we will not back down from her and will continue to help put her behind
bars.
So in closing, Mary is a very unhappy person,
constantly blaming her own self adversities on innocent other people. And my
husband and I are not the only ones- Mary Prantil has SEVERAL people in New York
that have pressed charges on her and are waiting for her to be
prosecuted.
For future reference, my husband and I will
continue to run our very reputable and innocent highly successful business and
continnue to defend ourselves, no matter WHAT Mary Prantil
says.
We know who we are, and we know who Mary Prantil
is.
Give me a call if any questions. By the way, I
see Mary had to actually write a long story of lies about me since she did a
background check and could not find anything on MY record,
lol.
Mary Prantil certainly has PLENTY of garbage
racked up against her huh? Just think here is a woman 46 years old that will
never be a responsible adult or lead a positive productive life. But that is
her problem now, and she has Divinity to answer for, for all her misdeeds and
her many lies and crimes.
The comical thing about all of this is, nobody
CARES what Mary Prantil writes or says. She is a liar and nobody or any of my
cleints EVER ask me who Mary Prantil even IS.
All the stories that Prantil fabricates about us
are garbage, as we have stated many times. My husband and I are very successful
honest people and we are not ruffled by anything Mary Prantil says because all
she is doing at this point is taking up bandwidth that someone else who has
something important to say could be using up here,
lol.
Concerning my home address- Mary is the reason I
will never disclose my residential address. I do not need her crazy as_ showing
up in my neighborhood, LOL. Anyone reading these threads would feel the
same.
Take care and be blessed everyone, call me and
come visit my website I have nothing to hide, lol. Come and see the new
beautiful altar my husband James and I have built to bring glory to Divinity.
In Divinity's Service,
This report is concerning Frank George Prantil
and his daughter Mary Theresa Prantil. In past reports authored by Miss
Prantil, she has stated that " I'm proud to have been the daughter of Frank G.
Prantil" and that she again "comes from a "PRESTIGIOUS" family based in the San
Diego there in the state of California.
I can't speak for the character of the rest of her family as I
don't personally know them however, I have no reason to believe them to be
anything other then reasonable and law abiding people however, I can relay what
I've read from credible sources such as transcripts from the Supreme Court,
Colleges of Frank Prantil, Attorney Generals office, State Attorneys office
legal sites etc pertaining to Frank G. Prantil.
Miss Prantil has stated that "My father got off lots of
criminals" then latter went on to say: "My father got off lots of criminals and
innocent people to", LOL. Well, I'm sure he did successfully defend some
innocent people along the way but from the looks of it, he also was instrumental
in successfully defending the trash of society such as Murders, Child Molesters,
Check Forgers, Bank Robbers etc. Upon researching the records and past legal
performance of Mr. Prantil, I was also informed that not only was he successful
in defending the scum of humanity on several occasions but went on to be
completely corrupted by the same criminals that he had been representing
throughout his practice.
It was in my research sited below, did I run across several
charges launched against Frank G. Prantil via the Supreme and Superior court
system there in California, such infractions as Perjury, Drug Poisson, Drug
Abuse, Unlawfully removing $700,000 from a Clients safe as she sat in jail
awaiting a murder trial and so fourth. Mr. Prantil also had interfered with the
homicide trial by becoming personally involved with his Client of that same
murder trial by attempting to cover for the accused so he could recover his
fees. Prantil lied blatantly on several occasions and attempted to hold up the
due process of law by filling one frivolous motion of delay right after another
just like Mary in the current charges being lodged against her by the State of
New York.
Frank Prantil was known as a greedy individual who would stop
at nothing to accomplish his goals be they of a positive or unethical nature,
JUST LIKE Mary T. Prantil his daughter, He was considered out spoken, brazened,
and ruthless just like his daughter Mary T. Prantil Internet Terrorist
Extraordinaire. So in essence and according to other legal professionals, Frank
Prantil was nothing but a GREEDY UNETHICAL Attorney that happened to like the
spotlight just like Mary. Another thing I'd like to add here. Did you know that
Frank G. Prantil was in and out of rehab centers for his uncontrolled use of
illegal narcotics ?, Did you know that he was imprisoned for 14 months for not
only botching a homicide trial, but for being an Accomplice to check FORGERY in
the commission of that crime.
As you can read in the research below, Mr. Prantil wasn't
considered a professional on any level by the courts or his peers. Mr. Prantil
was DISBARRED twice for drug, unethical activity, and leaving his Clients
holding the bag simply because they ran out of money in the middle of their
defense. Does any of this sound familiar ?, Does it sound like anything Miss
Mary T. Prantil has done in the past ?, I would say that Little Mary is the
preverbal apple that didn't fall very far from the tree, wouldn't you say ?
Well, Frank Prantil won't be bothering, SCAMMING, or ripping off his Clients any
more because he's now deceased. Good Riddance I say.
Now, we have little Mary carrying on his legacy with all of
her criminal activities such as you can view below after her fathers
information. Please view the facts below coming from the Experts and those that
had the misfortune of dealing with him first hand. Sounds like a real Gypsy Scum
Ball to me. Read the history of this Idiot and be SHOCKED and then read about
the exploits of his daughter little miss marry low life prantil, people like
this should just be locked away forever and kept from wasting the courts time
and resources.
High Court Closes Book on Colorful Legal Career
SAN DIEGO At Largehttp://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-31/local/me-603_1_high-court
PUBLIC RECORDS http://public.resource.org/
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Ninth Circuit.
Memorandum Jan. 4, 1988.
Order and
Opinion March 31, 1988.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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19
20
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27
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36
*
1
2
3
4
5
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals
that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to
compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous
role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing
arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an
advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can
argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized
attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's
summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy,"6 "corrupt," "dishonest," and "sleazy." The
prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum
standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As
such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a
bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to
account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the
ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true,
thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general
rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an
experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both
a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
30
31
32
5
6
25
29
30
1
5
6
Report Attachments
New York,
USA
SCAM MARY PRANTIL EXPOSED BY Jan Windglows - Convicted Criminal Mary Prantil DO NOT USE Mary Prantil but DO USE www.bloodloveandlustspells.com TOP SPELLCASTING SITE ON THE INTERNET Jan Windglows
Hello to all who read this- this is Enchantress
Jan Windglows, owner and successful entrepreneur of my beautiful web site, www.bloodloveandlustspells.com
The person above posting against us on the
Internet is a deluded woman from New York facing a lot of criminal charges,
named Mary Prantil.
We expect her to be thrown in jail this October
hopefully sooner. She is a liar and blabber mouth, as everyone can see, and a
garbage mouth as well.
Every time she emails or calls us, we simply send
her threatening emails and phone calls to the attorney in New York currently
prosecuting her.
Mary Prantil is our "pet psycho" so to speak-
every successful business owner deals with these types of unsavory characters.
People like this freak Mary Prantil are actually twisted GROUPIES trying to ride
off our famous coat tails because it is their only claim to fame since they
cannot get a life of their own and keep messing up their own life by perpetually
getting into trouble with the law, LOL.
My husband James and I are here in Bonners Ferry
Idaho, anyone can call us- our phone number is 208-714-4348, just like it says
on our web sites. No one is on the lam here, lol just Mary and her CRIME RIDDEN
CLAN.
Mary would LOVE to have our home residential
address so she can make more trouble for us, but that will never happen. This
is precisely why business owners have post office boxes- to avoid psychotic
people like Mary of course, LOL.
You see, Mary is MAD because when we did her spell
work, the spells WORKED, her boyfriend wanted to marry her, and then Mary messed
up and drove her boyfriend off, and she has been blaming all her messed up
agenda on us ever since.
She also has some kind of psychotic thing going
where she makes up outlandish stories about other people about the same things
that are happening in HER life, lol. The woman needs to be put away, committed,
locked up for the rest of her life. She is 46 years old and still all she can
do is try to make trouble for innocent people.
My husband James spent countless hours on the
phone helping this woman. She did receive her spell results. She messed up her
life. Oh, well ! I have no control over what this crazy woman did to her own
life and we will not back down from her and will continue to help put her behind
bars.
So in closing, Mary is a very unhappy person,
constantly blaming her own self adversities on innocent other people. And my
husband and I are not the only ones- Mary Prantil has SEVERAL people in New York
that have pressed charges on her and are waiting for her to be
prosecuted.
For future reference, my husband and I will
continue to run our very reputable and innocent highly successful business and
continnue to defend ourselves, no matter WHAT Mary Prantil
says.
We know who we are, and we know who Mary Prantil
is.
Give me a call if any questions. By the way, I
see Mary had to actually write a long story of lies about me since she did a
background check and could not find anything on MY record,
lol.
Mary Prantil certainly has PLENTY of garbage
racked up against her huh? Just think here is a woman 46 years old that will
never be a responsible adult or lead a positive productive life. But that is
her problem now, and she has Divinity to answer for, for all her misdeeds and
her many lies and crimes.
The comical thing about all of this is, nobody
CARES what Mary Prantil writes or says. She is a liar and nobody or any of my
cleints EVER ask me who Mary Prantil even IS.
All the stories that Prantil fabricates about us
are garbage, as we have stated many times. My husband and I are very successful
honest people and we are not ruffled by anything Mary Prantil says because all
she is doing at this point is taking up bandwidth that someone else who has
something important to say could be using up here,
lol.
Concerning my home address- Mary is the reason I
will never disclose my residential address. I do not need her crazy as_ showing
up in my neighborhood, LOL. Anyone reading these threads would feel the
same.
Take care and be blessed everyone, call me and
come visit my website I have nothing to hide, lol. Come and see the new
beautiful altar my husband James and I have built to bring glory to Divinity.
In Divinity's Service,
This report is concerning Frank George Prantil
and his daughter Mary Theresa Prantil. In past reports authored by Miss
Prantil, she has stated that " I'm proud to have been the daughter of Frank G.
Prantil" and that she again "comes from a "PRESTIGIOUS" family based in the San
Diego there in the state of California.
I can't speak for the character of the rest of her family as I
don't personally know them however, I have no reason to believe them to be
anything other then reasonable and law abiding people however, I can relay what
I've read from credible sources such as transcripts from the Supreme Court,
Colleges of Frank Prantil, Attorney Generals office, State Attorneys office
legal sites etc pertaining to Frank G. Prantil.
Miss Prantil has stated that "My father got off lots of
criminals" then latter went on to say: "My father got off lots of criminals and
innocent people to", LOL. Well, I'm sure he did successfully defend some
innocent people along the way but from the looks of it, he also was instrumental
in successfully defending the trash of society such as Murders, Child Molesters,
Check Forgers, Bank Robbers etc. Upon researching the records and past legal
performance of Mr. Prantil, I was also informed that not only was he successful
in defending the scum of humanity on several occasions but went on to be
completely corrupted by the same criminals that he had been representing
throughout his practice.
It was in my research sited below, did I run across several
charges launched against Frank G. Prantil via the Supreme and Superior court
system there in California, such infractions as Perjury, Drug Poisson, Drug
Abuse, Unlawfully removing $700,000 from a Clients safe as she sat in jail
awaiting a murder trial and so fourth. Mr. Prantil also had interfered with the
homicide trial by becoming personally involved with his Client of that same
murder trial by attempting to cover for the accused so he could recover his
fees. Prantil lied blatantly on several occasions and attempted to hold up the
due process of law by filling one frivolous motion of delay right after another
just like Mary in the current charges being lodged against her by the State of
New York.
Frank Prantil was known as a greedy individual who would stop
at nothing to accomplish his goals be they of a positive or unethical nature,
JUST LIKE Mary T. Prantil his daughter, He was considered out spoken, brazened,
and ruthless just like his daughter Mary T. Prantil Internet Terrorist
Extraordinaire. So in essence and according to other legal professionals, Frank
Prantil was nothing but a GREEDY UNETHICAL Attorney that happened to like the
spotlight just like Mary. Another thing I'd like to add here. Did you know that
Frank G. Prantil was in and out of rehab centers for his uncontrolled use of
illegal narcotics ?, Did you know that he was imprisoned for 14 months for not
only botching a homicide trial, but for being an Accomplice to check FORGERY in
the commission of that crime.
As you can read in the research below, Mr. Prantil wasn't
considered a professional on any level by the courts or his peers. Mr. Prantil
was DISBARRED twice for drug, unethical activity, and leaving his Clients
holding the bag simply because they ran out of money in the middle of their
defense. Does any of this sound familiar ?, Does it sound like anything Miss
Mary T. Prantil has done in the past ?, I would say that Little Mary is the
preverbal apple that didn't fall very far from the tree, wouldn't you say ?
Well, Frank Prantil won't be bothering, SCAMMING, or ripping off his Clients any
more because he's now deceased. Good Riddance I say.
Now, we have little Mary carrying on his legacy with all of
her criminal activities such as you can view below after her fathers
information. Please view the facts below coming from the Experts and those that
had the misfortune of dealing with him first hand. Sounds like a real Gypsy Scum
Ball to me. Read the history of this Idiot and be SHOCKED and then read about
the exploits of his daughter little miss marry low life prantil, people like
this should just be locked away forever and kept from wasting the courts time
and resources.
High Court Closes Book on Colorful Legal Career
SAN DIEGO At Largehttp://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-31/local/me-603_1_high-court
PUBLIC RECORDS http://public.resource.org/
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Ninth Circuit.
Memorandum Jan. 4, 1988.
Order and
Opinion March 31, 1988.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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*
1
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5
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals
that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to
compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous
role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing
arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an
advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can
argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized
attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's
summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy,"6 "corrupt," "dishonest," and "sleazy." The
prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum
standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As
such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a
bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to
account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the
ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true,
thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general
rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an
experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both
a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
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Washington,
United States of America
Criminal Jan-SCAM Janhett T. Windglows SCAM SITE www.bloodloveandlustspells.com - Jan on the LAM
Report Attachments
New York,
USA
Liar Mary Prantil- Trash Can For A Mouth
This post was written
on Monday July 26th, 2010.
Hello to all who read this- this is Enchantress Jan Windglows- I do not
live in Florida, LOL and have not for about seven years.
The person above posting against us is a deluded woman from New York
facing a lot of criminal charges, named Mary Prantil.
We expect her to be thrown in jail this October hopefully sooner. She
is a liar and blabber mouth, as everyone can see, and a garbage mouth as well.
Every time she emails or calls us, we simply send her threatening emails and
phone calls to the attorney in New York currently prosecuting her.
Mary Prantil is our "pet psycho" so to speak. Hello, Mary ! My husband
James and I are here in Bonners Ferry Idaho, anyone can call us- our phone
number is 208-714-4348, just like it says on our web sites.
Mary would LOVE to have our home residential address so she can make
more trouble for us, but that will never happen. This is precisely why business
owners have post office boxes- to avoid psychotic people like Mary of course,
LOL.
You see, Mary is MAD because when we did her spell work, the spells
WORKED, her boyfriend wanted to marry her, and then Mary messed up and drove her
boyfriend off, and she has been blaming all her messed up agenda on us ever
since.
She also has some kind of psychotic thing going where she makes up
outlandish stories about other people about the same things that are happening
in HER life, lol. The woman needs to be put away, committed, locked up for the
rest of her life. She is 46 years old and still all she can do is try to make
trouble for innocent people.
My husband James spent countless hours on the phone helping this
woman. She did receive her spell results. She messed up her life. Oh, well !
I have no control over what this crazy woman did to her own life and we will not
back down from her and will continue to help put her behind bars.
So in closing, Mary is a very unhappy person, constantly blaming her
own self adversities on innocent other people. And my husband and I are not the
only ones- Mary Prantil has SEVERAL people in New York that have pressed charges
on her and are waiting for her to be prosecuted.
For future reference, my husband and I will continue to run our very
reputable and innocent highly successful business and continnue to defend
ourselves, no matter WHAT Mary Prantil says.
We know who we are, and we know who Mary Prantil is.
Give me a call if any questions. By the way, I see Mary had to
actually write a long story of lies about me since she did a background check
and could not find anything on MY record, lol.
Mary Prantil certainly has PLENTY of garbage racked up against her
huh? Just think here is a woman 46 years old that will never be a responsible
adult or lead a positive productive life. But that is her problem now, and she
has Divinity to answer for, for all her misdeeds and her many lies and
crimes.
The comical thing about all of this is, nobody CARES what Mary Prantil
writes or says. She is a liar and nobody or any of my cleints EVER ask me who
Mary Prantil even IS.
All the stories that Prantil fabricates about us are garbage, as we
have stated many times. My husband and I are very successful honest people and
we are not ruffled by anything Mary Prantil says because all she is doing at
this point is taking up bandwidth that someone else who has something important
to say could be using up here, lol.
Concerning my home address- Mary is the reason I will never disclose my
residential address. I do not need her crazy as_ showing up in my neighborhood,
LOL. Anyone reading these threads would feel the same.
Take care and be blessed everyone, call me and come visit my website I
have nothing to hide, lol. Come and see the new beautiful altar my husband
James and I have built to bring glory to Divinity.
In Divinity's Service,This report is concerning Frank George Prantil and his
daughter Mary Theresa Prantil. In past reports authored by Miss Prantil, she
has stated that " I'm proud to have been the daughter of Frank G. Prantil" and
that she again "comes from a "PRESTIGIOUS" family based in the San Diego there
in the state of California.I can't speak for the character of the rest of her family as I don't
personally know them however, I have no reason to believe them to be
anything other then reasonable and law abiding people however, I can relay what
I've read from credible sources such as transcripts from the Supreme Court,
Colleges of Frank Prantil, Attorney Generals office, State Attorneys office
legal sites etc pertaining to Frank G. Prantil.
Miss Prantil has stated that "My father got off lots of criminals" then
latter went on to say: "My father got off lots of criminals and innocent people
to", LOL. Well, I'm sure he did successfully defend some innocent people along
the way but from the looks of it, he also was instrumental in successfully
defending the trash of society such as Murders, Child Molesters, Check Forgers,
Bank Robbers etc. Upon researching the records and past legal performance of Mr.
Prantil, I was also informed that not only was he successful in defending the
scum of humanity on several occasions but went on to be completely corrupted by
the same criminals that he had been representing throughout his practice.
It was in my research sited below, did I run across several charges
launched against Frank G. Prantil via the Supreme and Superior court system
there in California, such infractions as Perjury, Drug Poisson, Drug Abuse,
Unlawfully removing $700,000 from a Clients safe as she sat in jail awaiting a
murder trial and so fourth. Mr. Prantil also had interfered with the homicide
trial by becoming personally involved with his Client of that same murder trial
by attempting to cover for the accused so he could recover his fees. Prantil
lied blatantly on several occasions and attempted to hold up the due process of
law by filling one frivolous motion of delay right after another just like Mary
in the current charges being lodged against her by the State of New York.
Frank Prantil was known as a greedy individual who would stop at nothing to
accomplish his goals be they of a positive or unethical nature, JUST LIKE Mary
T. Prantil his daughter, He was considered out spoken, brazened, and ruthless
just like his daughter Mary T. Prantil Internet Terrorist Extraordinaire. So in
essence and according to other legal professionals, Frank Prantil was nothing
but a GREEDY UNETHICAL Attorney that happened to like the spotlight just like
Mary. Another thing I'd like to add here. Did you know that Frank G. Prantil was
in and out of rehab centers for his uncontrolled use of illegal narcotics ?, Did
you know that he was imprisoned for 14 months for not only botching a homicide
trial, but for being an Accomplice to check FORGERY in the commission of that
crime.
As you can read in the research below, Mr. Prantil wasn't considered a
professional on any level by the courts or his peers. Mr. Prantil was DISBARRED
twice for drug, unethical activity, and leaving his Clients holding the bag
simply because they ran out of money in the middle of their defense. Does any of
this sound familiar ?, Does it sound like anything Miss Mary T. Prantil has done
in the past ?, I would say that Little Mary is the preverbal apple that didn't
fall very far from the tree, wouldn't you say ? Well, Frank Prantil won't be
bothering, SCAMMING, or ripping off his Clients any more because he's now
deceased. Good Riddance I say.
Now, we have little Mary carrying on his legacy with all of her criminal
activities such as you can view below after her fathers information. Please view
the facts below coming from the Experts and those that had the misfortune of
dealing with him first hand. Sounds like a real Gypsy Scum Ball to me. Read the
history of this Idiot and be SHOCKED and then read about the exploits of his
daughter little miss marry low life prantil, people like this should just be
locked away forever and kept from wasting the courts time and resources.
High Court Closes Book on Colorful Legal Career
SAN DIEGO At Largehttp://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-31/local/me-603_1_high-court
PUBLIC RECORDS http://public.resource.org/
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent-Appellee.
Ninth
Circuit.
Memorandum
Jan. 4, 1988.
Order and Opinion March 31, 1988.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
*
1
2
3
4
5
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A
review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his
statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound
the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as
both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments
illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through
his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury
based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The
prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A
recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as
"greedy,"6 "corrupt,"
"dishonest," and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant
did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the
"advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that
"Mr. Prantil is the kind of
person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as
jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the
responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a
"crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense
attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced
prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a
participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
30
31
32
5
6
25
29
30
1
5
6
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A
review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his
statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound
the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as
both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments
illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through
his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury
based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The
prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A
recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as
"greedy,"6 "corrupt,"
"dishonest," and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant
did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the
"advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that
"Mr. Prantil is the kind of
person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as
jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the
responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a
"crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense
attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced
prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a
participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary
throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury
examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury
convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor
drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder
informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant
committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a
number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal
knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
30
Washington,
United States of America
Jan Windglows CRIMINAL - Inmate at Sumter Bushnel Couty JAIL -
Report Attachments
➤
//
